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Introduction
“The master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts. ... He must be
mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher in some degree. He must understand
symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular, in terms of the general,
and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present
in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his
institutions must be entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested
in a simultaneous mood, as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near to
earth as a politician.”
John Maynard Keynes
Research in economics is closely related to public policy. This applies particularly to
labor economics where researchers often aim to shed light on the causal effect of either
a policy intervention (for example the introduction of a minimum wage or the abolish-
ment of a tuition) or an individual choice variable (e.g. child care utilization) on labor
market outcomes such as labor force participation or income (Van Der Klaauw 2014).
Questions like “Does free child care facilitate maternal labor force participation?”, “Does
employing people performing community service in hospitals support patient health?” or
“Who benefits from a liberal citizenship policy?” are equally important to economists
and politicians.
To illuminate such questions it is important to provide reliable econometric estimates
on the relationship between causes and effects. This, however, can be quite challenging.
Considering the potential outcomes model developed by Rubin (1974), based on earlier
work by Neyman (Neyman and Iwaszkiewicz 1935), helps to understand why. The model
illustrates that each individual can be observed in two states: the state where it did not
obtain treatment and the state where it did. One can think of treatment as a medical
treatment or a change of rules and regulations - a policy change. Rubin (1974) calls
1
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these states potential outcomes. The difference between these two potential outcomes is
the causal effect for an individual of participating in the treatment. Since each person
is either treated or untreated only one of the two potential outcomes can be observed.
Thus, it is simply impossible to directly observe the treatment effect for an individual.
Instead, the treatment effect is unobservable which the economist calls an unobserved
random variable. Holland (1986), one of Rubin’s students, famously described this fact
as the fundamental problem of causal inference.
The gold standard for the identification of a causal effect of an intervention is the observa-
tion of treated and untreated control units in a randomized controlled experiment (Athey
and Imbens 2017). Such experiments provide data where by randomization the units that
are exposed to an intervention, i.e. treated, in expectation are the same as those who
are not. The difference between the average outcome of the treated and untreated can
be interpreted as an unbiased estimate of the average causal effect (Average Treatment
Effect (ATE)). Thus, these experiments overcome the fundamental problem of causal in-
ference by approximating the individual treatment effect by an average treatment effect.
Initially conducted in medical and psychological science, economic research has discov-
ered the value of randomized controlled lab and field experiments decades ago (Deaton
and Cartwright 2018). Yet, there are many settings where experimentally testing policy
interventions in randomized experiments is too costly or politically not feasible. Think,
for instance, of randomly allocating citizenship to migrants to learn about the effects of
naturalization on educational success or forcing hospitals to hire or lay off medical staff
to study how labor and capital interact in treating patients. Still, policy decisions on
these and similar questions have to be made and reliable empirical evidence is needed to
inform these decisions. Economists, in particular labor economists, have been very active
in developing and adapting microeconometric methods to provide evidence in settings
where controlled experiments are not feasible (Van Der Klaauw 2014).
This thesis consists of three essays drawing on these concepts. It provides empirical ev-
idence from actual policy changes in rather distinct areas of labor economics: health,
education and migration. Each essay analyses an actual policy change and exploits a dif-
ferent identification strategy to derive empirical estimates on economic questions relevant
to policy makers.
The first essay “Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production: Evidence from the Suspen-
sion of Compulsory Military Service in Germany” analyses the relationship between low-
skilled labor, capital input and hospital production. In particular, it discusses questions
like “How do low-skilled employees contribute to health care production in the highly
professionalized setting of German hospitals?” and “How does low-skilled labor input
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interact with capital input as, for instance, medical equipment and drugs?” and “How
does a different ratio between labor and capital input alter the productivity of hospitals
for example in terms of patient’s health (numbers of patients treated successfully, death
rates etc.)?”.
The second essay “Free Universal Daycare: Effects on Children and Maternal Labor Sup-
ply” analyses the effects of free universal daycare on childcare attendance, maternal labor
supply and child development. Specifically, it discusses questions like “How does the intro-
duction of free public daycare affect childcare arrangements?”, “Does offering free daycare
facilitate maternal labor supply?” and “What is the effect of access to free daycare on
children?”.
Finally, the third essay “Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill Development” provides
evidence on whether the option to naturalize improves educational outcomes of migrant’s
children. It sheds light on questions like “Who takes the opportunity to naturalize when
citizenship policy is liberalized?”, “Who benefits from citizenship in terms of educational
outcomes?”and “Under which circumstances could a reform of immigration policy carry
additional net benefits for children?”.
Gaining insights in these questions is relevant to economists and policy makers alike. Let
us consider why for each essay in more detail:
Consider, for instance, the first essay “Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production: Evidence
from the Suspension of Compulsory Military Service in Germany”. Labor is not only a
very crucial input factor in health care production, labor of health care professionals is
also an important economic factor. Health worker’s wages account for more than half
of health care spending, whereas health care sector employment accounts for 10% of the
total workforce in OCED-countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment) (OECD 2016). Considering the growing demand for health and care services, it
is of increasing importance to assess how different types of labor function and interact,
for one thing, with each other and, for another thing, with capital input in health care
production. Yet, despite the importance and topicality of this issue, data limitations
and endogeneity concerns have largely prevented the existing literature from providing
clear cut evidence on the causal relationship between hospital staffing and production
(Friedrich and Hackmann 2017).
A similar line of argument applies to the second essay “Free Universal Daycare: Effects
on Children and Maternal Labor Supply”. Many governments have expanded their social
policies in the area of early childcare and education. While countries like France, Sweden,
Norway or Denmark have long offered universal access to public childcare, others like Ger-
many, Spain, Canada or the US have expanded public daycare and pre-K programs much
more recently - beginning in the 1990s. Proponents of such policies argue that money
3
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invested in early childhood education is well spend as it would simultaneously boost the
human capital development of preschool children and encourage female labor supply. Yet,
the empirical evidence on the link between daycare availability and maternal labor supply
is still mixed.
The third essay discusses “Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill Development” : Over
recent decades, many developed countries have accumulated sizable immigrant popula-
tions. In 2017, the foreign-born made up 15.5 percent of the population in Germany,
almost 13 percent in France and even close to 30 percent in Switzerland (OECD 2018a).
At the same time, immigrants often seem to perform poorly compared to natives and
sometimes are not able to catch up over generations. Previous evidence has shown that
a liberal citizenship policy improves the labor market position, especially of immigrant
women (Gathmann and Keller 2018). Yet, it remains unclear if positive effects on the first
generation of immigrants carry over to immigrants’ children. This is relevant to ensure
equal opportunities for migrants and natives alike but is also of interest to policy mak-
ers because a disadvantaged economic position reduces the fiscal benefits of immigration
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Systematic differences might threaten the social cohesion of
host countries producing hostility among natives as well as immigrants.
While each of the essays contributes to a different literature in the field of labor eco-
nomics all three of them rely on observational data, i.e. data from policies that were not
implemented randomly (Athey and Imbens 2017). Potential data sources containing the
necessary information are, for instance, surveys (Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), National
Educational Panel Study (NEPS)), administrative records (Hospital and Patient Statis-
tics) or (digital) protocols (consumption data, scraped data). The identification of causal
effects from observational data, however, can be quite challenging.1 Consider, for exam-
ple, the introduction of minimum wages, as discussed many times in economic literature,
very recently also in a paper by Athey and Imbens (2017): A researcher interested in the
causal effect of minimum wages on employment might observe the introduction of high
minimum wages on a state level in some states while other states do not implement any
or only low minimum wages. It is plausible that states with higher costs of living and less
price-sensitive consumers are those that implement higher minimum wages. At the same
time, employers in these states might also be more able to pass on higher production costs
to consumers without losing too much business. This does not need to be true in states
where living costs are low and consumers are more price-sensitive. The latter states might
choose a lower level of minimum wages. If a researcher interested in the effect of a higher
minimum wage on employment followed the approach of randomized controlled studies
1Refer to Deaton and Cartwright (2018) for some reflective thoughts on causal inference based on
randomized controlled experiments.
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and naively compared the average employment level of states with a high minimum wage
to that of states with a low minimum wage he or she would not obtain a credible estimate
of the causal effect of an increase in minimum wages.
Observational data almost never provide a control group that, in expectation, is the same
as the treatment group offhand. In the vast majority of cases the policy is not randomly
implemented, data on treatment as well as potential control units is possibly confounded
by simultaneous events and the independent variable is not manipulated by the researcher.
The key to success with observational data is to search for exogenous variation in treat-
ment assignment to obtain a natural experiment or quasi-experiment, i.e. variation in
treatment participation that is not related in any way to the outcome of interest (Van
Der Klaauw 2014). A starting point for such a search could, for instance, be an age based
cut-off rule, regional or temporal variation in policy implementation or variation in treat-
ment intensity due to pre-determined characteristics. Often exogenous variation stems
from institutional rules causing almost identical individuals to be exposed to different
treatment schemes (Van Der Klaauw 2014).
The first essay of this dissertation, for instance, uses the suspension of military drafting
in Germany to advance our understanding of labor in hospital production. How can the
suspension of drafting help shedding light on this? Germany followed the international
trend towards a professional army when it indefinitely suspended the compulsory military
service in 2011. As a consequence, the number of draftees decreased dramatically over
the course of a year. This also led to a sudden drop in hospital staffing because by law
(Zivildienstgesetz) draftees were allowed to serve in a “position for the common good”, i.e.
perform some type of community service instead of joining the armed forces (“conscien-
tious objection”). Opting for community service was very common such that, at the time
of the suspension, 6% of the care staff in general hospitals were young men performing
community service. Yet, not all hospitals employed people performing community service
before the policy change. This enables me to divide the population of German hospitals
into a treatment and a control group.
The second essay of this thesis exploits regional variation as well as age and temporal
variation in policy implementation from the adoption of free daycare policies in West
Germany between 2007 and 2016. Regional variation stems from the fact that nine out of
eleven states adopted a free daycare policy. The timing of adoption within states gener-
ates additional variation by birth cohorts of children. Finally, the policies cover different
age groups. While all reform states introduced free daycare for the last year prior to
school entry (“kindergarten”), some states introduced more comprehensive reforms cov-
ering children aged between 2 and 5 (“pre-K”). Consequentially, children who were not
eligible for free child care because of their age or place of residence can serve as a control
5
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group here.
Finally, the third essay relies on variation in eligibility for citizenship across migrants’
arrival year in Germany and their birth cohort. The variation is induced by two reforms
in citizenship law which together defined four routes to citizenship for children of immi-
grants: birthright citizenship, an associated transitional rule, eligibility through parents
and individual eligibility. The first reform, taking place in 1991, defined age-dependent
residency requirements for naturalization. Consequently, younger and older immigrants
arriving in the same year potentially faced different waiting periods until they were al-
lowed to apply for citizenship. Additional variation is obtained from the second reform,
implemented in 2000, that allowed all immigrants to apply for citizenship after 8 years
regardless of their age and on top of that introduced citizenship by birth. The estimation
approach then implements a marginal treatment effects framework using the various eli-
gibility indicators as instruments.
Identifying feasible exogenous variation is key but only the first step. To establish causal
effects exogenous variation has to be paired with the appropriate econometric approach
which jointly is often described as an identification strategy, i.e. a way to use observational
data to approximate a randomized controlled experiment. To be able to provide credi-
ble estimates of causal effects from observational data labor economists have been very
active in developing and refining micro econometric methods and identification strate-
gies in the last fifty years. By this time, the policy evaluation toolbox contains several
non-experimental and quasi-experimental identification strategies. Around these methods
and strategies a sizeable literature has evolved. The same is true for their applications.
Van Der Klaauw (2014) provides a brief history of the methods developed in empirical
labor economics and discusses several important applications for each of them, whereas
Athey and Imbens (2017), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a),
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) among others, discuss the recent developments in causal-
ity and policy evaluation, at times even in textbook extension (Imbens and Rubin 2015).
The choice of the appropriate approach eventually depends on the treatment assignment
mechanism and data availability (Van Der Klaauw 2014).
The first and second essay in this thesis rely on variants of a difference-in-difference ap-
proach, whereas the third essay exploits a marginal treatment effect framework to identify
the effect of the policy. Thus, all three essays presented in this thesis build on this by
now rather mature literature. To see how the papers arrive at their results and how they
relate to the previous work in their particular field of literature let us consider each of the
essays in more detail:
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Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production:
Evidence from the Suspension of Compulsory Military Service in Germany
The analysis of natural experiments demands detailed information regarding cause and
context of the exogenous variation and a sufficient number of observations at the margin
of the natural experiment (Van Der Klaauw 2014). Oftentimes, surveys do not fulfill these
requirements. Thus, facilitated by the increasing digitization of administrative records,
using administrative data became increasingly popular in the last years. Chapter 1 of this
dissertation follows this trend by using administrative data from the German Hospital and
Patient Statistics, a data set established to monitor and plan hospitals by governmental
authorities. This data set provides detailed information on the universe of general hospi-
tals of the country and the vast majority of their patients; for some outcomes even with
daily precision.
This essay provides results on three different sets of outcomes. Firstly, I show that hos-
pitals were able to maintain their output levels in terms of quantity as well as in terms
of measurable quality, when people performing community service dropped out of their
workforce. This applies to a wide set of objective outcomes, such as numbers of in- and
out-patients treated and overall care days performed. Considering patient outcomes shows
that neither patients’ duration of stay nor their likelihood of dying in the hospital or being
referred to another hospital was affected on the hospital level. However, when individual
patients are considered, there is some evidence for an adverse effect on durations of stay.
Although statistically significant it is not sizable enough to level the overall time trend of
decreasing durations of stay. Secondly, medical institutions did not alter their contracted
labor input in measurable ways. The loss in people performing community service was
neither compensated by training more apprentices nor by hiring more nurses or any other
staff group related to patient treatment. Yet, thirdly, evidence on hospital expenditure
shows that staffing costs increased, either due to hours worked overtime or higher salaries.
I also show that expenditure on material costs (including medical consumables like drugs,
bandages, instruments, therapeutic appliances, blood and plasma) went up as a conse-
quence of the drop out of low-skilled labor, indicating that hospitals switched to a more
capital intensive production. This is of interest because a more capital intensive pro-
duction, for instance through increased drug administration, has been associated with
detrimental effects on patients’ health (e.g. Cawley et al. 2006: on nursing homes).
Using the suspension of drafting as a natural experiment is the main contribution of this
paper and has a number of new and interesting features when studying labor input in
hospital production. Firstly, it did not originate in the health system. Instead, it was im-
plemented to decrease military expenditures2. Earlier empirical evidence is mostly based
2Another reason was the aim to re-establish fairness in drafting among young men. Although in principle
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on (seemingly) exogenous variation caused by fluctuations in patient loads (Evans and
Kim 2006), minimum staffing regulations (Cook et al. 2012; Tong 2011) or on strikes in
the health system (Gruber and Kleiner 2012; Cunningham et al. 2008). The disadvantage
of these variations, caused within or as a reaction to the situation in the health system,
is that they can be foreseen and accounted for, potentially causing endogeneity problems
that downward bias the point estimates. During physician strikes in Israel, for instance,
doctors refused to treat patients in hospitals but established separate aid stations for
treatment outside (compare Cunningham et al. 2008). One other notable exception to
this literature is provided by Friedrich and Hackmann (2017) who study the effects of
a parental leave program offered to Danish parents on health care delivery. Secondly,
the policy change was implemented rather quickly and led to a sharp drop in low-skilled
labor. It was debated in fall 2010 and already voted for in parliament in December of the
same year. The last men were drafted in the following June such that by the end of 2011
there were no more men performing military or community service compulsorily. As a
consequence, the number of people performing community service dropped from around
80,000 in the previous years to 0 by the end of 2011, leaving hospitals little time to adapt
to the policy change beforehand and thus providing profound variation to study. Thirdly,
this indefinite suspension of drafting enables me to study a much longer time horizon than
most other studies, as strikes or seasonal variations are typically short-lived.
Free Universal Daycare:
Effects on Children and Maternal Labor Supply
In this essay, we exploit the staggered introduction of free universal daycare in several
German states to track how families with pre-school children between the age of 2 and 6
respond to and benefit from the policies. Our analysis yields five main findings. First, the
free daycare policy only affects the youngest children aged between 2 and 3. Access to a
free daycare slot raises daycare attendance in that age group by 8.4 percentage points or
17% relative to the pre-policy period.
Second, daycare attendance for older children (aged 3 and above) does not respond to
the free daycare policy. In particular, we find no effect for the most common policy that
adopted a free year of daycare prior to school entry (‘kindergarten’). The main reason is
that daycare attendance for children aged 3 and above has been high (94.4 percent) even
before the policies were introduced.
Third, we observe substantial positive employment effects among mothers with 2-3 year-
all able-bodied men could be drafted, eventually, a decreasing share of men were actually committed.
In April, 21, 2004 the administrative court in Cologne for the first time raised doubts about fairness
in drafting. This case, however, was not negotiated through all official channels before the suspension
of drafting. For more details on this topic refer to Fleischhauer (2007).
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old children after the policy is adopted. Labor force participation increases by 7.7 percent-
age points or 17% relative to the pre-reform period. Mothers with older children (aged
between 4 and 6) in turn increase their labor supply at the intensive margin – working
more full-time and increase working hours by almost two hours per week (or 11%). Over-
all, these results imply that the additional income saved from the free daycare slot is not
used to reduce female labor supply.
Fourth, the free daycare policy has few persistent effects on child development. For the
youngest children, we observe no overall effect, though a negative effect on skills in daily
activities (i.e. whether the child can use a spoon on its own, for instance) and a positive
effect on social skills. For children aged 5 to 6, we find no overall effect and also no
effect on sub-categories measuring behavioral problems. Hence, the policy seems to do no
persistent harm, but also creates few benefits in terms of cognitive or non-cognitive skills
for the average preschool child.
Finally, we document substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effect: poor and low-
skilled households respond more to the policy than the average family. Children from
low-skilled and poor households are more likely to attend public daycare and less likely to
be cared exclusively at home. Poor children in particular benefit from free daycare, which
boosts their cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In contrast, we find no effect on female
labor supply suggesting that either the returns to work (more) or labor supply elasticities
more broadly are small for low-income and low-skilled mothers.
With this analysis we make four important contributions to the literature on childcare
and early childhood education. Most importantly, we can compare whether the margins
of adjustment to and benefits of a free daycare policy differ for 2-year-olds and 5-year-
olds, for instance. Since attendance rates in many countries have traditionally been much
higher for older pre-school children, providing daycare free of charge is likely to generate
stronger behavioral responses among families with very young children for which atten-
dance rates are still low.
Second, we can assess the impact of free daycare on a range of family choices, including
childcare arrangements and labor supply, as well as short-run child development. Ana-
lyzing the full range of family responses to daycare policies is crucial for interpreting the
estimated effects on child development. Children are less likely to benefit from a free day-
care policy, for instance, if parents switch from high-quality parental care to low-quality
public care; they are more likely to benefit if families switch from low-quality informal (or
parental) care to high-quality daycare instead.
Because the policies we study are universal, our third contribution is to shed light on
who responds to the policy; and whether the benefits accrue to the average child or are
concentrated among children from disadvantaged families, for instance. Whether public
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daycare is able to level the playing field between poor and more affluent families is of cen-
tral interest to policy-makers concerned about equality of opportunity in early childhood
education.
Finally, the policy we analyze offered childcare subsidies rather than merely expanding
daycare supply. Providing additional daycare slots expands the choice set of parents,
which generates substitution effects out of care at home or informal care into formal
childcare. Free daycare, in turn, is equivalent to a price decline of public daycare relative
to other childcare options and, since it is uncompensated, there will be both income and
substitution effects on childcare and labor supply choices. Hence, children might still
benefit from the policy even though parents do not adjust their labor supply behavior,
for instance.
Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill Development
Finally, the third paper estimates the causal effects of citizenship and explores its het-
erogeneity for the skill development of children and young adults along both observable
and unobservable characteristics. Our main data source is the National Educational
Panel Study (NEPS, Blossfeld et al. 2011), which is particularly suited for our analysis as
the panel collects detailed information on children’s education and skill development. A
unique feature of the data for our purpose is that the NEPS study administers standard-
ized competence tests to all children. Such detailed standardized test results are rarely
available in Germany and certainly not for large samples of school-aged children. We fo-
cus in our analysis on young immigrants as immigrant-native gaps in language, math and
science tests are sizable and persistent as has been demonstrated, for instance, for 15-year-
olds (Dustmann and Glitz 2011; OECD 2018b). Similarly, the ethnic gap in achievement
test scores and other skills increases substantially during childhood (Fryer Jr. and Levitt
2004; Heckman et al. 2006; Cunha and Heckman 2007). Given the strong link between
student competencies and outcomes later in life, these gaps are likely to have long-term
effects on the occupational careers and labor market success of children from immigrant
families, reducing upward mobility and cementing unequal opportunities (Dustmann and
Glitz 2011).
Indeed, we find substantial heterogeneity in the returns to citizenship along both observ-
able and unobservable characteristics. Immigrant children born in Germany and girls in
particular benefit substantially from German citizenship in terms of language skills as
measured by standardized test scores but also their school grade in German. At the same
time, German-born children of immigrants are more likely to naturalize pointing to a
positive selection on gains. Immigrant girls in turn, are just slightly more likely to obtain
citizenship than immigrant boys. The positive selection in gains is reflected in unobserved
heterogeneity as well: returns to citizenship with respect to language skills are declining
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with increasing resistance to treatment. Hence, children whose unobserved characteristics
make them most likely to naturalize benefit the most, while children whose unobservable
characteristics make them least likely to pick up German citizenship have zero returns to
host country citizenship. We further show that improvements in language skills also help
immigrant children to improve their school performance: children are much less likely to
repeat a grade in school, for instance.
Our analysis makes several important contributions to the literature. Existing stud-
ies on the consequences of citizenship have estimated at most intention-to-treat effects
of birthright citizenship on early childcare attendance, school entry and school track
(Felfe et al. 2019). Our analysis estimates causal effects (Local Average Treatment Ef-
fect (LATE)), of citizenship on skill development throughout primary and secondary
school. Even more importantly, we explore for the first time the heterogeneity of returns
to citizenship across observable and unobservable characteristics by estimating Marginal
Treatment Effects. Furthermore, our data cover all states in Germany and allows to con-
trol for detailed parental characteristics like years since migration, which is typically not
available in administrative datasets.
A second line of research analyzes how birthright citizenship has affected parental inte-
gration efforts (Avitabile et al. 2013), fertility behavior (Avitabile et al. 2014) and return
migration (Sajons 2016) showing that parents increase their efforts to use the local lan-
guage and reduce the total number of children in favor of more investments in the ‘quality’
of children.
Another line of research investigates the consequences of access to citizenship on the la-
bor market performance and marriage behavior of adult immigrants using panel data
approaches (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Steinhardt 2012) or intention-to-treat effects (Gath-
mann and Keller 2018; Gathmann et al. 2019). Unlike all previous evidence, we focus
on how access to citizenship through parents, individual eligibility or birthplace affects
children’s skill development, which is a crucial prerequisite for later success in the labor
market. In addition, we are able to identify causal effects and explore for the first time
their distribution along observable and unobservable dimensions.
Our study also contributes to the growing literature that estimates marginal treatment
effects. Most studies focus on monetary returns to a college education (see e.g. Carneiro
et al. 2011; Kaufmann 2014; Nybom 2017; Kamhöfer et al. 2018), to secondary education
(e.g Carneiro et al. 2011: in Indonesia) or to early childhood education (Cornelissen et al.
2018; Felfe and Lalive 2018; Kline and Walters 2016).
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CHAPTER1
Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production:
Evidence from the Suspension of Compulsory
Military Service in Germany
1.1 Introduction
Labor is not only a very crucial input factor in health care production, labor of health
care professionals is also an important economic factor. Health worker’s wages account for
more than half of health care spending, whereas health care sector employment accounts
for 10 percent of the total workforce in OECD countries (OECD 2016). Considering the
growing demand for health and care services, it is of increasing importance to assess how
different types of labor input function and interact, for one thing, with each other and, for
another thing, with capital input in health care production. Yet, despite the importance
and topicality of this issue, data limitations and endogeneity concerns have largely pre-
vented the existing literature from providing clear cut evidence on the causal relationship
between hospital staffing and production (Friedrich and Hackmann 2017).
This paper uses the suspension of military drafting in Germany to advance our under-
standing of labor in hospital production. In particular, it discusses questions like “How do
low-skilled employees contribute to health care production in the highly professionalized
setting of German hospitals?” and “How does the input of low-skilled labor interact with
capital input as, for instance, medical equipment and drugs?” and “How does a different
relation between labor and capital input alter the productivity of hospitals for example
in terms of patient’s health?”.
How can the suspension of drafting help shedding light on these questions? Germany fol-
lowed the international trend toward professional armies when it indefinitely suspended
the Compulsory Military Service (CMS) in 2011. As a consequence, the number of draftees
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decreased dramatically over the course of a year. This also led to a sudden drop in hospi-
tal staffing because by law (Zivildienstgesetz) draftees were allowed to serve in a “position
for the common good”, i.e. perform some type of community service instead of joining the
armed forces (conscientious objection). Opting for community service was very common,
such that, at the time of the suspension, 6 percent of the care staff in general hospitals
were young men performing community service.
Using the suspension of drafting as a natural experiment has a number of interesting
features when studying labor input in hospital production. Firstly, it did not originate in
the health system. Instead, it was implemented to decrease military expenditures1. This
paper is among the first to use exogenous variation affecting hospital staffing but not orig-
inating in the health system. Earlier empirical evidence is mostly based on (seemingly)
exogenous variation caused by fluctuations in patient loads (Evans and Kim 2006), mini-
mum staffing regulations (Cook et al. 2012; Tong 2011) or on strikes in the health system
(Gruber and Kleiner 2012; Cunningham et al. 2008). The disadvantage of these varia-
tions, caused within or as a reaction to the situation in the health system, is that they can
be foreseen and accounted for, potentially causing endogeneity problems that downward
bias the point estimates. During physician strikes in Israel, for instance, doctors refused
to treat patients in hospitals but established separate aid stations for treatment outside
(compare Cunningham et al. 2008). One notable exception to this literature is provided
by Friedrich and Hackmann (2017) who study the effects of a parental leave program
offered to Danish parents on health care delivery.
Secondly, it was implemented rather quickly and led to a sharp drop. The policy change
was debated in fall 2010 and already voted for in parliament in December of the same
year. The last men were drafted in the following June such that by the end of 2011 there
were no more men performing military or community service compulsorily. As a conse-
quence, the number of people performing community service dropped from around 80,000
in the previous years to 0 by the end of 2011, leaving hospitals little time to adapted to
the policy change beforehand.
Thirdly, this indefinite suspension of drafting enables us to study a much longer time
horizon than most other studies, as strikes or seasonal variations are typically short-lived.
Using administrative data on all general hospitals of the country and the vast majority
of their patients (German Hospital and Patient Statistics), this paper provides results on
three different sets of outcomes. Firstly, it shows that hospitals were able to maintain their
1Another reason was the aim to re-establish fairness in drafting among young men. Although in principle
all able-bodied men could be drafted, eventually, a decreasing share of men were actually committed.
In April, 21, 2004 the administrative court in Cologne for the first time raised doubts about fairness
in drafting. This case, however, was not negotiated through all official channels before the suspension
of drafting. For more details on this topic refer to Fleischhauer (2007).
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output levels in terms of quantity as well as in terms of measurable quality, when people
performing community service dropped out of their workforce. This applies to a wide set
of objective outcomes, such as numbers of in- and out-patients treated and overall care
days performed. Considering patient outcomes shows that neither patients’ duration of
stay nor their likelihood of dying in the hospital or being referred to another hospital was
affected on the hospital level. However, when individual patients are considered, there is
some evidence for an adverse effect on durations of stay. Although statistically significant,
it is not sizable enough to level the overall time trend of decreasing durations of stay.
Secondly, medical institutions did not alter their contracted labor input in measurable
ways. The loss in people performing community service was neither compensated by
training more apprentices nor by hiring more nurses or any other staff group related to
patient treatment.
Yet, thirdly, evidence on hospital expenditure shows that staffing costs increased, either
due to hours worked overtime or higher salaries. It also can be shown that expendi-
ture on material costs (including medical consumables like drugs, bandages, instruments,
therapeutic appliances, blood and plasma) went up as a consequence of the drop out of
low-skilled labor, indicating that hospitals switched to a more capital intensive produc-
tion. This is of interest because a more capital intensive production can be associated with
detrimental effects on patients’ health (compare Cawley et al. 2006: on nursing homes).
This chapter proceeds as follows. The following section provides a brief overview of the
related literature. Section 3 describes the institutional background. Section 4 provides
the empirical analysis, discusses some microeconomic considerations, potential effects as
well as details on the applied data and the empirical approach. Section 5 then outlines
the results, before concluding remarks are presented in the final section 6.
1.2 Literature
By exploiting exogenous variation from the suspension of drafting, this analysis con-
tributes to two main strands of literature: the literature on labor in hospital production
and the economic literature on conscription.
The literature on labor in hospital production includes, but is not limited to, an anal-
ysis of strikes by nurses and doctors. Evidence on strikes of nurses suggests that the
consequential labor input reduction leads to an increased duration of stay and higher
in-hospital mortality (Gruber and Kleiner 2012). Previous research on strikes of doctors,
however, reveals a puzzling pattern of a reduction of work effort in hospitals. Evidence
from several strikes, lasting between 9 days and 17 weeks, indicates that when physicians
go on strike mortality levels stay constant or even decrease. Cunningham et al. (2008)
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provide a comprehensive review of this literature. This counter-intuitive pattern is only
partly explained by the fact that scarce staff is re-assigned to compensate for the loss of
labor input and the fact that the number of elective surgeries are reduced. As the longest
strike only lasted 17 weeks these studies, however, cannot rule out that this finding is
a short-run effect. As the suspension of drafting in this analysis is indefinite (and still
in place today), this paper can complement these previous studies by providing evidence
from a more permanent reduction in staffing.
Besides the literature considering changes in labor input due to strikes, a number of
studies have looked at the extensive margin of labor supply by studying patient-to-nurse
ratios. In summary, they suggest that increases in patient-to-nurse ratios are associated
with increases in mortality and other adverse effects on in-patients. Seminal papers in this
area have been provided by Aiken et al. (2002) and Needleman et al. (2002). These first
studies, however, rely on cross-sectional variation. This paper, alongside other studies,
adds to this early work by relying on exogenous variation. Among the first to provide
evidence from exogenous variation are Evans and Kim (2006) who use changes in patient
loads. These authors find that patients, who are admitted when patient loads are high,
tend to have higher mortality but effects are estimated to be quite small and are not
statistically significant in several of their specifications. Cook et al. (2012) provide evi-
dence from legally mandated increases in nurse staffing in California and do not find a
discernible effect on patient safety. The same variation is also exploited by Tong (2011),
who finds that increased staffing reduces on-site patient mortality, and Lin (2014), who
establishes a positive relationship between number of registered nurses and quality of care
in nursing homes. She also establishes that the potential endogeneity problem in previous
cross-sectional studies would downward bias estimates and thereby could be responsible
for low effect sizes established by seminal papers. While there is some evidence on the
consequences of a short-run reduction in high-skilled and well-trained labor in hospitals
there is only little evidence on the effects of changes in labor input by untrained staff. Lin
(2014) is among the few studies that also provide evidence on nurse aid staffing which is
most comparable to people performing community service. Nurse aid in that study did
not have a significant influence on care quality.
The vast majority of studies relies on variations caused within the health system. One
notable exception is provided by Friedrich and Hackmann (2017) who analyze the effect of
a 10 percent drop in labor input in the Danish health system caused by the introduction of
a parental leave program. These authors identify an increase in 30-day readmission rates
and a distortion of technology utilization in hospitals while mortality remains unaffected
in this study. Studying the effects of the same policy change in nursing homes, however,
reveals a 13 percent increase in mortality among patients aged 85 or older. These dif-
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ferential effects point to interesting differences in returns to nursing across sub-sectors of
the health system. While the work by Friedrich and Hackmann (2017) relies on variation
predominately affecting female and licensed professionals, this study adds to the literature
by providing evidence from a large scale reduction in the labor input of low-skilled males,
with potentially very different effects.
There is also a somewhat smaller literature evaluating the intensive margin of labor in-
put. Bartel et al. (2014) provide evidence on the productivity of nurses’ human capital.
They study how education and unit-specific human capital from experience affect patients
and show that both components of human capital significantly improve patient outcomes.
Additionally, they demonstrate that disruptions to the care team (for instance the depar-
ture of experienced nurses, the absorption of new hires, and the inclusion of temporary
contracted nurses) negatively affect productivity by increasing patients’ durations of stay.
Aiken et al. (2003) show that an increase in the proportion of nurses holding a bachelor’s
degree is associated with a decrease in both the likelihood of surgical patients dying within
30 days of admission and the odds of failure to rescue. Doyle et al. (2010) study how
patient outcomes vary between well and less well trained doctors and interestingly find
no effect on health but uncover that treatment by less skilled doctors is more costly, thus
implying that hospitals move to a production point with a higher capital to labor input
ratio when operating with lower human capital. The results of this paper complement the
results of Doyle et al. (2010) by indicating that not only changes in the intensive margin
of high-skilled labor but also changes of the extensive margin of low-skilled labor input
lead to significant adaptations in the capital and labor input structure of hospitals.
By providing evidence on the interplay of labor and capital in hospital production this pa-
per also relates to the literature on factor substitution. Besides numerous papers studying
factor substitution in general2 there are some previous papers studying factor substitution
in the health sector which are related to this paper in relevant ways. Most importantly,
the papers by Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) and Cawley et al. (2006) who both pro-
vide evidence from the U.S.American health system. Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008)
provide evidence from hospitals showing that an increase in labor costs leads to lower
labor input and induces a higher capital to labor ratio. Cawley et al. (2006) provide
similar evidence from nursing homes. Specifically, they show that higher nursing home
wages are associated with greater use of psychoactive drugs and lower care quality. This
paper complements the already existing literature in two ways. By providing evidence on
factor substitution induced by a drop in labor supply and by providing evidence from the
German setting. To the best of my knowledge, there is just one previous working paper
considering factor substitution in the German hospital sector. The work of Schmitz and
2Google Scholar provides more than 3.5 million results on “factor substitution”.
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Tauchmann (2012), however, is very different from this paper as the authors specifically
focus on the establishment of ownership-specific heterogeneity in the technical elasticity
of substitution between physicians and nurses in the wake of new regulations regarding
the remuneration of hospitals implemented in the second half of the last decade. Their
findings indicate that non-profit hospitals operate particularly physician-intensive.3
By exploiting exogenous variation from the suspension of mandatory military service this
paper also contributes to the understanding of the economic effects of drafting and its
substitute services. The volume of drafts (all able men in each cohort), the duration
(between 6 and 24 months in most countries), and the fact that young men and, in some
countries, women are drafted during a period in their lives that is usually used for hu-
man capital investment4 (commonly starting at the age of legal majority) indicate, that
drafting can have potentially far reaching consequences for economies as a whole as well
as for recruits personally. Thus, the economic literature has long been considering the
concept of conscription, beginning with general considerations of the costs and inefficien-
cies of drafting decades ago (Fisher 1969; Oi 1967). In particular, the consequences for
the recruits themselves in terms of labor market outcomes (e.g. Bauer et al. 2012; Grenet
et al. 2011; Imbens and Klaauw 1995), demand for education (e.g. Bauer et al. 2014; Card
and Lemieux 2001) and health (Angrist et al. 2011) are well researched. There is also a
smaller literature of the effects on crime (compare, for instance, Galiani et al. 2011) and
some evidence on how conscription affects the market for education or the labor market,
for instance provided by Card and Cardoso (2012) and Maurin and Xenogiani (2007).
Considerably less, however, has been said about the effects of CMS and its alternative
services on the market sectors conscripts were working in. To the best of my knowledge
this is the first paper providing evidence on this aspect of drafting.
1.3 Institutional Background
1.3.1 Compulsory Military Service in Germany
Over recent decades, many European countries have changed the recruitment of military
personnel. Whereas most countries pursued a policy of CMS for at least some time
3Hospitals’ labor markets or input and patients well-being have also been considered in the broader
context of labor market regulation (e.g Propper and Reenen 2010), hospital competition (e.g. Propper
et al. 2004; Cookson et al. 2013) and market consolidation (Ho and Hamilton 2000). Yet, these and
similar studies in general do not consider explicitly the structure of the hospitals labor force and thus
can be seen as a different area of research.
4Interestingly, empirical evidence on educational outcomes suggests that conscription may lead to higher
numbers of university graduates due to incentives to avoid the draft (Bauer et al. 2014).
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during the last century, currently only few European countries (e.g. Austria, Finland and
Greece) rely on drafting. Most of the states abolished or suspended military drafting
several years ago (e.g. Netherlands (1997), France (2001), Italy (2005), Croatia (2008)
and Poland (2010)) and now run professional armies5. Germany followed this trend when
it indefinitely suspended the CMS in 2011 after more than half a century of mandatory
military service.
Until 2011, according to the CMS Act introduced in 1956 (Wehrpflichtgesetz), every
German male aged 18 to 23 was drafted for a period between 6 to 18 months6. In 1960
the alternative possibility to perform community service was introduced. By the Civilian
Alternative Service Act (Zivildienstgesetz) young males were given the possibility to serve
in a position “for the common good” (community service7) as part of a conscientious
objection of military service. Young men performing community service had to serve
between 6 and 20 months. There were a variety of options where to perform community
service, yet, as can be seen in Figure 1.1 most people worked in care or care related
jobs. Whereas in the 60s and 70s only few draftees chose the non-military service, it
became rather common to object military service in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1961 only
574 young men were drafted for community service, but numbers went up to 135,924
decades later and remained on high levels ever since, stabilizing at around 100,000 about
10 years prior to the suspension (compare Figure 1.2). As a consequence, the share
of draftees performing community service increased substantially over the decades and
reached numbers above 50 percent 10 years before the suspension as can be drawn from
Figure 1.3. Two developments are likely to have contributed to this increase in take
up rates. Changing societal attitudes towards alternative services and the fact that the
length of time young men had to serve under either of the options converged progressively.
Whereas for most of the time (1973 to 2004) young men had to serve for a longer period
if they opted for non-military service jobs, both services lasted 6 months in the last years
before the cessation of drafting8. This includes the entire observational period of this
paper. Thus, eventually there was no incentive to opt for military service besides the
5Compare CIA Worldfactbooks: Central Intelligence Agency. “World Factbooks”
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.html, Central Intelligence Agency,
n.d., Web, last accessed on 20 Oct. 2017
6The number of months depended on the year the recruit turned 18 in. By tendency, recruits were
conscripted for more months in earlier decades of the draft.
7This paper uses the terms community service, non-military service, and alternative service interchange-
ably. All of these terms refer to the type of service falling under the Civilian Alternative Service Act
(Zivildienstgesetz).
8Despite the fact that according to §12a(2) of the Civilian Alternative Service Act the alternative service
was not supposed to take longer than the military service, for most of the time, the alternative service
took between one and five months more than the military service. This was officially justified by the
fact that draftees in the armed forces had to work longer hours, for instance, when participating in
field maneuvers.
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Figure 1.1: Areas of Employment of People Performing Community Service in 2010
Related to Care 7% 
All Other Areas 33%
Care/Care Support 60%
Source: Federal Agency for Family and Civil-Societal Tasks, Own Calculations
content of the tasks performed. In the years prior to the suspension, the majority of the
draftees preferred to perform non-military service. While, in 2010, less than 70,000 young
men agreed to serve in the armed forces almost 80,000 were drafted for substitute services.
This system was in place and enacted for 50 years until in December 2010 the German
federal cabinet voted for the indefinite suspension of the CMS starting in July 2011.
1.3.2 The German Hospital Sector
The German health care sector is highly regulated by legislation on federal and state level.
This applies specifically to the hospital sector, which is subject to supply planning and
a dual system of financing mainly provided by federal states and health care providers.9.
According to these regulations public institutions are responsible for covering the capital
costs of hospitals that are subject to the hospital requirement plan (Krankenhausbedarfs-
plan). The hospital requirement plan has to be provided by the federal states. It includes
the number of hospitals and beds required to cover the medical needs of the states’ popu-
lation, including investments, building occupancy expenses, and acquisition costs of large
medical equipment10. For this the federal states decide on the capacity requirements (e.g.
9Details of this funding scheme are laid down in §17b of the Hospital Financing Act (Gesetz zur
wirtschaftlichen Sicherung der Krankenhäuser und zur Regelung der Krankenhauspflegesätze (KHG)),
in the Hospital Remuneration Act (Krankenhausentgeltgesetz (KHEntgG)) and in the case rate agree-
ment of the self-governing partners (Fallpauschalenvereinbarung der Selbstverwaltungspartner).
10Large medical equipment refers to all equipment that, according to law, can be written off over the
course of at least 3 years.
20
1.3 Institutional Background
Figure 1.2: Community Service Time Series
Source: Federal Agency for Family and Civil-Societal Tasks, Own Calculations
Figure 1.3: Time Series of Draftees
Source: Federal Armed Forces, Federal Agency for Family and Civil-Societal Tasks, Own Calculations
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numbers of hospitals, location, specialization, emergency services or beds) a year ahead
in the hospital requirement plan and provide monetary resources accordingly.11 Overall,
there is increasing cost pressure as financial resources provided by the states decreased
by 30 percent since the 1990s (compare Destatis 2016).
A similar pattern of prospective planning applies to the running costs of the hospital,
which are covered by health insurances based on a Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) reim-
bursement system. DRG is a classification scheme that serves as a basis for a lump sum
billing system. Based on main and secondary diagnosis, procedure codes, and demograph-
ics each case is classified into an ICD-10 code12 for which there are fixed reimbursements
to the hospital13. The budget, type, and number of services are negotiated yearly be-
tween hospitals and health insurance providers14 and there is a refund system between
hospitals and health insurances if hospitals deviate from the plan. This means that hos-
pital sponsors have to refund part of their earnings from the case based payments to
the insurance companies, if they provided more treatments during a year than initially
agreed on and vice versa. The rationale behind that is that hospitals are hardly able to
adapt their (prospectively determined) labor and capital input within the current year
and therefore should not have (much) more costs, regardless of the number of cases taken
care of. Despite the fact that hospitals included in the supply plan have to take and treat
patients “within the scope of their performance requirements and abilities”15 [translation
by author] this provides a strong incentive to stick to the initially agreed terms. The
negotiation typically takes place in the beginning of the prospective year and can last
until the end of the year. During our period of observation, however, negotiations were
finished before the suspension of military drafting was discussed and decided on, leaving
hospitals no scope to incorporate the policy change in their prospective planning before
11Additionally, there is the possibility for the hospital sponsor to apply to the regarding state for extra
non-recurrent investments, for instance, if refurbishments or re-buildings are necessary.
12International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision
13There has been a worldwide trend towards prospective reimbursement systems. DRGs are at the center
of this development. Originally introduced to standardize patients and thereby hospitals’ services
they are vastly used as an informational basis to rate and reimburse hospitals’ services now, for
instance, since 1984 by Medicare in the USA or since 2004 in all German hospitals, except for mental
hospitals (Breyer et al. 2013). It is the aim of DRGs to classify patients into homogeneous cost groups.
Therefore, patients are first assigned to a major diagnostic category, which is usually defined by the
affected body part, and then further classified into DRGs based on their case and treatment. Apart
from the diagnosis, complications and the undertaken procedures also are considered when determining
the DRG. Therefore, precisely the system in place is not a purely diagnose-based classification and
reimbursement system, but also includes fee for service and cost reimbursement elements (Breyer et al.
2013).
14Precisely, health insurance providers that insure at least 5 percent of the patients in the regarding
hospital are involved in the negotiations.
15This obligation can be deduced from §108, Abs. 1, 109 SGB V.
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it was implemented16. Note, however, that this does not apply to the years after 2011,
i.e. there was not much scope to adapt to the policy change in-between planing and
implementing the change in the yearly budget negotiations but hospitals were absolutely
able to negotiate and adapt their staffing in following years, i.e. our after period.
1.3.3 The Suspension of Military Drafting and Low-Skilled Labor
in Hospitals
The suspension of military drafting was discussed in fall 2010 and already voted for in
December of the same year. It was then implemented quickly, resulting in a large scale
and fast reduction of low-skilled labor in hospitals. The last men were drafted in the
following June such that by the end of 2011 there were no more men performing military
or community service compulsorily. As a consequence, the number of people performing
community service dropped from around 80,000 in the previous years to 0 by the end of
2011. For the average community service activity field this meant that one percent of their
staff dropped out of their service fields within one year. Hospitals, medical prevention,
and rehabilitation institutions were particularly affected by this policy change as until
then around 67 percent of the people performing community service worked in hospitals
and care homes (care/ care support) as well as ambulance services and patient trans-
portation (areas related to care) (Figure 1.1). For these institutions people performing
community service provided a considerable portion of the workforce. Due to the policy
change the average general hospitals, under consideration in this paper, lost more than 6
percent of their care staff (Figure 1.4)17.
Draftees in the health sector provided assistance to the care staff and patients directly.
Typical tasks in hosptials were, for instance, changing and cleaning beds, assisting pa-
tients in getting around or simple care assistance like taking patients’ temperature or
feeding immobile people. The labor input of draftees by law was meant to be labor mar-
ket neutral, implying that people performing social work were only allowed to be assigned
to tasks that otherwise would not have been done by paid personnel. Yet, the fact that
16The suspension of drafting was voted for due to an initiative of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). This
party had been elected into the government in federal elections 2009, when the government changed
from a grand coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) to a coalition between CDU and FDP. If hospitals anticipated this controversially
debated policy change to be implemented solely by the fact that the liberal party had been voted
for and adapted to it before the policy change was actually enacted, it would attenuate any effect
on personnel or patients. One should, however, be able to observe changes in the input structure of
hospitals from 2009 to 2010 then. Neither descriptive evidence, provided in the data section below
(1.4.2), nor results provided in 1.5 show any evidence corroborating this view.
17Figure 1.5 depicts people performing community service in hospitals with different types of ownership.
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Figure 1.4: Drop in People Performing Community Service in General Hospitals
hospitals did not have the duty to hire people performing community service and at the
same time had to pay for draftees’ material if they did so makes it implausible that people
performed community service in hospitals without any valuable contribution. This ratio-
nale is clearly supported by studies on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs,
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Beher et al. 2002: chapter 21.1). Even more so, the
provider of jobs for draftees expressed their concerns regarding the quick suspension.
Thus, to account for the sudden loss of labor input for health care providers, previously
existing voluntary services (Youth Volunteer Service, Jugendfreiwilligendienst) were ex-
tended by the government in the wake of the cessation of drafting. On top of that, more
opportunities to perform voluntary services were introduced (Federal Volunteer Service,
Bundesfreiwilligendienst). Comparable to community service, these services were accessi-
ble to volunteers in all states, yet, for a broader age group and with an even broader set of
institutional partners. Still, people participating in these programs only accounted for less
than half of the previous employees in hospitals (compare right panel of Figure 1.4), i.e.
even when taking this into account, as the empirical analysis of this paper does, the policy
change still caused a considerable drop in labor input. The drop is also rather similar
across the different types of hospital ownership (compare right panel of Figure 1.5). Nei-
ther the people under the drafting system nor participants of the Youth Volunteer Service
Program were offered any comprehensive job specific training before their employment18.
Similar regulations applied to the community service. Therefore, draftees and volunteers
can be regarded low-skilled with respect to the tasks performed in a hospital.
18Volunteers participating in the Federal or Youth Volunteer Service are obligated to participate in 25
training days per year of service, but these seminars only prepare participants on a general level and
facilitate the exchange of experiences with other volunteers.
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Figure 1.5: Community Service in General Hospitals by Type of Ownership
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1.4 Empirical Analysis
1.4.1 Theoretical Considerations
To understand how hospitals are affected by the suspension of drafting theoretically, it
is helpful to consider a hospital production function. The previous literature has shown
that hospital production can authentically be described by versions of a Cobb-Douglas
production function19, compare, for instance, Jensen and Morrisey (1986) for one of the
earliest references. The suspension of drafting led to a drop of people performing commu-
nity service, i.e. the amount of labor input decreased. Standard theory implies that the
effect of the policy change on hospitals would be a decrease in hospital production, i.e.
the empirical analysis would show the significant drop in people performing community
service induced by the policy change, no further effect on labor input, no effect on capital
input and a decrease in production20.
However, it is natural to assume that hospitals also respond to the policy change. Let us
consider two different types of responses according to the Cobb-Douglas function. These
cases should be viewed as theoretical cases for illustration. It is, of course, possible that
adjustments are made in several dimensions at the same time.
Case 1: Hospitals adjust their labor input.
Hereby, three sub-cases can be distinguished. (a) The drop in people performing commu-
nity service leads to a drop in overall labor input. One possible scenario would be that
hospitals were not able to react to the exogenous shock in terms of staffing enough to
compensate exactly for the drop. All other things equal, the initial reduction in labor in-
put then leads to a reduction in hospital output. Empirically, we would expect to observe
no or small positive changes in staffing (besides the negative effect on people performing
community service, of course) and a negative effect on hospital output measures.
(b) It could be possible for hospitals to hire exactly the amount of human capital they lost
19For example:
f : R+ × R+ → R+, f(x1, x2) = Axa1xb2, 0 < a, b < 1, a+ b = 1 (1.1)
where f(x1, x2) denotes hospital output, x1 denotes capital input and x2 stands for labor input. The
parameters a and b show how the output reacts to changes in input and A ∈ R+ can be seen as
the scale of productivity. For the qualitative considerations here it is not necessary to analyze these
factors in more detail. The production function yields the following partial derivatives
∂
∂x1
f(x1, x2) = aAxa−11 xb2,
∂
∂x2
f(x1, x2) = bAxa1xb−12 ,
whereas A, a, b, x1, x2 > 0 imply that both derivatives are strictly positive.
20This, of course, excludes the possibility that people performing community service did not contribute
any valuable labor input to institutions production. Then output would not be affected at all. Reasons
why this theoretical case can be excluded were already outlined above.
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through the policy change. We would then observe an increase in at least one staff group
and no effect on output. In most cases conscripts did not have any or only few weeks
of training to prepare for their community service jobs. As such, they can be considered
low-skilled. If hospitals were to adjust labor input it is plausible that they did so by
employing other low- or medium skilled workers. The employees closest in skills would
be volunteers participating in the federal and youth volunteer program, who also did not
have any formal training regarding their activity fields. Unlike in other countries, where
nursing requires a university degree, nurses in Germany undergo a 3-year vocational train-
ing. Despite the fact that this training is considered challenging and includes a rather
high amount of theoretical instruction, nurses are primarily concerned with supporting
the therapies prescribed by doctors. As such, they can be considered medium skilled and
could also be suitable substitutes for conscripts’ labor. A similar reasoning applies to
nursing apprentices. Economic theory would predict an increase in labor input by these
personnel groups if hospitals were to substitute.
Doctors, on the other hand, rather function as complements to low(er)-skilled staff in
hospital production. A medical treatment in a hospital usually involves physicians doing
check-ups and prescribing or carrying out treatments and care staff supporting their ther-
apies. If doctors are complements to other skill groups in hospitals, we should observe
a change in the same direction as with the overall input from low and medium skilled
personnel. In the same sense medical equipment (part of the capital input of hospitals)
is complementary to doctoral staff, because physicians have to approve or prescribe their
usage or operate it.
(c) It could also be possible that hospitals hire more human capital in response to the
policy change. Due to a shortage of volunteers, for instance, hospitals could replace each
draftee by a nurse and consequently would operate with the same head count but more
able teams, predicting positive effects on production.
Case 2: Hospitals adjust their capital input.
As can be derived from the production function above, capital and labor can be used in
different ratios to produce the same hospital output. It is therefore possible that hospitals
respond to the initial drop in labor input by increasing their capital input. Applying a
similar reasoning as above three main cases can be distinguished here as well. Hospitals
could (a) not respond at all, (b) respond a little bit but not fully offset the effect of the
labor decrease or (c) over-compensate the labor input, possibly due to capital investments
being discrete (for instance, a software that assists in monitoring patients replacing the
work of more draftees than lost). All other things equal, each increment in capital has
a positive effect on hospital production. The overall effect on production in these three
cases, however, depends on the interplay between capital and labor and is eventually an
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empirical question.
1.4.2 Data Source: The German Hospital and Patient Statistics
Shedding light on the theoretical mechanisms just outlined requires very comprehensive
data on hospital’s in- as well as outputs. These data are contained in the German Hospital
and Patient Statistics (Krankenhausstatistik I-III ), an administrative data set collected by
the statistical offices of the German federal states, covering all hospitals of the country21
and the vast majority of their patients every year22. This statistic serves as the planning
basis for the public authorities involved in financing of hospitals and clinics. As such,
every hospital and clinic is obliged by law (§28 KHG) to provide detailed information
on their organizational structure, staff, equipment and costs. Overall, the Hospital and
Patient Statistics 2009 to 2012 include between 2017 and 2084 economic entities23 and a
total of 75 million patient cases24.
For the analysis in this paper I restrict the sample to general hospitals, because preven-
tion and rehabilitation clinics as well as pure day or night clinics are structurally very
different from general hospitals. They have rather fixed durations of stay and very low
mortality rates, for instance. Also, they were not relying on people performing commu-
nity service as much. Furthermore, I exclude from the analysis general hospitals with
an average duration of stay below one day, hospitals with no directly employed doctors
or nurses and hospitals where the average cost for nurses are higher than the costs for
doctors. This excludes highly specialized clinics such as beauty clinics or hospitals that
disproportionally rent out beds to resident physicians, for instance, for smaller surgeries.
To analyze the effect of the suspension of CMS I will make use of three main sets of
outcome variables (hospital outcomes and labor and capital input).
Measuring hospital’s outcomes is inherently difficult because hospitals produce a mul-
21Hospitals by German law (§2(1) KHG (Hospital Financing Act)) are “institutions that diagnose, cure
or mitigate diseases, conditions or physical injuries or assist at birth by doctoral or nursing support
that accommodate and keep the persons to care for” [translation by author] i.e. by definition the
observational basis is rather broad, including prevention and rehabilitation clinics, which are excluded
from the analysis.
22Only very small entities with less than 100 beds are exempted from the obligation to provide information
on their patients.
23For the sake of simplicity in this paper one economic entity is referred to as a hospital. Note, however,
that one economic entity can include several hospitals or different sites (Information by Data Specialist
Department of Statistisches Landesamt Hessen, as received via email by Dr. Peter Gottfried on Aug, 2,
2017). The number of hospitals decreases slightly over time because of increasing market concentration
due to merging, i.e. initially individual hospitals merge to one larger hospital with several sites. These
are then surveyed under one hospital identifier. There is also a slight reduction by hospital closure.
24Note that, although there is information on transferals and shifts of patients, it is not possible to link
the data of previous stays to current stays of re-admitted patients.
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tidimensional and to a certain degree subjective outcome: health. They also stand by to
fulfill an optional demand, i.e. they withhold a certain capacity, for instance, for emer-
gency treatment (compare conclusion 9.1, pp.355 in Breyer et al. 2013). The value of this
good can also be rather subjective and particularly hard to quantify especially when not
utilized. To measure hospital outcomes the empirical analysis will make use of the overall
number of cases treated, numbers of in- and out-patients, numbers of death as well as
rates, and likelihoods to be discharged to another hospital instead of being able to go
home after treatment. While there is a much bigger variety of potential output measures
(e.g. failure to rescue rates or case progression severity), these are seen to be the most
objective outcome measures25.
An analysis of the development and interaction of overall case numbers as well as num-
bers of in- and out-patients treated allows us to identify one important potential way of
reacting to the policy change if original staffing levels cannot be retained. The number of
out-patients refers to registered cases for which hospitals reported a duration of stay of a
day or less in general hospitals26. In-patients are identified by a duration of stay of two
days and above. Duration of stay reports the average duration of stay of all in-patients in
the final sample in a regarding hospital. Due to the diagnoses related case based refund
scheme hospitals have a strong incentive to discharge patients as soon as possible, i.e. as
soon as a patient reaches the necessary level of health to be discharged. A longer duration
of stay means that hospitals need more time to reach that level indicating adverse effects
on patients’ health. Mortality is measured in absolute numbers of in-hospital death in-
cidences as well as in share of people dying in hospital (=case fatality rate). Mortality
is the most severe clinical outcome, but is also commonly used as a quality indicator for
hospitals. One clear advantage of this outcome is that it is robust to different coding be-
havior of hospitals (Wissenschaftliches Institut der AOK 2007: p.29) and thereby easily
comparable across hospitals27.
The main dependent variables to measure labor input are yearly average full-time equiv-
alences (Full-Time Equivalences (FTE)) of all low, medium and high-skilled staff. Yearly
average FTEs are calculated based on the working hours of all contracts over the course
of the year. A full-time employed nurse working from January until March would, for
instance, be reported as 0.25 FTE. The same applies to all other trained groups consid-
25A detailed discussion of potential outcome measures for analyzing hospital production can, for instance,
be found in Cook et al. (2012).
26This is done because registering a patient with a duration of stay of one day is very common even if
the actual hospital stay takes less than 24 hours and does not include staying over night.
27This can be of relevance because hospitals record their own data and know that this data can be used
for qualitative evaluation. Therefore, despite the fact that there are strong incentives to report data
correctly as to being paid accordingly, there might be an incentive to down play adverse events like
complications which would bias indicators like failure to rescue rates.
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To provide a complete picture of care staff’s labor input, 3 more measures of labor input
are defined. Nurses per bed refers to yearly average FTEs of care personnel per installed
hospital bed and reflects the potential capacity care personnel need to cover. Workload
of nurses in terms of case numbers relates the number of cases per hospital and year to
the number of FTEs. This is of interest because every case causes a certain amount of
time consuming registration and discharge paper work and therefore causes a workload
different from an in-hospital care day. Finally, workload of nurses in terms of care hours is
an indicator of how many care hours (reported care days x 24) were performed per actual
working hours of a yearly average full-time equivalent (FTE x 220 [working days per year]
x 8 [hours]), which provides us with a measure of how strenuous an actual workday is.
The same measures are defined for all other skill-groups.
The main dependent variables for analyzing hospital’s capital input are hospital’s
material costs and overall expenditure in Euros per year. Material costs is a summary
measure for all capital input of the hospital29. They include various types of costs related
to the treatment of the patient. In particular, medical consumables like drugs, bandages,
instruments, therapeutic appliances, blood and plasma are contained in this measure.
Any form of expenditure on labor is excluded. Additionally, this paper provides evidence
on overall hospital expenditure. Here, a summary measure for all costs of the hospital that
are not covered by public authorities, including material costs, staff costs, training costs
just as well as costs for hospital administration is constructed. As labor expenditures are
included these costs provide a complete picture of hospital costs. Additionally, this paper
provide more detailed evidence on how expenditure on staffing changed in response to the
policy change. Costs for the single staff groups are split up in eleven subcategories in the
original data (including, for instance, doctoral services, care services, medical-technical
services, and administration). This paper considers doctoral services, care services, and
expenditure on staff training in more detail. All of these are measured in yearly sum
per hospital grouped by staff category. Considering these measures provides interesting
additional insights into staffing beyond contracted labor input.
As additional control variables hospital characteristics like type of sponsor (public, pri-
vate, non-statutory welfare services), type of hospital (i.e. university hospital, hospital
forming part of the German hospital plan, hospital with provision contract or others), and
share of apprentices in total staff are used. Hospital size is controlled for by number of
28Apprentices in contrast are converted with a factor of 9.5 to 1 or 6 to 1, depending on their type.
People performing community service are converted 1 to 1 as they were employed full-time.
29Capital costs which are covered by state authorities (e.g. large medical equipment, buildings) are
excluded because they are subject to prospective planning and should react differently, if at all, to
changes in the labor structure.
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installed beds. Following the standard approach in the literature (compare, for instance,
Breyer et al. 2013) these are summarized in 5 categories (less than 75, 75-124, 125-249,
250-499, 500 or more). Additionally, regional characteristics are accounted for by con-
trolling for the degree of regional agglomeration by considering 8 categories ranging from
densely populated urban areas to rural county, lightly populated. This is relevant because
descriptive evidence has shown marked differences between treatment prevalence across
counties. Furthermore, share of female patients, share of patients aged 75 and above, and
share of patients undergoing surgery are included to control for hospitals patient mix.
Further details on the data set, sample, and the definition of each variable are contained
in the data appendix.
Data on yearly averages for additional years was drawn from the basic data on hospi-
tals published by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis 2017). Complementary data on
draftees as well as specific general information on military service were obtained from the
Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). Further supplementary data on community service,
as, for instance, numbers of people performing community service or types of tasks per-
formed, were obtained from the Federal Agency for Family and Civil-Societal Tasks.
Table 1.1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of general hospitals separately for
the pre-reform (2009/2010) and the post-reform period (2011/2012). The descriptive
statistics clearly show the drop in people performing community service in hospitals.
Whereas there were 11.5 people performing community service per hospital before the
policy change, there were none in 2011 and 2012. The descriptives also show that the
staffing situation in hospitals improved over time. In the after reform period, there have
been more nurses, more specialized care staff, doctors, and apprentices per hospital. At
the same time, the number of hospitals decreased. The higher staffing levels could, there-
fore, also be related to market concentration, i.e. there are fewer, but bigger hospitals
and need not indicate that people performing community service have been replaced. The
fact that all measures of nurses workload remain rather constant corroborates this view.
1.4.3 Empirical Approach
I estimate the effect of an exogenous change in the amount of low-skilled personnel on
a range of hospital and patient outcomes. The empirical strategy of this paper exploits
the fact that not all hospitals employed people performing community service. Hospitals
that employed people performing community service experienced an exogenous change
in their staff structure due to the policy change and will be included in the treatment
group. All other hospitals are assigned to the control group. The main specification
then compares hospitals that did experience an exogenous drop in people performing
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
(2009-2010) (2011-2012)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Input
Community Service (Staff No.) 11.5 16.3 6.9 11.4
Nurses (FTE) 178.2 226.9 187 236.7
Nurses per Bed 0.57 0.21 0.59 0.22
Workload Nurses (Care Hours) 6.9 3 6.7 3.1
Workload Nurses (Cases) 68.3 34.5 69.7 35.9
Other Medical Staff (FTE) 141.9 271.2 152.7 286.4
Doctors (FTE) 81.5 141.2 88.8 149.4
Apprentices (FTE) 11.3 31.3 12.5 29.7
Output
Number of Out-Patients 1,696 2,083 1,906 2,276
Number of In-Patients 9,536 10,406 10,043 10,850
Share of In-Patients 0.86 0.08 0.85 0.09
Number of Beds 293 306 300 315
Number of Care Days 81,803 91,569 83,656 93,844
Average Staying Duration 8.7 11.4 8.7 12
Share of Patients Dying 0.0224 0.0162 0.0211 0.0153
Costs
Total Expenditure 46.7 1.4 52.1 1.5
Material Costs 18.3 0.6 20.3 0.6
Expenditure Care Staff 8.8 0.2 9.6 0.2
Expenditure Apprentices & Training 0.3 0.01 0.4 0.01
Expenditure Doctoral Staff 8.3 0.2 9.7 0.3
Controls
Share of Patients Undergoing Surgery 0.3021 0.231 0.3012 0.2331
Share of Female Patients 0.542 0.0919 0.5383 0.0898
Share of Patients Aged 75 and Above 0.2765 0.125 0.2886 0.1269
Observations Public 795 808
Observations Not-for-Profit 1,062 1,010
Observations Private 1,251 1,203
Observations Total 3,108 3,021
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the sample of general hospitals and their patients in Germany over
the period from 2009 to 2012. The first two columns report mean and standard error for main outcome and control
variables for the pre-policy period, the last two columns report the same statistics for the post-policy period. Staffing
is reported in terms of numbers (regardless of type or scope of employment relationship) and yearly average full-time
equivalences. Nurses per bed refers to yearly average full-time equivalences per hospital bed and workload of nurses
(care hours) is an indicator of how many care hours (reported care days x 24) were performed per actual working hour
of a yearly average full-time equivalent (FTE x 220 (working days per year) x 8 hours). The workload in terms of cases
relates the number of patient cases per hospital and year to the number of full-time equivalences of nurses. Number
of out-patients refers to numbers of registered cases for which hospitals reported a staying duration of a day or less in
general hospitals. Note that registering a patient with a staying duration of one day is very common even if the actual
hospital stay takes less than 24 hours and does not include staying over night. Number of in-patients refers to cases
with a staying duration of above one day. Average staying duration is calculated on the basis of all patients in the final
sample. The same applies to share of people dying, female patients and patients aged 75 and above. The cost measures
refer to average costs per year and hospital.
Source: German Hospital and Patients Statistics (2009-2012)
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community service to those that did not in a differences-in-differences approach30. In 2010,
the year prior to the policy change, 482 hospitals did not report any people performing
community service31. These hospitals did not experience any changes due to the policy
change directly, as their staff structure was not affected by the suspension of military
drafting. Consequently, these hospitals serve as the control group. The model can be
written in the following way:
yht = β0 + β1aboveh + β2aftert + β3(aboveh · aftert) + λ′Xht + εht (1.2)
where aboveh is equal to one in all years t if the number of people performing community
service in a given hospital h is greater than zero in 2010 and zero otherwise, splitting
the sample into treatment and control group. The coefficient then indicates the average
difference between the two groups. aftert is a dummy variable equal to one after the
suspension of military drafting. As the German Hospital Statistic samples all hospital
information as matters stand on December, 31, 2011 and 2012 can both be regarded as
observations after the policy change. This however, does not apply for yearly average
full-time equivalences and yearly costs, which is accounted for by solely considering 2012
as the after period in the regarding specifications. The coefficient of aftert reflects the
average difference between the before and after period, i.e. the general time trend. The
interaction term between aboveh and aftert then introduces the differences-in-differences
structure to the model and its coefficient reflects the change in differences between the
two groups caused by the policy change. β3 therefore is our main parameter of interest.
I also include a set of control variables, contained in Xht, by controlling for observable
differences these variables reduce the residual error and improve the precision of the point
estimates. Following the previous literature on hospital production (for instance Herr
2008; Herr et al. 2011; Steinmann and Zweifel 2003), the main specification controls for
hospital characteristics, that have been shown to significantly impact hospital efficiency,
such as hospital size (in bed number categories), legal form, sponsor, and share of appren-
tices. Furthermore, to control for hospitals’ patient case mix, the share of females among
the patients, the share of people aged 75 and above as well as the share of patients that
underwent surgery are included in this model. Both, including hospital fixed effects as
30In principle, this setting would also be feasible for the application of a regression discontinuity or
regression kink design. Unfortunately, the nature of the data at hand (only a few years and yearly
averages for most outcomes of interest, covering up changes around the discontinuity) does not permit
the implementation of such an approach.
31This includes hospitals that reported 0 people performing community services as well as missing values.
Hospitals are not only obligated by law to report staff, they also have clear incentives to report all
people performing community service, because these peoples’ salaries were partly paid by public au-
thorities. Therefore, I also include hospitals that reported a missing for people performing community
service in the control group, assuming these hospitals simply did not report zero values.
33
1 Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production
well as adding the set of control variables just discussed - eventually accounting for the
differences across hospitals - are common in the literature. The advantage of including
the control variables is that the influence of the single factors becomes transparent and
thereby sheds some light on the underlying mechanisms.
Descriptive evidence on the regional distribution of disease prevalence as well as treat-
ments indicates substantial regional variation in the quantity of health care services per-
formed32, compare, for instance, Nolting et al. (2011). To account for this correlation
within regions, standard errors εht are clustered at the nuts-2 level, leaving us with 39
regional clusters33.
Key to the identification strategy of this paper is the parallel trend assumption between
hospitals that employed people performing community service and hospitals that did not.
For the identification strategy to be credible, hospitals of the treatment and control group
need to share the same time trend in potential outcomes (compare, for instance, Angrist
and Pischke 2009). To corroborate this assumption a graphical test for all sets of depen-
dent variables (hospital outcomes, staffing, and costs) can be found in Figure 1.6. The
graphs depict all of the outcome variables (y-axis) for the four years (x-axis) observed in
the data set, including the two pre-policy years 2009 and 2010. As can be seen in the
graphs only minor differences in changes from 2009 to 2010 can be observed. Further
descriptive evidence on the pre-treatment period can be drawn from Table 1.2, which re-
ports the pre-treatment outcomes by years. Ideally, of course, one would observe a much
longer pre-treatment period.
32Interestingly, the reasons for this regional correlations are largely unclear. Explanatory approaches
include, but are not limited to, regional differences in indication, possibly due to regional differences
in training and experience levels of doctors, as well as differences in availability of and access to
specialists. Previous attempts to correlate these explanations to procedures however did not manage
to establish clear correlations. For a detailed overview of several regional descriptive indicators based
on the German Hospital Statistics and several other German data sources refer to Nolting et al. (2011).
33This improves upon typical numbers of clusters, yet, might still be problematic (Bertrand et al. 2004;
Abadie et al. 2017)
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Figure 1.6: Key Variables Over Time by Treatment and Control Group
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics Pre-Treatment Period by Year
2009 2010
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Input
Community Service (Staff No.) 13 0.6 7 0.8 11 0.5 0 0
Nurses (FTE) 210 7.7 110 6.4 212 7.8 110 6.1
Workload Nurses (Care Hours) 6.8 0.0 7.4 0.2 6.7 0.1 7.3 0.2
Workload Nurses (Cases) 66.8 0.6 70.6 2.4 67.5 0.7 72.1 2.4
Doctors (FTE) 98 4.9 46 3.4 100 5.0 46 3.5
Workload Doctors (Care Hours) 20.9 1.9 23.1 0.7 19.9 1.1 22.5 0.7
Workload Doctors (Cases) 200.2 18.6 205.3 8.9 198.5 13.3 210.3 9.7
Output
Number of Out-Patients 1987 69.0 1009 62.3 2057 71.1 1029 63.8
Number of In-Patients 11201 347.0 5943 305.2 11367 353.4 5899 305.5
Number of Care Days 96406 3099.2 52252 2609.4 96299 3119.8 51267 2597.2
Average Staying Duration 8 0.2 10 0.4 8 0.1 10 0.4
Share of Patients Dying 0.024 0.0004 0.021 0.0010 0.023 0.0004 0.020 0.0009
Costs
Total Expenditure 55.0 2.6 27.2 1.9 57.1 2.7 27.8 1.9
Material Costs 21.5 1.1 10.7 0.7 22.4 1.1 11.0 0.8
Expenditure Care Staff 10.3 0.4 5.3 0.3 10.5 0.4 5.4 0.3
Expenditure Apprentices & Training 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0
Expenditure Doctoral Staff 9.7 0.5 4.7 0.4 10.4 0.5 4.9 0.4
Controls
Share of Patients Undergoing Surgery 0.29 0.0057 0.30 0.0137 0.30 0.0057 0.32 0.0142
Share of Female Patients 0.54 0.0022 0.54 0.0059 0.54 0.0022 0.54 0.0056
Share of Patients Aged 75 and Above 0.28 0.0033 0.26 0.0072 0.29 0.0033 0.26 0.0072
Observations Total 1050 471 1061 482
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the sample of general hospitals and their patients in Germany over the period for
the two pre-treatment years, seperately by treatment and control group. Staffing is reported in terms of numbers (regardless of type
or scope of employment relationship) and yearly average full-time equivalences. Nurses per bed refers to yearly average full-time
equivalences per hospital bed and workload of nurses (care hours) is an indicator of how many care hours (reported care days x 24)
were performed per actual working hour of a yearly average full-time equivalent (FTE x 220 (working days per year) x 8 hours).
The workload in terms of cases relates the number of patient cases per hospital and year to the number of full-time equivalences of
nurses. Number of out-patients refers to numbers of registered cases for which hospitals reported a staying duration of a day or less
in general hospitals. Note that registering a patient with a staying duration of one day is very common even if the actual hospital
stay takes less than 24 hours and does not include staying over night. Number of in-patients refers to cases with a staying duration
of above one day. Average staying duration is calculated on the basis of all patients in the final sample. The same applies to share
of people dying, female patients and patients aged 75 and above. The cost measures refer to average costs per year and hospital.
Source: German Hospital and Patients Statistics (2009-2010)
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1.5.1 The Drop in People Performing Community Service
The identification strategy of this paper rests on the assumption that the suspension of
drafting led to a significant drop in people performing community service in German gen-
eral hospitals. As already shown descriptively and discussed above two things happened
in 2011. On the one hand, drafting was suspended. On the other hand, to account for
the sudden loss of labor input for health care providers, the previously existing voluntary
service (Youth Volunteer Service, Jugendfreiwilligendienst) was extended by the govern-
ment. On top of that, more opportunities to perform voluntary service were introduced
(Federal Volunteer Service, Bundesfreiwilligendienst). Descriptively, people participating
in these programs only accounted for half of the previous employees in hospitals (compare
Figure 1.434). Yet, for the empirical analysis it is crucial that, even taking these volun-
teers who are very similar to people performing community service into account, hospitals
still experienced a significant exogenous shock in their low-skilled labor input. Table 1.3
provides evidence that this indeed was the case. Columns (1) and (3) each provide the
pure differences-in-differences effect without including any controls and columns (2) and
(4) provide results of the specification including the full set of control variables. As can
be seen in columns (1) and (2) even including volunteers in the staff count for low-skilled
labor a significant reduction in labor input can be observed. Columns (3) and (4) pro-
vide evidence on the development of low-skilled staff before the policy change, revealing
a positive effect in column (3) and no effect on column (4). The positive effect on column
(3), however, is only 0.075 percent of the actual effect induced by the policy change. It
is important to note that all following results already take the increment in labor from
volunteers into account, i.e. we only observe the effect of the “net” policy change.
1.5.2 The Drop in People Performing Community Service and
Quantity and Quality of Hospital Production
The empirical analysis is proceeded by investigating how the drop in people perform-
ing community service affected quantity and quality of hospital production, in particular
treated cases and objective treatment success. Table 1.4 reports results of differences-
in-differences estimations of hospital outputs measured by four different indicators. The
effects of the policy change on the number of patients treated each year are reported in col-
umn (1) and (2), the same numbers broken down by type of patient (in- vs. out-patients)
34Further evidence on all hospitals can be found in the appendix (Figure 1.7)
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Table 1.3: Effects of Policy Change on Staffing: The Drop in People Performing Com-
munity Service
2010 to 2012 2009 to 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Additional Change in Treated Hospitals -2.215** -2.662** 0.002*** 0.001
(S.E.) [0.951] [1.155] [0.000] [0.000]
Hospital Controls No Yes No Yes
Regional Controls No Yes No Yes
Patient Mix Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,580 2,580 3,083 2,580
R-squared 0.013 0.401 0.024 0.425
Notes: The table shows how the staffing with people performing community service responds to the policy change (columns
(1)-(2)). As a robustness check it also shows changes in the pre-treatment period (columns (3)-(4)). Both specifications take
the volunteers into account who stepped in for draftees. People performing community service and volunteers are counted in
yearly average FTE. The first specification always shows the pure difference-in-difference estimator and the second specification
includes the full set of control variables to gain precision. The full set of control variables includes dummy variables for public,
private and free or not-for-profit providers, bedclass indicators, summarized in 5 categories (less than 75, 75-124, 125-249, 250-
499, 500 or more), controls for the patient composition of hospitals (i.e. the share of females, the share of patients aged 75
and above and the share of people that undergo surgery during their hospital stay), dummy variables for the type of hospital
(i.e. university hospital, hospital forming part of the German hospital plan, hospital with a hospital provision contract or other
hospitals), the share and squared share of apprentices in total staff and regional characteristics (considering 8 categories ranging
from “densely populated urban areas” to “rural county, lightly populated”). Shares are calculated based on staff and patients in
the final data set. The sample is restricted to general hospitals with more than 100 beds. Standard errors are clustered at the
nuts-2 level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: German Hospital and Patient Statistics (2009-2012)
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can be found in columns (3) to (6) and the overall number of days of care provided by the
hospital can be drawn from columns (7) and (8). The key independent variable in all of
the specifications reported in this table is the interaction term in equation (1.2). It equals
one for treated hospitals after the policy change and its coefficient indicates the additional
change a treated hospital experiences due to the policy change reported in the first line.
Again, the first specification of each outcome is a simple differences-in-differences estima-
tion without any control variables, whereas the second one reports the results of the full
specification. Here, the full set of control variables are added to control for observable
differences and gain statistical precision.
For most specifications and outcomes this table reveals no clear cut evidence for an effect
of a drop in people performing community service on hospital production. Let us con-
sider the development of numbers of treated cases first. While it is a common measure
of hospital productivity, it can be interpreted in two ways. Whereas an increase could
point to a higher productivity of hospitals, i.e. more healthy patients per year, it could
also point to higher re-admission rates of patients and has been interpreted in such a way
in the previous literature. As can be seen in column (1) and (2) the number of patients
treated slightly but insignificantly increases by an additional 214 or 129 cases per year
in hospitals experiencing a drop in people performing community service. This equals at
most less than 2 percent of the baseline value in the pre-treatment period. According to
the common interpretation, this would point to lower treatment success. With this data
set, however, there is no possibility to check whether this increment is really caused by
higher re-admission rates35.
To decrease care workload, hospitals might also try to avoid in-patient treatment. If this
was the case we should observe a shift towards out-patients. Results in columns (3) to (6)
show no significant evidence for this. Whereas the number of out-patients significantly
increases when estimated without further controls, it does not seem to change differen-
tially in the two groups once controls are included. The effect of an additional increase
of 53 cases reported in column (4) refers to 3 percent of the baseline value36, but is not
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The additional increment in cases
clearly is lower for in-patients. The 75 cases reported in column (6) correspond to 0.7
percent of the pre-treatment period average. Still, the share of in-patients only marginally
decreases by 0.001 when estimated using the same specifications. Finally, columns (7) and
(8) report hospitals output measured in terms of days of care provided on average per
year. Again, results are not significant. On average treated institutions only decreased
35Interestingly, there is also a strong time trend towards hospital treatment in general. After the policy
change hospitals on average treat around 470 to 820 cases more than in 2009/2010 - even controlling
for size. This pattern is also descriptively depicted in the summary statistics in Table 1.1
36In 2009/2010 hospitals treated around 1,696 out-patients each year, compare Table 1.1.
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their number of care days by 717 and 1,044 compared to un-treated hospitals. Considering
the average duration of stay of less than 9 days per case, this corresponds to 116 patient
cases, i.e. around 1 percent of the average case number per hospital. Interestingly, the
sign is reversed to the sign of case numbers, indicating a stronger decrease in days per-
formed per patient. As can be seen in Table 1.5, estimating the average duration of stay
per case directly, however, does not reveal significant results either (columns (5) and (6)).
In summary, some of the results in Table 1.4 are indicative of the fact that health care
providers were not fully able to maintain the same output level as before the suspension
of drafting. Overall, however, effects are statistically insignificant and economically small.
If clinics did not or not strongly adapt their quantitative output levels, did they reduce
treatment quality instead? Table 1.5 reports results on patients’ health which can be seen
as an important indicator of treatment quality. The reported specifications correspond
to the ones reported in the previous table. Outcome variables are the number of patients
dying in a hospital in a given year in column (1) and (2), the share of patients dying in
columns (3) and (4), the average duration of stay per case, column (5) and (6) and the
share of patients discharged to another hospital after treatment in column (7) and (8).
The binary outcome “death incident” is a particularly reliable indicator of hospital quality
because it is robust to different coding behavior across hospitals. The same applies to the
duration of stay of a patient or the fact whether he or she was discharged to another hos-
pital, i.e. not fully recovered at the end of the stay in the considered institution. Patterns
are rather similar to the results reported in Table 1.4. They do not show any evidence of
a loss in treatment quality. Compared to the 250 patients dying in an average hospital
per year, the additional dead patient reported in column (2) is not only statistically in-
significant but only corresponds to less than 0.5 percent of death incidences. If anything,
the negative sign of the share of patients dying reported in the next 2 columns points
to a favorable development of death incidences in treated hospitals, but the differential
change is also not significantly different from 0 on conventional statistical levels. The
same applies to the decreased duration of stay or the likelihood of being discharged to
another hospital. A decrease in the duration of stay usually is interpreted as an increase
in productivity. A certain health status was obtained earlier37. Both estimations report
a negative, yet, insignificant coefficient - both statistically as well as economically. The
decrease in average duration of stay refers to a 3 percent drop compared to the baseline
37Obviously, one could also argue that a shorter duration of stay stands for an increased risk for the
patient. People could be discharged too early, leading, for instance, to unsupervised complications
or more relapses. As a consequence, one would observe higher re-admission rates. Recall, however,
that results on case numbers did not provide any clear cut evidence for more re-admissions (partly,
of course, because the data at hand are not feasible for investigating this question). Clearly, the
relationship between health status and changes in duration of stay is not linear. Therefore, results
from these regressions should be treated with caution.
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level, i.e. for more than 33 patients staying for the average duration just 1 is discharged
a day earlier. In summary, results point to the fact that hospitals did not react to the
policy change in terms of treated cases and objective treatment success.
1.5.3 Measuring Health Outcomes at Patient Level
There are at least two ways to measure patient outcomes when treatment (i.e. the policy
change) takes place on a hospital level. As presented in the previous section effects could
be estimated on a hospital level. The advantage of this approach is that specifications
considering patients’ health outcomes and results on other hospital parameters, as, for
instance, staffing or costs, are easily comparable as they rest on the exact same estimation
strategy. At the same time, estimations of shares of people dying in hospital or average
durations of stay include an implicit re-weighting of the results because each hospital,
regardless of how many patients are treated in it, is regarded as equally important to
the analysis. Policy makers, however, might also be interested in the effects on patients
directly. Therefore, an alternative specification considering patient outcomes based on
single patient observations is provided. Furthermore, results on the short-run effects on
patients which can be identified from within treatment year variation are presented in
this paper.
The identification of the effects on patients rests on a symmetric time window around
the policy change. To uncover the short-run effects the sample is restricted to 2011.
In particular, the health outcomes of patients hospitalized six months before and after
the cut-off date are compared. A key concern with this simple difference is that the
health outcomes of patients might systematically vary on the two sides of the cut-off
date, i.e. patients hospitalized between January and June might a priori have different
average durations of stay and mortality levels than patients hospitalized between July and
December, for instance, due to seasonality in diseases. In order to avoid biased estimates,
I use patients from the previous year as an additional control group. This control group is
then comprised of patients hospitalized (and discharged) between January, 1st 2010 and
December 31, 2010. All of these patients where unaffected by the suspension of military
drafting and no other policy change occurred at the control cut-off date. The regarding
regression model can be written in the following way:
yihm = β0 + β1aboveih + β2afterim + β3(aboveih · afterim) +
∑
m
θmDim + λ′Xihm + εihm
(1.3)
where aboveih is a binary variable equal to one if a patient i was treated in a hospital h that
was highly affected by the policy change, i.e. it switches on for patients in hospitals whose
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share of people performing community service was above zero before 2011. The coefficient
β1 then captures the differences between highly affected and unaffected hospitals. afterim
is a binary indicator equal to one if patient i was hospitalized in the second half of a given
year, i.e. between months m July and December. β2 captures differences in-between
patients treated in different parts of the year. The interaction between these previous two
variables (aboveih·afterim), switches on for patients hospitalized in the second half of 2011,
i.e. after the suspension of military drafting. The coefficient β3 then is the differences-in-
differences effect of interest. To allow for additional heterogeneity in seasonal effects that
may arise because patients are affected by different conditions over the year, I control
for a full set of month-of-hospitalization dummies. Xihm is a vector of additional control
variables including the same variables as in the previous specifications and indicated in the
regarding tables. Equation (1.3) is estimated separately for a patient’s duration of stay
and likelihood of dying. To account for correlation of patient outcomes within regions,
standard errors εihm are clustered at the nuts-2 level38.
Results for the probability of dying in a hospital and the average duration of stay on
patient level are presented in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. Recall that when average numbers
or share of patients dying in hospital where estimated on hospital level, no effect on
either of the two indicators was detectable. Interestingly, when estimated on patient
level small effects on the probability of dying in a hospital can be observed. As can be
seen in columns (1) to (4) of Table 1.6 the effect is smaller than 0.0 percentage points
unless all control variables are included (column (5)). The full specification indicates a
small positive effect on the likelihood of dying 0.1 percentage points which stands for 4
percent of the baseline value of 2.24 percentage points. Considering the decrease in the
likelihood of dying over time39, the effect of the policy change almost fully compensates
the favorable development in death probability all hospitals experience. This means that
despite controlling for hospital size, hospital averages cover up a small effect on the risk
of dying for all patients. Note, however, that the R-squared of these estimations is also
really low even despite the fact that a full set of month of hospitalization controls is
included. One could also suspect the significance of these results to be driven by the
high number of patient observations. Whereas the estimations based on hospital averages
were relying on around 4,500 observations, the sample here includes more than 28 million
observations. Table 1.7, presenting results on patients durations of stay, indicates that
this is not the case. Based on the same number of observations results on the length
of stay are not significantly different from 0. Hence, they deliver the same result as the
38Clustering standard errors on the hospital level to account for within hospital variation instead only
slightly increases significance for the effect on duration of stay in one specification. All other tests
deliver the exact same significance levels. Results are available on request.
39Compare the summary statistics presented in Table 1.1 which indicate a drop of 0.13 percentage points.
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previous specifications. The policy change did not have any effect on the average duration
of stay. Whereas results on hospital level lead to an insignificant coefficient of between
-0.29 and -0.39 days, results on the patient level are even closer to zero (between -0.04
and -0.06 days).
Table 1.6: Death Incidents on Patient Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Additional Change in Treated Hospitals 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.001**
(S.E.) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Additional Staff for Free/Not-for-Profit Providers 0.002** 0.001
(Baseline Public Hospitals) [0.001] [0.000]
Additional Staff in Private Hospitals 0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.000]
Additional Staff in Hospitals with 75-124 Beds 0.010*** 0.004*
(Baseline <75 Beds in Hospital) [0.003] [0.002]
Additional Staff in Hospitals with 125-249 Beds 0.012*** 0.006***
[0.003] [0.002]
Additional Staff in Hospitals with 250-499 Beds 0.013*** 0.008***
[0.003] [0.002]
Additional Staff in Hospitals with 500 and more 0.012*** 0.009***
[0.003] [0.002]
Share of People Obtaining Surgery -0.010*** -0.009***
[0.002] [0.001]
Share of Female Patients -0.018*** -0.007
[0.004] [0.004]
Share of Patients 75 and Above 0.074*** 0.085***
[0.005] [0.005]
Hospital Provider Dummies No Yes No No Yes
Hospital Size Controls No No Yes No Yes
Hospital Patient Mix Controls No No No Yes Yes
Full Set of Controls No No No No Yes
Observations 28,135,721 28,135,721 28,135,721 28,135,721 28,135,721
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table reports how the likelihood of dying in hospital changes in response to the suspension of military drafting. The sample is
restricted to patients in general hospitals. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for death. The key independent variable in all of
the specifications reported in this table is an interaction term. It equals one for treated hospitals after the policy change and its coefficient
indicates the additional change a “treated” hospital experiences due to the policy change. The first line reports the additional change in
the likelihood of dying in treated hospitals due to the policy change (the differences-in-differences estimator). The specifications include a
variety of hospital, regional and patient mix controls as indicated. Dummy variables for public, private and free or not-for-profit providers are
included in column (2). Bedclass indicators, summarized in 5 categories (less than 75, 75-124, 125-249, 250-499, 500 or more), are included
in column (3). The specification in column (4) controls for the patient composition of hospitals by including the share of females, the share
of patients aged 75 and above and the share of people that undergo surgery during their hospital stay as control variables. Additionally to
all of the above, the specification including the full set of control variables, presented in column (5), includes dummy variables for the type
of hospital (i.e. university hospital, hospital forming part of the German hospital plan, hospital with a hospital provision contract or other
hospitals), the share and squared share of apprentices in total staff and regional characteristics. Regional characteristics refer to the degree
of regional agglomeration, considering 8 categories ranging from “densely populated urban areas” to “rural county, lightly populated”. Note
that only hospitals with a capacity of 100 beds have to report patient characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the nuts-2 level. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05 and * p < 0.1.
Source: German Hospital and Patient Statistics (2010-2011)
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1.5.4 The Drop in People Performing Community Service and
Hospital Staffing
The previous section has shown that hospitals were largely able to maintain their output
levels in terms of quantity as well as quality. But then, how did they compensate the
loss of draftees? If they did not adjust output levels did they hire other staff? As the
majority of draftees in hospitals performed tasks in care support, nurses can be seen as
the closest substitute to people performing community service and the staff group most
likely to compensate the work of draftees40. Table 1.8 provides results on how hospital’s
labor input from nurses changed through the suspension of drafting. I apply the same
specification as above, with sets of control variables varying as indicated in the table.
Again, the first column reports the pure difference in development over time between the
treatment and control group without including controls. To shed light on the changes in
staffing several different staffing measures are constructed. I first consider overall labor
input by nurses by estimating yearly average FTEs. This accounts for different types
of employment relationships. It reveals that hospitals that experienced a drop in people
performing community service did not hire more additional nurses than hospitals that
did not experience a drop. The coefficient is positive in specifications without control
variables or when controlling for the full set of controls, but is not significantly different
from zero in any of the presented or further tested specifications.
It is, of course, possible that hospitals implicitly adapted their labor input by changing
the workload the same personnel had to manage. To examine the complete picture of
care staffs’ labor input, 3 more indicators of labor input are reported in Table 1.8. The
effects on nurses per bed are reported in columns (3) and (4). In both specifications
presented, as well as in all other specifications including the control variables discussed
above, the differences-in-differences coefficient is insignificant and rather close to zero,
indicating that the capacity nurses had to cover did not change differentially in the two
groups. Obviously, the pure capacity of the hospital does not always equate the actual
workload per person, therefore, another indicator considering the workload of nurses in
terms of care days is constructed41. The baseline and main specifications are reported in
columns (5) and (6). Again, the differences-in-differences coefficients show no response
in reaction to the suspension of drafting. Finally, the same applies to the workload of
nurses in terms of patient case numbers. The workload in terms of case numbers reflects
a different aspect of workload because some labor intensive tasks, as, for instance, paper
40Note that the group “nurses” subsumes trained nurses as well as untrained but fully paid employees in
care, but excludes specialized care personnel, such as radiographers or physiotherapists and volunteers.
In Germany nursing is a 3 year vocational training.
41It reflects how many hours of care (i.e. invoiced care days x 24) were actually performed per working
hours of a FTE equivalent (i.e. per FTE x 220 [working days per year] x 8 [hours])
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work or general examinations, only have to be performed in the context of an intake or a
discharge of a person. Regressions reported in column (7) and (8) show that the number
of patient cases in a hospital did not develop differently in the two groups, revealing
that hospitals also did not react in this dimension of care staff’s workload either. When
all hospital characteristics are controlled for, the coefficient raises to 1.6, indicating that
treated hospitals experienced an additional increment of patient cases per nurse, but
considering the standard error of 1.1 this coefficient is not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels. It is, however, important to note that none of the measures
referring to FTEs takes extra hours into account.
If hospitals did not adapt in terms of trained and untrained nurses, did they compensate
the labor input in terms of other staff groups instead? To shed light on this question
Table 1.9 reports the results for specialized medical care staff and apprentices, two other
staff groups, that could be regarded as similar to draftees. Hospitals could educate more
apprentices for two reasons. Firstly, among all staff groups in a hospital apprentices are
most likely to carry out low-skilled and assisting tasks, in particular in care, whereas their
salaries are comparably low. Therefore, hiring more apprentices could be a cost conscious
way of replacing people performing community service. Secondly, it could be possible
that there is not enough trained staff available on the labor market. Training apprentices
could then be the only option to replace care staff in the long-run. Results in column
(1) and (2) show that this was not the case. No matter which control variables included,
the differences-in-differences estimator is never distinguishable from zero. Another short-
run alternative could be hiring more specialized medical care staff, for instance, dietary
advisors or radiographers. These are usually more costly if, however, there is not enough
other care staff available they could be employed instead. Column (3) and (4) show that
this was not the case. Without controlling for hospital characteristics, there seems to be an
additional increase in hospitals experiencing a decrease in people performing community
service, but the coefficient moves a lot closer to zero and becomes insignificant once
hospital and regional characteristics are controlled for. In summary, no other staff group
performing care or care related tasks was adjusted measurably in response to the drop
out of people performing community service.
Similar patterns hold true for the effects on doctoral staff presented in Table 1.10. The
first two columns present results on numbers on doctors regardless of type of contract.
This measure is added because physicians are more likely to work hours over-time than
the other staff groups discussed above. Therefore, hiring more (part-time) physicians
could help hospitals in increasing labor input without necessarily adapting the amount
of contracted hours. Column (3) and (4) present the effect on full-time equivalences,
whereas columns (5) and (6) consider the workload in terms of patient hours relative to
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1 Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production
Table 1.9: Effects on Measures of Staffing: Other Medical Staff and Apprentices
Apprentices Other Medical Staff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Additional Change in Treated Hospitals 0.241 -0.702 -0.625 1.140
(S.E.) [1.444] [1.051] [6.683] [3.284]
Hospital Controls No Yes No Yes
Regional Controls No Yes No Yes
Patient Mix Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 4,541 4,541 4,541 4,541
R-squared 0.024 0.575 0.016 0.766
Notes: The table shows how the staffing with apprentices (columns (1)-(2)) and other medical staff (columns (3)-(4)) respond
to the suspension of military drafting. Other medical staff refers to specialised and trained care staff, including for instance
physiotherapists, radiographers or dietary advisors but excluding nurses. Both groups are given in yearly average FTE. The
first specification always shows the pure difference-in-difference estimator and the second specification includes the full set of
control variables to gain precision. The full set of control variables includes dummy variables for public, private and free or
not-for-profit providers, bedclass indicators, summarized in 5 categories (less than 75, 75-124, 125-249, 250-499, 500 or more),
controls for the patient composition of hospitals (i.e. the share of females, the share of patients aged 75 and above and the share
of people that undergo surgery during their hospital stay), dummy variables for the type of hospital (i.e. university hospital,
hospital forming part of the German hospital plan, hospital with a hospital provision contract or other hospitals), the share and
squared share of apprentices in total staff and regional characteristics (considering 8 categories ranging from “densely populated
urban areas” to “rural county, lightly populated”). Shares are calculated based on staff and patients in the final data set. The
sample is restricted to general hospitals with more than 100 beds. Standard errors are clustered at the nuts-2 level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: German Hospital and Patient Statistics (2009-2012)
working hours of doctors (parallel to the measure for nurses presented above) the last two
columns present the labor input relative to patient case numbers. Eventually, none of the
dimensions indicates a differential change in treatment and control group hospitals.
In conclusion, hospitals did not notably adapt any of the contracted labor input related
to health production and patient care in response to the suspension of drafting.
1.5.5 The Reduction in Low-Skilled Personnel and Hospital Costs
So far we have established that hospitals were largely able to maintain their output levels
while not adapting any of their contracted labor input. According to the hospital produc-
tion function discussed above, we then should observe higher spending on capital input
indicating that hospitals moved along the hospital production niveau curve, i.e. produce
the same output with a different ratio of capital to labor. Do the empirical findings cor-
roborate these theoretical predictions?
Table 1.11 presents results on hospital costs showing that empirical findings are indeed
in line with theoretical predictions. As a first overview, columns (1) and (2) show overall
hospital expenditure. This is a summary measure for all costs of the hospital that are not
covered by public authorities, including material costs, staff costs, training costs just as
well as costs for hospital administration. Overall hospital costs increased by additional
50
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1 Low-Skilled Labor in Hospital Production
2.4 million Euros in hospitals that experienced a drop in people performing community
service. Considering that hospitals on average spent 46.7 million Euros per year in the
pre-policy period and 52.1 million in the after policy period this corresponds to around 5
percent of the average expenditure of hospitals or an increase to the general time trend
of 44 percent.
Considering the single cost components in more detail, as presented in columns (3) to (10),
leads to the insight that the largest share of this increment is caused by material costs (45
percent) and expenditure on doctoral staff (24 percent). Material costs include various
types of costs related to the treatment of the patient, in particular, medical consumables
like drugs, bandages, instruments, therapeutic appliances, blood and plasma and can be
seen as a way to measure capital input of the hospital. An increment in average hospital
material expenditure indicates that more capital was needed to treat, as shown before, a
rather stable number of patients. This not only points to pure economic inefficiencies in
the production process, but can also have potentially harmful consequences for patients
not measured by the objective output indicators presented above. Cawley et al. (2006),
for instance, show that more capital input can stand for greater use of psychoactive drugs,
which does not necessarily lead to a higher likelihood to die but at the same time might
not be the ideal way to treat patients. This evidence is in line with studies finding that
less skilled doctors (i.e. lower labor input on the intensive margin) cause higher treatment
costs (Doyle et al. 2010).
Interestingly, splitting up total hospital expenditure also reveals an increment of expen-
diture on doctoral staff. On average, as reported in columns (9) and (10) of Table 1.11,
affected hospitals spent slightly more than half a million Euros on physicians extra, while,
as shown above, not hiring significantly more doctors. An average hospital employed 88
doctors after the policy change, i.e. this effect equals 565 additional Euros per doctor
each month after losing the people performing community service. With this data set
it is not possible to distinguish whether physicians earned more per contracted hour or
worked more hours than contracted42, but it is very clear that at least one of the two
must be true. Given that hospitals paid around 57 Euros per contracted hour of labor
input on doctors before, 565 additional Euros per month stand for 2.5 extra hours of work
each week. Assuming that (only) hours worked overtime increased, these would add up to
880 hours per year in total43. Volunteers replacing people performing community service
offered around 1100 hours. Interestingly, this would mean that the additional labor input
by doctors and volunteers add up to around the loss of hours performed by people per-
forming community service (1840 hours). As shown in columns (5) to (8) of Table 1.11,
42Recall that only contracted hours are reported, whether staff works over time is not documented.
43If hospitals paid higher salaries the additional 565 Euros would stand for an increase of around 3.50
Euros per hour.
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there is no additional spending on care staff and apprentices.
In summary, the findings on hospital expenditure show two things. Firstly, the drop in
low-skilled labor leads to a higher capital to labor input ratio. While hospitals are able to
maintain their output levels in terms of quantity and measurable quality this still might
have potentially harmful consequences for patients. Secondly, while compensating the
loss in labor input by utilizing more capital, hospitals also spend more money on doctoral
labor, which is complementary to capital input. Interestingly, the additional spending
amounts to around 880 hours equivalences of labor, which in sum with hours worked by
volunteers equals approximately the average decrease in labor input by people performing
community service.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates labor in hospital production. It sheds light on how hospital pro-
duction, staffing, and costs react to a sudden reduction of labor input from low-skilled
staff. Providing evidence on this requires very comprehensive data on hospital’s in- as
well as outputs. Therefore, this paper uses administrative data from the German Hospital
and Patient Statistics, covering all of the hospitals and clinics of the country including the
vast majority of their patients. The identification strategy of this paper exploits quasi-
experimental variation in staffing induced by the indefinite suspension of military drafting
in Germany in 2011.
This policy change, in combination with newly available rich administrative data, allows
to add to the existing literature by providing one of the first papers to use exogenous
variation, which affects hospital staffing, but does not originate in the health system.
Additionally, the indefinite suspension of drafting enables us to study a much longer time
horizon than most other studies, as previous sources of variation (strikes or seasonal fluc-
tuations) are typically short-lived. By exploiting exogenous variation from the suspension
of mandatory military service this paper also contributes to the understanding of the eco-
nomic effects of drafting and its substitute services.
Empirical results provide several interesting insights. Firstly, hospitals impacted by the
policy change neither decrease their quantitative output nor their measurable output qual-
ity.
Secondly, medical institutions also do not alter their staffing structure in response to the
suspension of drafting. There is no evidence on a differential change in number of full-time
equivalences of nurses, specialized care staff, apprentices or doctors between hospitals af-
fected and unaffected by the policy change. The same applies to various other measures
of staff’s workload, like, for instance, the number of cases or beds per nurse and doctor
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or the number of care hours performed.
Thirdly, considering hospital’s costs reveals interesting patterns on capital input as well
as on labor expenditure. For one thing, the drop in low-skilled labor leads to a higher
capital to labor input ratio. While hospitals are able to maintain their output levels in
terms of quantity and measurable quality this still might have potentially harmful con-
sequences for patients. For another thing, while compensating the loss in labor input
by utilizing more capital, hospitals also spend more money on doctoral labor, either to
finance overtime or on higher wages. Interestingly, the additional spending is equivalent
to around 880 hours of labor from doctors, which in sum with hours worked by volunteers
equals approximately the average decrease in labor input by people performing commu-
nity service. There is no additional spending on care staff and apprentices.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 German Hospital and Patient Statistics (2009-2012)
The administrative data in the German Hospital and Patient Statistics is an important in-
formational source for health policy and serves as the planning basis for the federal states
involved in financing of hospitals and clinics. Every hospital and clinic is obliged by law
to report detailed information on a variety of figures to the Federal Ministry of Health.
The data are collected and administered by the statistical offices of the German federal
states. General conditions regarding these statistics are regulated in §28 of the KHG.
To focus on the periods around the policy change, I restrict the Hospital and Patient
Statistics to the years 2009 to 2012. The basic sample consists of between 1571 (2009)
and 1495 (2012) general hospitals reporting detailed figures on hospital production, staff
numbers, hospital costs and a variety of other measures that serve as control variables.
People performing community service: The identification strategy of this paper rests
on the number of people performing community service in the year 2010, the year prior
to the policy change. Treatment and control group in all specifications are distinguished
by the extent to which hospitals rely on labor input by people performing community
service. The main specification compares hospitals that did not report any people per-
forming community service in 2010 to those that did. Hospitals are not only obligated by
law to report staff, they also have clear incentives to report all people performing com-
munity service, because their salaries were partly paid by public authorities. Therefore,
I also include hospitals that reported a missing for people performing community service
in the control group, assuming they simply did not report zeros.
Hospital output variables: To analyze how hospitals’ output reacts to the policy
change, I construct several measures on numbers of patients treated and treatment dura-
tion. Case numbers is an overall head count of all in- and outpatients treated in a hospital
in a given year. Number of out-patients refers to numbers of registered cases for which
hospitals reported a duration of stay of a day or less in general hospitals. This is done
because registering a patient with a duration of stay of one day is very common even if
the actual hospital stay takes less than 24 hours and does not include staying over night.
In-patients are identified by a duration of stay of two days and above. An analysis of the
development and interaction of these types of cases allows us to identify one important
potential way of reacting to the policy change if original staffing levels cannot be retained.
Days of care is a summary measure of the total number of care days performed in a hos-
pital in a given year regardless of case numbers and severity.
Further output measures refer to patients health as objectively as possible. Mortality is
measured in absolut numbers of in-hospital death incedences as well as in share of people
dying in hospital (=case fatality rate). Mortality is the most severe clinical outcome, but
is also commonly used as a quality indicator for hospitals. One clear advantage of this
outcome is, that it is robust to different coding behavior of hospitals (Wissenschaftliches
Institut der AOK 2007: p.29) and thereby easily comparable across hospitals. This can
be of relevance because hospitals record their own data and know that this data can be
used for quality evaluation. Therefore, despite the fact that there are strong incentives to
report data correctly as to being paid accordingly, there might be an incentive to down
play adverse events like complications. Average duration of stay indicates the average du-
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ration of stay of all in-patients in the final sample in a hospital. Hospitals have a strong
incentive to discharge patients as soon as possible, i.e. as soon as a patient reaches the
necessary level of health to be discharged. A longer duration of stay means that hospitals
need more time to reach that level, indicating adverse effects on patients’ health. Dis-
charges to other hospitals provides the share of patients that at the end of their stay in a
clinic cannot be discharged but need to be transferred to another hospital. The reason for
this transferral cannot be identified in the data, therefore, it is unclear whether a patient
has not yet recovered, is eligible for a rehabilitation clinic or the hospital does not have
the capacity to treat him or her any further.
Labor input variables: The main dependent variables to measure labor input are the
numbers (regardless of type or scope of employment relationship) and yearly average full-
time equivalences of all low, medium and high-skilled staff of hospitals. Staff head count
refers to the number of all directly employed people at any institution as matters stand
on December, 31 each year. This does not account for different types of employment rela-
tionships. Therefore, information on yearly average FTE is included. FTEs are calculated
based on the working hours of all contracts over the course of the year, for instance, a
full-time employed nurse working from January until March, would be reported as 0.25
FTE. The same applies to most other groups considered, except apprentices who are
converted with a factor of 9.5 to 1 or 6 to 1, depending on their type.
To reflect various aspects of care staffs’ labor input, I define 3 more measures of labor
input by doctoral and care staff. Nurses/doctors per bed refers to yearly average full-time
equivalences per installed hospital bed. Workload of nurses and doctors in terms of care
hours is an indicator of how many care hours were performed per actual working hours
of a yearly average full-time equivalent44. Workload of nurses/doctors in terms of case
numbers relates the number of cases per hospital and year to the number of full-time
equivalences.
Cost measures: The main dependent variables to measure hospitals costs and expendi-
ture on a variety of assets are hospital’s overall expenditure and expenditure split up by
single staff groups and material in Euros per year. Overall hospital costs is a summary
measure for all costs of the hospital that are not covered by public authorities, including
material costs, staff costs, training costs just as well as costs for hospital administration.
Costs for the single staff groups are split up in eleven subcategories in the original data
set (including for instance doctoral services, care services, medical-technical services and
administration). This paper considers doctoral services, cares services and expenditure on
staff training in more detail. All of these are measured in yearly sum per hospital grouped
by staff category. Material costs include various types of costs related to the treatment of
the patient. In particular, medical consumables like drugs, bandages, instruments, ther-
apeutic appliances, blood and plasma are contained in this summary measure.
Control variables: As additional control variables I use hospital characteristics like type
of sponsor (public, private, non-statutory welfare services), type of hospital (i.e. univer-
sity hospital, hospital forming part of the German hospital plan, hospital with provision
contract or others) and share of apprentices in total staff. Hospital size is controlled for
by number of installed beds. Following the literature (compare, for instance, Breyer et al.
2013) these are summarized in 5 categories (less than 75, 75-124, 125-249, 250-499, 500
44Care hours equals reported care days x 24, whereas working hours of yearly average full-time equiva-
lences equals FTE x 220 [working days per year] x 8 [hours].
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or more). Additionally regional characteristics are accounted for by controlling for the
degree of regional agglomeration by considering 8 categories ranging from densely popu-
lated urban areas to rural county, lightly populated. This is relevant because descriptive
evidence has shown marked differences between treatment prevalence across counties.
Hospitals with more than 100 beds also provide information on all of their patients, their
main (and, if applicable, secondary) condition and additional details like age, gender,
place of residency, day of hospitalization and discharge, ward with the longest duration
of stay of the patient and if a surgery was performed. To additionally control for the type
of patients hospitals treat, I include share of female patients, share of patients aged 75 or
older and share of surgeries performed.
1.A.2 Additional Figures
Figure 1.7: Community Service in All German Hospitals
Source: German Hospital Statistics, Aggregate Data
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CHAPTER2
Free Universal Daycare: Effects on Children
and Maternal Labor Supply
joint work with Christina Gathmann
2.1 Introduction
Many governments have invested sizable amounts of taxpayer’s money into fostering day-
care for preschool children.1 Proponents of such policies argue that money invested in
early childhood education is well spent as it simultaneously boosts female labor supply,
benefits child development and promotes a level playing field for children from disadvan-
taged family backgrounds. Initially, policy-makers focused on providing daycare prior to
school entry (“kindergarten”). Over time, political attention has shifted to expanding
daycare for ever younger children.
Hitherto, the empirical evidence on daycare for older pre-school children is much more
comprehensive than our understanding of the impact on children under the age of three.2
How public daycare influences family choices and child development is likely dependent
on the age of a child. Sensitive periods for certain skills like language acquisition and
visual memory (see e.g. Robson 2002; Siegler et al. 2017) and possible dynamic comple-
1Countries like France, Sweden, Norway or Denmark have long offered universal access to public child-
care. Others, like Germany, Spain, the UK or the U.S., have expanded public daycare and pre-K
programs much more recently – beginning in the 1990s.
2A sizable literature investigates the labor supply effects of daycare prior to school entry (Gelbach 2002;
Berlinski and Galiani 2007; Cascio 2009) and daycare for children between the ages of three and six
(Schlosser 2006; Fitzpatrick 2010; Havnes and Mogstad 2011a; Nollenberger and Rodriguez-Planas
2015). A much smaller literature investigates the consequences of daycare attendance on the short-
and medium-run development of 3-6-year old children (Datta Gupta and Simonsen 2010; Blanden
et al. 2016; Cornelissen et al. 2018). Yet another literature analyzes more long-term consequences
of daycare on educational attainment, for instance (see e.g. Black et al. 2014; Carneiro et al. 2015;
Dustmann and Schönberg 2012; Havnes and Mogstad 2011b).
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mentarities over time (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Heckman 2007) might make daycare
more productive at some ages than others, for instance.3
Most previous evidence for very young children stems from highly targeted programs for
disadvantaged families like Head Start, for instance.4 Universal early childcare programs
that offer public daycare to young children likely have different effects than targeted
programs to help disadvantaged children (Baker 2011; Cascio 2017; Kottelenberg and
Lehrer 2017). It is only very recently that a few studies on the consequences of public
childcare for very young children on labor supply (Goux and Maurin 2010) and first skill
development (Felfe and Lalive 2018; Fort et al. 2019) emerged.
In this paper, we exploit the staggered introduction of free universal daycare in German
states to track how families with pre-school children between the age of 2 and 6 respond
to and benefit from the policies. Specifically, we make four contributions to the literature
on childcare and early childhood education. Most importantly, we can compare whether
the margins of adjustment to and benefits of a free daycare policy differ for 2-year-olds
and 5-year-olds, for instance. Since attendance rates in many countries have traditionally
been much higher for older pre-school children, providing daycare free of charge is likely
to generate stronger behavioral responses among families with very young children for
which attendance rates are still low.
Second, we can assess the impact of free daycare on a range of family choices, including
childcare arrangements and labor supply, as well as short-run child development. Ana-
lyzing the full range of family responses to daycare policies is crucial for interpreting the
estimated effects on child development. Children are less likely to benefit from a free day-
care policy, for instance, if parents switch from high-quality parental care to low-quality
public care; they are more likely to benefit if families switch from low-quality informal (or
parental) care to high-quality daycare instead.
Because the policies we study are universal, our third contribution is to shed light on
who responds to the policy; and whether the benefits accrue to the average child or
are concentrated among children from disadvantaged families, for instance. Whether
public daycare is able to level the playing field between poor and more affluent families
is of central interest to policy-makers concerned about equality of opportunity in early
childhood education.
Finally, the policy we analyze offered childcare subsidies rather than merely expanding
daycare supply. Providing additional daycare slots expands the choice set of parents,
3Also, earlier evidence showed negative effects of maternal labor supply among very young children that
turn positive when the child is two years or older (James-Burdumy 2005). Also, the trade-off between
parental preferences, returns to work and childcare constraints might be very different for a 2-year-old
than for a 6-year-old.
4See e.g. Currie and Thomas (1995); Garces and Currie (2002); Love et al. (2005); Ludwig and Miller
(2007); Carneiro and Ginja (2014); Walters (2015).
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which generates substitution effects out of care at home or informal care into formal
childcare. Free daycare, in turn, is equivalent to a price decline of public daycare relative
to other childcare options and, since it is uncompensated, there will be both income and
substitution effects on childcare and labor supply choices. Hence, children might still
benefit from the policy even though parents do not adjust their labor supply behavior,
for instance.5
Closest to our analysis are two studies that also analyze the effect of childcare subsidies on
maternal labor supply and child development (Black et al. 2014; Baker et al. 2008).6 Black
et al. (2014) exploit income thresholds for subsidies targeted at 5-year-olds in Norway to
identify the effect on long-run child outcomes in junior high school and female labor
supply. Our study can provide evidence of childcare subsidies across the full age range of
pre-school children. A second advantage of our study is that we explore the heterogeneity
of effects for disadvantaged families, which are often the focus of the political debate
on early childhood education. Baker et al. (2008) study the introduction of the Family
Policy in Quebec that expanded daycare supply and further offered generous subsidies for
children between the ages of 1 and 5. One advantage of our analysis is that we can exploit
free daycare policies in nine states rather than just one state. Furthermore, we explore
the heterogeneity of free daycare policies for different child ages and for disadvantaged
families. Both types of heterogeneity are important to understand who responds to and
benefits the most from free daycare policies; and to inform policy-makers on the targeting
of public daycare policies.
Germany provides an interesting case to analyze childcare policies. Federal and state
governments in Germany spend a lot of public resources, about 200 billions Euros per
year, on various family policy measures (Bonin et al. 2013). Yet, many women, despite
having surpassed men in their formal education, still drop out of the labor force or work
only part-time once they have children. Many people argue that affordable childcare,
especially for children under three, is crucial to boost female labor force participation and
promote economic self-sufficiency, especially for economically disadvantaged families (e.g.
Attanasio et al. 2008).
Our empirical analysis uses birthday cutoffs for school entry to define eligibility of a
child for a free daycare slot in a state and year. Eligibility thus depends on the state of
residence, the child’s birth cohort and age. Hence, we compare the choices of families
5Furthermore, the behavioral response might be larger or smaller in response to declining daycare prices
than in response to the availability of daycare. The labor supply effect of a free daycare policy might
be smaller if maternal labor supply is mainly held back by rationing of slots rather than high prices.
6Focusing on labor supply and reforms in childcare subsidies a few studies find no effect on female labor
supply in Sweden (Lundin et al. 2008) but sizable effects on employment and hours worked in Canada
(Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008). Offering a generous child benefit for newborns results in a substantial
postponement of maternal labor supply in Spain, however (Gonzalez 2013).
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with eligible children in states with a free daycare policy in place to the choices of families
with children in the same birth cohort and age who live in states without a free daycare
policy. Both graphical evidence and estimates from placebo reforms confirm the absence
of differential pre-trends between families in treatment and control states. We further
bolster our findings by performing a large number of robustness checks to rule out that
differences in child age, the supply of daycare, local economic conditions or other policy
features may explain our results. Our alternative specifications and informal validity tests
yield estimates that are very similar to the baseline estimates.
Existing studies on Germany all focus on the rapid expansion of public daycare for children
between the ages of 3 and 6. Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2015) find that maternal labor
supply responded strongly to the better availability of daycare. More recent contributions
show that the average effect of daycare is small but benefits are largest for minority
children and those children least likely to attend daycare (Cornelissen et al. 2018; Kühnle
and Oberfichtner 2017). There is only one prior study that analyzes childcare attendance
under the age of three (Felfe and Lalive 2018). They find developmental benefits for
some, but not all children.7 Our paper differs from prior studies on Germany along three
dimensions: first, we study policies that affect children between the ages of two and six.
We can therefore compare which and how families with children at different ages adjust
their behavior and who benefits from the policy. Second, we analyze a free daycare policy
rather than the availability of daycare per se. As discussed above, the behavioral responses
and overall effects we expect from a free daycare policy are likely to differ from expanding
daycare availability. Finally, our policies were introduced in many states, which differ
widely in their economic and social structure. Hence, our estimates capture the average
treatment effect of a universal free daycare policy rather than pick up the effects of specific
conditions or policy features in one locality or state.
Our analysis yields five main findings. First, the free daycare policy only affects the
youngest children aged between 2 and 3. Access to a free daycare slot raises daycare
attendance in that age group by 8.4 percentage points or 17% relative to the pre-policy
period. We further observe a corresponding decline in exclusive care at home. Interest-
ingly, the use of informal daycare by relatives, friends or neighbors for children in this
age group actually goes up by 8.3 percentage points or 22% suggesting that formal and
informal daycare are complements in our context.
Second, daycare attendance for older children (aged 3 and above) does not respond to
the free daycare policy. In particular, we find no effect for the most common policy that
adopted a free year of daycare prior to school entry (‘kindergarten’). The main reason
7Gathmann and Sass (2018) in turn analyze the effect of a home care subsidy, which is equivalent to a
price hike for public daycare, on families with 2 years-old children in East Germany.
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is that daycare attendance for children aged 3 and above has been high (94.4%) even
before the policies were introduced. For most families with 3-6 year-old children, the free
daycare policy is just windfall income. Our results indicate that some of the additional
income is used to purchase informal childcare.
Third, we observe substantial positive employment effects among mothers with 2-3 year-
old children after the policy is adopted. Labor force participation increases by 7.7 percent-
age points or 17% relative to the pre-reform period. Mothers with older children (aged
between 4 and 6) in turn increase their labor supply at the intensive margin – working
more full-time and increase working hours by almost two hours per week (or 11%). Over-
all, these results imply that the additional income saved from the free daycare slot is not
used to reduce female labor supply.
Fourth, the free daycare policy has few persistent effects on child development. For the
youngest children, we observe no overall effect, though a negative effect on skills in daily
activities (i.e. whether the child can use a spoon on its own, for instance) and a positive
effect on social skills. For children aged 5 to 6, we find no overall effect and also no
effect on sub-categories measuring behavioral problems. Hence, the policy seems to do no
persistent harm, but also creates few benefits in terms of cognitive or non-cognitive skills
for the average preschool child.
Finally, we document substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effect: poor and low-
skilled households respond more to the policy than the average family. Children from
low-skilled and poor households are more likely to attend public daycare and less likely
to be cared for exclusively at home. Poor children in particular benefit from free daycare,
which boosts their cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In contrast, we find no effect on
female labor supply suggesting that either the returns to work (more) or labor supply
elasticities more broadly are small for low-income and low-skilled mothers.
Overall, the free daycare policy substantially reduced the gap between rich and poor as
well as between skilled and low-skilled households. For both groups, the pre-reform atten-
dance gaps of around 13 percentage points declines by up to two-thirds after introducing
free daycare. Children from less educated households especially, benefit from the policy
in terms of their cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Hence, a free daycare policy, despite
being a universal policy, contributes to better equality of opportunities thus leveling the
playing field between children from more and less advantaged backgrounds.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background information on
public daycare and the adoption of the state-wide reforms. Section 3 discusses the policy
variation and our estimation approach, while section 4 introduces the data sources. We
present our main results in section 5 and discuss a battery of robustness checks in section
6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
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2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Public Daycare in Germany
We now provide relevant background information on the childcare market in Germany and
the adoption of free daycare policies. Daycare outside the home is supplied by either the
municipalities or private, non-profit providers, mostly churches and non-statutory welfare
services. Municipalities supply around one-third of the childcare slots, while private, non-
profit agencies provide around two-thirds. Private, for-profit childcare providers cover
only a very small share of the market - around 2% for children under 3 and 0.3% for
children from 3-6 years of age (Berger et al. 2008).
Federal regulations explicitly define three goals of public daycare: providing care and cus-
tody for preschool children; advancing their social and non-cognitive skills; and fostering
the children’s education and learning. In practice, many different educational approaches
(like Montessori, Waldorf etc.) exist side-by-side. Most popular in center-based day-
care is the situation-oriented approach, a social pedagogy tradition that stresses flexible
schedules, problem-solving and social skills through play, social interaction and informal
learning. This tradition contrasts with a more school-oriented approach that focuses on
teaching cognitive skills and basic knowledge (Sohns 2009).
Germany’s childcare system is considered of intermediate quality in terms of public ex-
penditures, but of relatively homogeneous quality thanks to strict regulations of quality
standards and high educational qualifications of childcare staff. Combined public and
private expenditures on early childhood education are around 0.6% of Germany’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), which is similar to the EU average though below the expen-
diture share in France, the UK and some Scandinavian countries (OECD 2013). The
federal and state governments put in place detailed regulations to ensure a certain quality
level in daycare centers. All childcare facilities require a permit which may be revoked
if standards regarding group sizes, educational background of the staff, the physical en-
vironment and standards for hygiene and security are not met. Even private, for-profit
childcare providers comply with these regulations as they would otherwise not obtain the
generous public subsidies that cover most of the facility’s variable costs. The local and
state youth offices are responsible to monitor the requirements and impose sanctions in
case of non-compliance, up to the point of closing a facility.
The educational standard of childcare staff is high in international comparison. Each fa-
cility must have at least one professionally trained educator. Training as a child educator
involves two years at a vocational school in combination with practical training followed
by one year of practical training in a childcare facility. Many of the head teachers have
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a diploma in social pedagogy or related subjects involving a curriculum of 3-4 years at
a technical college with a focus on early childhood education. Aggregate data illustrate
the high educational qualifications of childcare staff: 64% of all employees and 90% of
those leading a group have obtained vocational training as an educator (OECD 2017).
Regulations in each state further regulate group sizes with a maximum of 25 children.
The actual child-staff ratio is with 12 children much lower (OECD 2013).
The period we study saw some changes in the availability of public daycare slots as shown
in Figure 2.2 in the appendix. For 3-6 year-old children, the supply of public daycare
hovers around 100% (see left y-axis) and does not change much over time.8 The situation
is different for children under the age of 3 where traditionally few slots were available.
Starting in the early 2000s, the federal government has invested substantially in expand-
ing the number of daycare slots for children under the age of 3.9 As a result, childcare
slots increased from under 10% in 2002 to more than 30% in 2015 (shown on the right
y-axis in Figure 2.2). In the empirical analysis below, we will use district-level data on
the supply of childcare slots to check that changes in the availability of daycare slots do
not drive our results.
The expansion of supply might have potentially negative effects on daycare quality by
increasing child-staff ratios or the number of staff without proper educational qualifica-
tions, for instance. Aggregate statistics show no change in the staff qualifications over
time, however: the share of childminders with at least vocational training in early child-
hood education remains stable at 80% throughout. The quality might also suffer if group
sizes per child minder increase in areas with large expansion of childcare slots. Yet, Figure
2.3 in the appendix shows little evidence for a worsening of child-staff ratios between 2006
and 2014. If anything, the number of children per child minder falls over time with an
average of about 8 children aged between 3 and 6 and around 4 for children under the age
of 3.10 Overall, changes along the quality dimension do not seem to be a major concern
for our analysis.
8Since 1996 federal regulation grants a daycare slot to 3-6 years-old children in all states.
9In 2008, the federal government decided to offer a daycare slot for all children after their first birthday
from 2013 onwards. As a result, the supply of childcare, esp. for children under the age of 3, has
grown substantially over time.
10Furthermore, regressing the group size (in t + 2) on the adoption of a free daycare policy for the
specific age group (in t), state and year effects shows an increase in the group size in treatment states
by around 0.5-0.7 children for 2-3-year-olds with no effect for older children. If parents value quality
measured as small group sizes, these results suggest that our estimates are, if anything, a lower bound,
especially for very young children.
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2.2.2 Parental Fees and the Adoption of Free Public Daycare
Public daycare is heavily subsidized in Germany.11 Parental fees cover less than 20% of
the variable costs with the remainder being financed by state and local government funds
(OECD 2017; Leu and Schilling 2008). Fees are typically set at the municipal level, which
creates substantial variation in daycare prices both within a state and across states.12 A
typical range is between 0 and 220 euros per month for a part-time slot in daycare with
fees increasing in parental income. Fees for a full-time slot in daycare can be as high as
800 euros per month for high-income parents in urban areas.13 On average, parents in our
data pay around 90 euros per month for a childcare slot between 2002 and 2014. Similarly,
parents surveyed in the NEPS, a large panel study covering preschool and school children,
also report paying around 86 euros per month for a childcare slot in 2011.
Between 2000 and 2016, nine states in West Germany introduced public daycare slots
free of charge to eligible children.14 Two West German states in turn have never offered
free childcare over our sample period. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the implemented
reforms: states differ both in the timing of policy adoption and how comprehensive the
reforms are. Six of the nine states abolished parental fees only for the last year of daycare
prior to school entry (“kindergarten”) - when the child is 5 or 6 years old. Three states,
which make up roughly 15% percent of our sample, introduced more comprehensive re-
forms. Berlin, for instance, offers free public daycare for all children aged between 2 and
6 since 2016. The policy was initially adopted in 2007 for the last year of daycare prior
to school entry, then extended to two years of daycare in 2010, further expanded to three
years of public daycare in 2011 and to four years in 2016. Rhineland-Palatinate phased
in free daycare for all preschool children from 2-6 years of age between 2007 and 2010.
Hamburg, in turn, abolished parental fees for the last daycare year in 2009 and extended
the policy to all children aged 2 and above in 2014.
11Public daycare includes facilities for preschool children mostly provided by municipalities or private,
non-profit providers like churches or welfare services. The share of private, for-profit providers is very
low. Even private providers comply with state daycare regulations; otherwise, they would lose the
very generous public subsidies which cover around 80% of the facility’s variable costs.
12Unfortunately, there are no data sources that allow to trace daycare prices over time or their variation
across space. As a general rule, the cost of a daycare slot to parents varies with the number of children
in the household and parental income (Goerres and Tepe 2013).
13Expenditures for formal childcare are tax-deductible up to a limit of 4,000 euros per year; hence, net
expenditures for childcare after taxes are somewhat lower.
14We focus in our analysis on the eleven states in West Germany as childcare provisions and female labor
supply still differ between East and West Germany.
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Table 2.1: Introduction of Free Childcare in West Germany
Broad Age Group Covered Year Adopted State of Adoption
Last Year of Public Daycare Ages 5-6 2000 Saarland
2007 Rhineland-Palatinate
2007 Berlin
2007 Lower Saxony
2008 Hesse
2009 Hamburg
2009-2010 Schleswig-Holstein
2011 North-Rhine Westphalia
2013 Bavaria
2nd Year of Public Daycare Ages 4-5 2008 Rhineland-Palatinate
2010 Berlin
2014 Hamburg
1st Year of Public Daycare Ages 3-4 2009 Rhineland-Palatinate
2011 Berlin
2014 Hamburg
Public Childcare (pre-K) Ages 2-3 2010 Rhineland-Palatinate
2016 Berlin
2014 Hamburg
No Free Daycare Policy Ages 2-6 Baden-Wuerttemberg
Bremen
Notes: The table shows which states adopted free childcare in which year and for which broad age group
of children. Schleswig-Holstein abolished free childcare in July of 2010. In Hamburg and Schleswig-
Holstein, for instance, access to free childcare applies to a part-time childcare slot (up to 5 hours a day).
In other states, free childcare applies to a slot up to 12 hours per day (full-time slot).
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2.2.3 Determinants of Adoption
Our estimation strategy requires that the reforms and their timing have to be unrelated
to female labor supply and childcare. We further want to rule out that omitted variables,
like voter preferences, for instance, account for both the free daycare policy and family
choices.15 The political discussion prior to the introduction of free childcare in the nine
states stressed equity concerns. The main concern was to provide access to early childhood
education for all preschool children - independent of their family background and parental
resources.16 The political and media discussion does not indicate, for instance, that the
reforms were implemented in order to increase female labor supply or to assist children
lagging behind in their cognitive development.
Table 2.2 investigates the adoption decision more systematically: the dependent variables
are indicators whether a state adopts any free childcare policy in year t (in columns
(1)-(3)), and whether a state adopts a comprehensive free daycare policy in year t (in
columns (4)-(6)). The explanatory variables are lagged two years and include basic socio-
economic conditions (unemployment rate, GDP per capita, population, the shares of
medium- and high-skilled employees and the share of women in the labor force), state
and year fixed effects. The second specification (in columns (2) and (5)) adds the number
of slots available per 100 children separately for children under 3 and children between 3
and 6. The third specification (in columns (3) and (6)) further controls for the vote share
of conservative and left-wing parties in state elections to capture voter demand for free
daycare policies.
Table 2.2 shows four interesting patterns: first, states with higher unemployment rates
are less likely to adopt any or a comprehensive free daycare policy.17 High unemployment
rates reduce a state’s financial capacity because of higher welfare payments and lower
tax revenues. Below, we control for the unemployment rate and GDP per capita to rule
out confounding changes in local economic conditions. Second, the female share in the
workforce is unrelated to the adoption of free childcare. Hence, any changes in female
labor supply we might observe are indeed a consequence of the reform rather than its
motivation. Third, states with a better supply of daycare slots, especially for children
under age three, are more likely to adopt a free childcare policy.18 Responses to a free
15One might think that a free childcare policy is more likely on the agenda of a left-wing government.
Yet, six states were governed by a conservative state government when they adopted a free childcare
policy.
16See State Parliaments of Berlin (State Parliament Papers No. 16/2758 from November 10, 2009) or
North-Rhine-Westphalia (State Parliament Papers No. 15/1929 from May 10, 2011) for two examples.
17An increase in the unemployment rate within a state by one standard deviation (or 1.36%) reduces the
likelihood of adopting any free childcare policy by 23% (based on column (3)) and a comprehensive
free childcare policy by 29% (based on column (6)).
18An increase in the supply of slots for children under 3 within a state by a standard deviation (5.38
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daycare policy might be more pronounced if supply is readily available. We show in
Section 2.6.1 below that estimates become larger when we control for the local supply of
daycare slots.
Finally, there is no systematic relationship between electoral preferences and adopting
a free daycare policy (see column (3)). This null effect reduces concerns that a shift in
voter preferences in the years prior to the reform can account for both the policy and
changes in family choices. Yet, a stronger left-wing vote share encourages the adoption
of a comprehensive childcare reform (see column (6)).19
slots per 100 children) increases the likelihood of adopting any free childcare policy by 28% percent
(based on column (3)).
19Raising the vote share for left-wing parties within states by one standard deviation (5.38 percentage
points) increases the likelihood of adopting a comprehensive free childcare policy by 20% (based on
column (6)). Supplementary regressions indicate that controlling for the vote shares in state elections
as a proxy for electoral preferences does not affect our results on childcare arrangement or female
labor supply (not reported), however.
69
2 Free Universal Daycare: Effects on Children and Maternal Labor Supply
Table
2.2:D
eterm
inants
ofPolicy
A
doptions
A
dopt
A
ny
Free
C
hildcare
Policy
A
dopt
C
om
prehensive
R
eform
(9
out
of11
states)
(3
out
of11
states)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
U
nem
ploym
ent
R
ate
(%
)
-0.102
-0.148**
-0.169**
-0.181***
-0.165***
-0.217***
[0.064]
[0.065]
[0.067]
[0.061]
[0.061]
[0.057]
G
D
P
per
C
apita
(E
uros)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000*
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
[0.000]
State
Population
(in
100,000)
-0.138***
-0.187***
-0.194***
-0.203***
-0.223***
-0.198***
[0.043]
[0.045]
[0.046]
[0.045]
[0.046]
[0.043]
Share
M
edium
-Skilled
E
m
ployees
0.138
-0.048
-0.086
0.256***
0.152
0.123
0.088]
[0.098]
[0.105]
[0.0874]
[0.097]
[0.097]
Share
H
igh-Skilled
E
m
ployees
0.179**
0.043
0.021
0.323***
0.165*
0.116
[0.080]
[0.088]
[0.090]
[0.080]
[0.089]
[0.085]
W
om
en
in
W
orkforce
(%
)
0.079
0.055
0.044
0.074
0.113
0.029
[0.089]
[0.088]
[0.092]
[0.085]
[0.085]
[0.083]
Slots
for
C
hildren
A
ged
3-6
(per
100
children)
0.014**
0.015**
0.022***
0.018***
[0.006]
[0.007]
[0.007]
[0.007]
Slots
for
C
hildren
U
nder
3
(per
100
children)
0.045***
0.052***
0.021
0.018
[0.016]
[0.018]
[0.017]
[0.017]
C
onservative
Vote
Share
in
State
E
lections
(%
)
0.001
0.012*
[0.008]
[0.007]
Left-W
ing
Vote
Share
in
State
E
lections
(%
)
0.002
0.027***
[0.010]
[0.009]
State
Fixed
E
ffects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year
Fixed
E
ffects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
O
bservations
130
130
122
120
120
112
R
Squared
0.691
0.726
0.739
0.711
0.746
0.794
N
otes:
T
he
dependent
variable
in
colum
ns
(1)-(3)
is
an
indicator
equalto
one
ifa
state
has
adopted
any
free
childcare
policy
in
year
t
and
zero
otherw
ise;in
colum
ns
(4)-(6),the
dependent
variable
is
equalto
one
ifa
state
has
adopted
a
com
prehensive
reform
w
here
preschoolchildren
are
eligible
for
m
ultiple
years
offree
daycare.
T
he
sam
ple
consists
ofallW
est
G
erm
an
states
including
B
erlin
over
the
period
2000-2014.
A
llindependent
variables
are
lagged
tw
o
years.
Vote
shares
are
taken
from
state
election
results
and
assigned
the
value
ofthe
last
state
election
in
non-election
years.
In
addition
to
the
variables
show
n
in
the
table,the
specifications
also
include
state
and
year
fixed
effects.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05
and
*
p<
0.1.
Sources:
A
ggregate
Statistics
from
the
FederalStatisticalO
ffi
ce,SocialSecurity
D
ata
and
G
erm
an
Youth
O
ffi
ce
70
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Sources of Variation Induced by the Reforms
The free daycare reforms create three sources of variation for our empirical analysis: which
states implemented a reform; which birth cohorts are eligible for free daycare; and the age
groups covered by a reform. The first source of variation is straightforward: nine states
adopted a reform, while two did not adopt any. As the nine states adopted the policy
in different years ranging from 2000 to 2016, a child’s eligibility further depends on its
birth cohort.20 Finally, the reforms cover children in different age groups. Nine states
adopted free daycare for the last year before school entry (“kindergarten”), while three
states adopted more comprehensive reforms covering younger children (“pre-K”) as well.
States define eligibility for free daycare based on birthday cutoff rules, which are also used
to determine school entry. The last year of public daycare, for example, is defined as the
12 months preceding the school year in which the child turns six before the cutoff month.
School, and thus the daycare year, typically start in August and last until July of the
following year.21 Hence, a child born in June of 2003, for instance, enters school in August
of 2009 and thus starts its last year of daycare (“kindergarten”) in August of 2008.22 That
same child would enter the first year of public daycare, which typically starts at age 3,
in August of 2006. Eligibility for the youngest group of children (aged between 2 and 3)
is determined by their second birthday. Accordingly, we use the birth date range from a
child’s second birthday to the time it is predicted to entry into public daycare to define
eligibility for a 2-year-old.23
20The policies are adopted in January except in two states, which introduced it at the beginning of the
school year (in August or September). The timing of adoption will not affect our estimates as children
in the last year of childcare, for instance, are in these cases eligible for the period from January to
August only (rather than the full year from August to July). As long as parents know about the
adoption of the policy by the time children typically enroll in daycare, the timing of adoption does
not affect our estimation strategy.
21There is some variation as most states engage in rotating summer breaks of six weeks starting as early
as late June and as late as early August. As each state will start the summer break early in some
years and later in others, this rotating scheme will, if anything, introduce classical measurement error
in our estimation.
22It is important to stress that parents can actually enroll their child in daycare at any time during the
year. In practice most children start public daycare at the beginning of the school year when daycare
slots become widely available. Kühnle and Oberfichtner (2017) show that over 70% of children enter
daycare when the school year starts in August or September. The remaining children enter at the 10
other months of the year roughly in the same proportion. Earlier or later entry into daycare will not
invalidate our estimates as it only implies that we do not observe a child in daycare at the beginning
of the daycare year (in the case of late entry); or that we observe a child attending an even earlier
daycare year (in the case of early entry).
23In Hamburg children are eligible once they turn one. Yet, we have only about 10 children in our data
which would be affected by this policy. We thus focus in our analysis on preschool children aged 2
and above.
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States differ in the cutoff month they apply: five states use June 30, five states September
30 and one state uses December 31 as the cutoff rule. We therefore define a child’s re-
centered birth cohort as the 12 months following the cutoff. For a child living in a state
with a June 30 cutoff, we define the re-centered birth cohort of 2003 from July 1, 2002 to
June 30, 2003. Similarly, the 2003 birth cohort in a state with a September 30 cutoff is
defined as children born between October 1, 2002 and September 30, 2003.
Defining birth cohorts in this way ensures that all children of a certain birth cohort are
supposed to enter school and daycare in the same year: the 2003 birth cohort enters school
in August of 2009, the last daycare year in August of 2008, the first (of three) daycare
year in August of 2006 and so on irrespective of the state’s cutoff month. In treatment
states, the birth cohort defines the set of eligible children. Hamburg introduced a free last
daycare year in 2009, for instance. Hence, the first birth cohort eligible for this policy is
the 2004 birth cohort (defined as those born between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2004). In
control states, the birth cohorts identify the set of children who would be eligible if the
state introduced a free daycare policy for the same age group.
A potential disadvantage of defining birth cohorts in this way is that children belonging
to the same birth cohort differ in their actual age (by up to 6 months) at a given point
in time.24 Such age differences might affect daycare and labor supply choices as well as
a child’s cognitive skills even independently of the reforms (see e.g. Black et al. 2011: for
evidence from Norway). In the robustness section below, we show that controlling for the
age of the child in 3-month intervals does not affect our results.
To capture the third source of variation, we use the broad age group of a child (ages 2-3,
3-4, 4-5 and 5-6), which characterizes the daycare year a child would typically attend.
We use this variation in two ways: to control in the estimation for state-level differences
in daycare attendance by age groups and for any differences in attendance across birth
cohorts. More importantly, we use the broad age group of children to explore whether a
free daycare policy has different effects for older children (5-6 years of age) compared to
younger children (2 years of age, for instance). We now discuss our estimation strategy.
2.3.2 Estimation Strategy
We start with an analysis of access to a free daycare year prior to school entry (“kinder-
garten”), the most common policy adopted. Hence, we restrict the sample to children
24Children in states with a cutoff rule in June, for instance, will be slightly older when they enter their
last daycare year than children in states with a September or December cutoff rule. A regression of the
cutoff month on whether a state adopts any free childcare and year dummies shows that treatment
states have their cutoff date somewhat earlier in the year; hence, children in treatment states are
slightly older when they enter their last daycare year than children in control states.
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whose age group typically attends the last year of daycare in their state. In particular,
we estimate variants of the following model:
Yiacs = β ∗ Eligiblecs + γ′Xiacs + αs + θc + εiacs (2.1)
where Yiacs represents outcome of child (or parent) i of birth cohort c in state s. Our
main outcomes are childcare choices, maternal labor supply as well as child cognitive and
non-cognitive skills. The key independent variable Eligiblecs is equal to one if a child is
eligible for a free daycare slot and zero otherwise. As discussed in the previous section,
eligibility depends on whether the state of residence has adopted a free last year of daycare
and whether the child’s birth cohort is eligible for a free slot.
All specifications further include state (αs) as well as birth cohort (θc) fixed effects to
allow for differential childcare attendance across states and differential trends in daycare
attendance for earlier and later cohorts. We further include additional variables Xiacs to
control for family-level differences and improve the precision of estimates: child gender, the
parent’s education, age and marital status, whether the parent is foreign-born, household
size, the number of dependent children and number of infants. To adjust for changes in
local economic conditions, we control for state GDP per capita and unemployment rate.
Our results do not depend on the specific set of controls (as shown in Section 6.1. below).
The key parameter of interest, β, then identifies the Intention to Treat Effect (ITT) effect
of being eligible for free kindergarten relative to children of the same birth cohort in the
control states, which combines never adopting and later adopting states.
We then investigate how free daycare affects family choices for all preschool children aged
between 2 and 6. Here, we estimate variants of the following model:
Yiacs = β ∗ Eligibleacs + γ′Xiacs + αs ∗ λa + θc ∗ λa + εiacs (2.2)
where Yiacs are the same outcome variables as in equation 2.1 above. The treatment
variable Eligibleacs is now equal to one if a child in a certain age range and birth cohort
is eligible for a free daycare slot in a treatment state. We include the same additional
controls (Xiacs) as above.
We further include a full set of state x broad age group (αs ∗ λa) fixed effects to absorb
any differential trends in age-specific childcare and maternal labor supply choices across
states. If families in Hamburg send their child to daycare earlier than in Bavaria, for
instance, even independently of any free daycare policy, these differential choices will be
fully absorbed by the state x broad age fixed effects. Finally, we include a full set of birth
cohort x broad age group fixed effects (θc ∗λa) to capture any changes in childcare choices
between earlier and later birth cohorts. These fixed effects account for differential age of
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entry patterns, e.g. if the age of entry into daycare declines for later birth cohorts, for
example. In variants of equation (2.2), we also allow the effect of the treatment variable
to vary with the broad age range of the child by replacing Eligibleacs with Eligibleacs∗λa.
The parameters of interest β in (2.2) are then identified by comparing changes across
birth cohorts for eligible children residing in a treatment state to the changes for children
in the same broad age group in a control state. Given the fixed effects included in the
model, the parameter is identified from the triple interaction between state, birth cohort
and broad age group.25
As with any difference-in-differences strategy, causal interpretation relies on the assump-
tion that in the absence of reforms, the evolution of outcomes would be parallel for the
same birth cohorts across states regardless of whether and when they implemented a re-
form. While we cannot directly test for this assumption, we provide graphical evidence
that outcomes evolve similarly in the pre-reform period. Using residual choices of child-
care obtained by estimating equation (2.2) without the Eligibleacs variable (but including
all other control variables), Figure 2.1 plots residual means for the three years preceding
and following free daycare reforms (where the implementation of the first reform in a state
is defined as year 0). Control states combine never adopters and later adopting states.
For never adopters, we assign the mean reform year among treatment states as year zero.
The graphs show that family choices move in parallel in treatment and control states prior
to the reforms.
We further bolster the validity of our identification strategy using placebo reforms and
a range of alternative specifications in Section 2.6.1. We find very similar estimates if
we only use a narrow range of birth months around the cutoff date for school entry –
an estimation strategy commonly used in the school entry literature.26 Another concern
with difference-in-differences analysis is the correct computation of standard errors. To
account for within state dependence, our baseline estimations cluster standard errors at
the state level (Bertrand et al. 2004; Cameron and Miller 2015). In Section 2.6.3 below,
we demonstrate that using alternative estimators for the variance-covariance matrix (no
clustering, less aggregate clustering or accounting for the small number of clusters) does
not affect our inference.
25A regression of the eligibility variable on all control variables and fixed effects yields a R2 of 0.69. As
such, there is a lot of variation left in the treatment variable to identify the effects of the free daycare
policy.
26In principle, one could also use the cutoff rules and birthday information to implement a RDD design
for estimation (as in Fitzpatrick 2010; Gormley and Gayer 2005). In practice, our sample sizes are
too small for such a data-intensive procedure, however.
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Figure 2.1: Care for Eligible and Non-eligible Children
Top: Daycare Attendance, Center: Informal Care, Bottom: Exclusive Home Care
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2.4 Data Sources
2.4.1 The Socio-Economic Panel
Our empirical analysis uses data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP 2017), which
surveys around 9,000 West German households each year about their childcare choices,
labor supply and income. We restrict our sample to the period from 2000 to 2016, which
includes at least six pre-policy years and up to ten years after a reform.27 We include in
our sample all families in West Germany with at least one preschool child aged between
2 and 6. The data appendix provides more details about our sample and the variables
used in the empirical analysis.
Parents report whether their children attend public daycare, whether people from outside
the household (e.g. relatives, friends, neighbors or a child minder) care for the child or
whether childcare is exclusively provided by members of the household instead. Note that
home care does not imply that all care is provided by the parents; it also includes childcare
by other household members like older siblings, au pairs or grandparents. Based on this
information, we code an indicator variable whether a household uses public daycare or
not, whether the household uses informal care (as alternative or in addition to public
daycare) and whether the household does not use any childcare outside the home. To
test whether access to free childcare encourages mothers with preschool children to enter
the labor market or work more hours, we use information on labor force participation
and working hours of the responsible parent.28 Employment here comprises full- or part-
time employment, employment for less than 400 euros per month (which is exempt from
social security contributions) and vocational training. Mothers on parental leave are
considered not employed. Working hours are contractual hours and measured per week.
We use a number of socio-demographic characteristics of the child, the responsible parent
and the household to control for other influences on childcare arrangements or labor
supply. Finally, we merge our data on families with preschool children from the SOEP
with administrative data on the supply of public daycare slots from the Child and Youth
Services at the district level and with data on state-level unemployment and GDP per
capita from the Federal Statistical Office.
Table 2.10 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of families with preschool children
in West Germany separately for the pre-reform period (2000-2006) and the post-reform
period (2007-2016). Around 80% in our sample of preschool children between 2 to 6
attend public daycare but most children attend for less than 8 hours per day. Informal
27While the Saarland introduced a free daycare year in 2000, this state has less than one million inhab-
itants and constitutes less than 1% of our sample of preschool children.
28The responsible parent is the mother (99%) or another female adult like the grandmother.
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care is still common and often combined with public daycare in order to cover childcare
needs. Maternal employment is with roughly 50% relatively low compared to the United
States, for example; and most working mothers work part-time, i.e. less than 30 hours
per week. Figure 2.1 shows that daycare attendance has been rising mostly for children
between the ages of 2 and 4. Attendance rates are high for older children (aged 5-6) even
at the beginning of our sample period and do not change much over time.
2.4.2 Supplementary Information on Child Outcomes
To analyze child outcomes for 2-3 year-old children, we use a supplementary questionnaire
of mothers.29 Four skill categories are surveyed using an adapted Vineland Adaptive Be-
havior Scale (VABS): motor skills, language ability, social skills and skills in daily activ-
ities (see Sparrow et al. (2005) for more details). Five questions are used for assessment
in each category, e.g. whether the child can form a sentence with multiple words (for lan-
guage skills) or draw recognizable figures (for motor skills). For each question, the mother
reports whether the child is able (2 points), not able (0 points) or only partially able (1
point) to perform a particular task. We construct a score for each category (language,
motor skills etc.) by summing the responses to the individual items. We further calculate
a total VABS score across all four categories ranging from 0 to 40 (mean: 28.5, standard
deviation: 8.2 in our sample). Finally, we standardize the score to have mean zero and
standard deviation of one. A larger score implies that a child is better able to perform
the specific tasks.
To assess child outcomes for older children, we use a questionnaire of mothers with 5-
6 year-old children. Here, child outcomes are measured by an adapted version of the
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) by Goodman (1997). Mothers assess
emotional and conduct problems, hyperactivity/inattention and peer relationship issues
of their child relative to other children in the same age range. The four dimensions are
summed to a total SDQ score ranging from 0 to 23 (mean: 6.1, standard deviation: 4.1 in
our sample). As for younger children, we standardize the total score and the sub-scores
to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. Larger values indicate more behavioral
problems. We now turn to our main results.
29Parental assessments, often the only source of information on very young children, may suffer from
systematic biases. In appendix 2.A.3, we assess the relationship between parental assessments and
childcare choices in more detail. The results in Table 2.11 indicate that maternal assessments do
reflect actual changes in skills rather than biased parental perceptions.
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2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Childcare Arrangements
We first study how free daycare affects childcare choices in the last year before school entry
(“kindergarten”). Results from estimating linear probability models of equation (2.1) on
children in their last childcare year (as defined by the school entry rules) are reported
in Table 2.3. The dependent variables are binary indicators whether a child attends
public daycare (columns (1)-(2)), informal childcare by friends, relatives, neighbors or
a child minder (columns (3)-(4)), or whether the child is exclusively cared for at home
(columns (5)-(6)) respectively. The last two columns (columns (7)-(8)) report whether
a child attends daycare full-time (conditional on being in public daycare). The main
independent variable is equal to one if a child has access to a daycare slot free of charge
and zero otherwise.
Table 2.3 reveals no behavioral responses to the free daycare slot for children between
the ages of 5 and 6: there is neither an increase in attendance for the free public daycare
nor any substitution patterns from or to other childcare modes.30 Why do we see no
behavioral response to the free daycare year? The last row shows that almost all (97%)
children between the ages of 5 and 6 attend daycare even prior to the reforms. Hence,
there was very little room for raising daycare attendance. As such, offering the last
daycare year free of charge is mostly windfall income for the average family with eligible
children.
Next, we turn to the reform effects for younger, pre-K children. The sample now includes
all preschool children aged between 2 and 6. The dependent variables in Table 2.4 are
again binary indicators equal to one if the family uses a certain childcare mode and zero
otherwise. We now estimate linear probability models according to equation (2) where
the main independent variable is equal to one if a child in birth cohort c living in state s
is eligible for free daycare in the broad age range a. In addition to the control variables
in Table 2.3, we add a full set of state x broad age range and birth cohort x broad age
range fixed effects. The second specification (in even columns) interacts the age group
with eligibility to allow reforms effects to vary by child age.
We find few effects on childcare choices on average: there is little effect on public daycare or
exclusive home care (see columns (1) and (5)) but a positive, though not significant effect
on informal daycare (see column (3)). Allowing the treatment effects to vary across child
age, we see that the reforms encourage earlier entry into daycare: attendance for children
30The number of observations is lower for informal and home care because we have no information whether
a household uses informal childcare in 2003. Furthermore, information on full-time attendance is
available only until 2009.
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between the ages of 2 and 3 increases by 8.4 percentage points (see column (2)). Compared
to the mean attendance of 51 percentage points in the pre-policy period, the reform effect
is with 17% quite large. In contrast, there is no change in childcare arrangements of
children aged between 3 and 6 – likely because most children (94%) attend childcare in
the pre-reform period. For the youngest children, public daycare attendance also grows
at the intensive margin, though the coefficient on full-time attendance is not statistically
significant (see columns (7) and (8)).
The decline in exclusive care at home is the mirror image of the changes in daycare
attendance (see column (6)): 2-3 year-old children are 7.9 percentage points less likely to
be exclusively cared for at home. Relative to the 30 percentage points cared for at home
in the pre-policy period, the effect amounts to a decline of 27%. As for public daycare, we
find no responses for older preschool children. Interestingly, informal daycare increases for
all children between the ages 2 and 5 by 8.3 percentage points (see column (4)), but not
for children just prior to school entry (between the ages 5 and 6). These results suggest
that public daycare and informal childcare are complements for the youngest children,
while income effects account for the increase among older preschool children.31
2.5.2 Maternal Labor Supply
Access to free childcare could boost the labor supply for mothers of pre-school children
if returns to work increase, e.g. by reducing fixed costs of work; it could reduce maternal
labor supply if the additional income is used to buy maternal leisure. Table 2.5 investigates
labor force participation (in columns (1)-(2)), whether the mother works full-time (in
columns (3)-(4)) and the number of contractual working hours (in columns (5)-(6)) based
on estimating equation (2.2) and the same control variables as in Table 2.4. The second
specification (in even columns) interacts the broad age range with eligibility to allow
reforms effects to vary by the child’s age.
We find few responses in maternal labor supply on average along the extensive (column
(1)) and the intensive margin (columns (3) and (5)). Together with the evidence on
childcare choices (see Table 2.4), these findings indicate that parents use the additional
income (not spent on daycare fees) for informal childcare and activities other than parental
working time.
Despite the zero effect on average, mothers with 2-3 year-old children increase their labor
force participation by 7.7 percentage points or 17% (0.077/0.44). In contrast, there is
little change in maternal labor supply along the intensive margin for this group. Moth-
31Evidence for East Germany (Gathmann and Sass 2018) suggests that public daycare and informal care
are complements for very young children aged between 2 and 3, as daycare is often part-time or the
hours are not flexible enough to cover a full workday.
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ers of older preschool children (aged between 3 and 6) do not change their labor force
participation but increase their hours of work. Mothers of 4-5 year-old children increase
full-time work, while mothers of pre-school children (between the ages 5 and 6) increase
their working hours both contractual and also actual hours worked. Contractual hours
increase by 2.3 hours per week or about 11% (2.34/21.24).
Mirroring the effect on childcare choices, mothers of 2-3-year-olds indeed use a free daycare
slot together with informal daycare to increase their labor supply. For older children
(between the ages 3 and 5), some of the additional funds are used for informal care with
no clear cut effects on maternal labor supply. For children just prior to school entry (“pre-
K”), we find few changes in childcare choices, but an increase in working hours. Hence,
for most of the children in our sample, the additional disposable income from abolishing
daycare fees are not used for purchasing maternal leisure.
2.5.3 Short-Run Child Outcomes
We can further assess whether free daycare policies have any short-run consequences on
child development up to age 6. For 2-3-year-olds, the dependent variables are now the
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (total score) as well as its sub-scores for motor skills,
language skills, social skills and skills in daily activities. For 5-6-year-olds, the dependent
variables are the SDQ (total score) as well as its sub-scores for conduct problems, emo-
tional or peer problems and attention problems. The sample is much smaller than our
main sample because skill development has only been assessed for children aged between
2 and 3 since 2005 and for children aged between 5 and 6 since 2008.
As before, we estimate models based on equation (2.2) where the eligibility variable is one
if a child in a certain birth cohort and age range is eligible for free daycare in its state of
residency; and zero otherwise. In addition to our main control variables (see Table 2.4 and
Table 2.5), we also control for child age fixed effects (3 months window) and the survey
month to adjust for age differences in cognitive and non-cognitive development. Each
entry in Table 2.6 is an estimate of the treatment variable from a separate regression.
For children between the ages of 2 and 3, the left-hand side of Table 2.6 shows no effect on
average child development. Looking at the individual subcategories, we observe a decline
in skills in daily activities (like eating with a spoon correctly) of about 0.15 of a standard
deviation. At the same time social skills seem to improve by 0.08 of a standard deviation
(though the latter effect is not statistically significant). These results are in line with
the fact that free daycare encourages earlier attendance in public daycare (see Table 2.4,
column (2)): childminders are likely to have less time to teach each individual child how
to use a spoon; at the same time, the child also spends more time interacting with other
82
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small children in a daycare facility than with its parents, which could boost its social
skills.
Are these effects temporary or do we still observe them for children between the ages of
5 and 6? The right-hand side of Table 2.6 suggests no statistically significant increase
in behavioral problems among eligible children. The coefficient on the total score is very
close to zero and not significant. Two sub-scores (for conduct and emotions) are negative
suggesting fewer behavioral problems, while two others (for peers and attention) suggest
more behavioral problems. None of the coefficients reach statistical significance, however.
Based on the available data, a free daycare policy seems to have few longer-lasting negative
consequences for children with some adverse immediate effects for very young children.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity Across Families
Policy-makers often favor subsidies for public daycare out of equity concerns (see Section
2.2.3). Access to free daycare with its trained educators, toys and a stimulating envi-
ronment might boost skill development, especially for children from disadvantaged family
backgrounds. Yet, do we actually see any leveling of the playing field for vulnerable
subgroups like single mothers, poor or low-skilled households after the reforms?
Disadvantaged families might respond more to free daycare than the average family be-
cause parental fees constitute a larger share of their total household income, for instance.
At the same time, disadvantaged families typically pay lower childcare fees in some re-
gions, which might make them less responsive to the free daycare policy. In the end, it is
an empirical question whether the policy benefits some families more than others.
To test for heterogeneity in treatment effects across population subgroups we use our
baseline model in equation (2.2) but allow the coefficients on the treatment variable to
vary for population subgroups defined by education and marital status of the parent or
household income.32 We estimate the model separately for each group.33
Table 2.7 shows two interesting patterns: first, low-skilled and poor parents respond much
more to the free daycare policy than skilled or richer parents (see the first and second
panel in Table 2.7). Public daycare for children between the ages of 2 and 6 increases
by 5.6 percentage points for low-skilled and even 8.1 percentage points for poor children
compared to no change in the average family – an increase by 8% (0.056/0.682) and 12%
(0.081/0.701) respectively. Mirroring the sharp increase in daycare attendance, there is a
sizable decline in exclusive home care by 7.9 percentage points in low-skilled families and
32We use the official definition of poverty in Germany. Accordingly, households are classified as poor if
they have an income (adjusted for size) below 60% of the median household income.
33Alternatively, one could also estimate the model jointly to account for potential correlations between the
socio-demographic variables. The results (not reported) are actually very similar, which is explained
by the low correlation (at most 0.28) among the three demographic characteristics.
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10.6 percentage points in poor families. Like the average households, low-skilled parents
also buy more informal care. Children from low-skilled parents benefit a lot from access to
free daycare in terms of their short-run cognitive and non-cognitive skills, while there is no
effect for children from poor households. Single mothers respond like the average family in
the sample: they use some of the additional funds to buy more informal childcare, which
reduces the measured cognitive and non-cognitive skills of their child in the short-run.
Also, there are few effects on the labor supply of single mothers.
Overall then, vulnerable families with preschool children are typically more responsive to
universally offered free daycare policies than the average family. For low-skilled and poor
households, the policy closes a sizable fraction of the attendance gap: in the pre-policy
period, children from low-skilled parents are 13.5 percentage points less likely to attend
daycare; introducing a free daycare slot reduces this gap by 40%. For children from poor
households, the pre-policy attendance gap is 13.2 percentage points is closed by almost
two-thirds.
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2.6 Robustness Analysis and Standard Errors
Section 2.6.1 reports placebo tests to check for differential shocks prior to the reform and
a range of specification checks to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. Section 2.6.2
discusses selective migration, while Section 2.6.3 reports alternative ways of estimating
standard errors.
2.6.1 Placebo and Other Specification Checks
The graphical evidence in Figure 2.1 (in Section 2.3) suggests no differential pre-trends.
We next investigate more systematically whether eligible families experience any differ-
ential shocks in the pre-reform period compared to children of similar ages and birth
cohorts in states that have not (yet) adopted a free daycare policy. To do so, we perform
placebos by shifting the free daycare policy in adopting states two, four and six years
prior to the actual reforms. Table 2.8 shows the results: the top panel reports the mean
effect; the bottom panel allows the treatment effect to vary by age group. Eleven of the
12 average effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Only one (female labor
supply six years before an actual reform) is statistically significant as we would expect
based on a significance level of 5-10%. Turning to the effects by age group in the bottom
panel, only one out of 48 coefficients (informal care six years prior to an actual reform) is
statistically different from zero. Overall then, the evidence on placebo reforms supports
our identifying assumption that there were no differential trends between families living
in treatment and control states.
Even if the placebo reforms do not reveal statistically significant deviations in the treat-
ment states prior to a reform, other omitted factors could affect our estimates. We
investigate the role of other influences in Table 2.9 for the average effect and in Table
2.12 stratified by child age. Our first robustness check removes all parental and house-
hold characteristics from our baseline to show that our treatment effects are unaffected
by controlling for observables. The first row of Table 2.9 (and Table 2.12) shows that
estimates obtained by including only state, birth cohort and age fixed effects as well as
state x age and cohort x age interactions are very similar to the baseline. Hence, parental
choices do not depend on the set of observable characteristics included as controls.
A second concern are that children belonging to the same birth cohort will differ in age
across states for two reasons (see Section 2.3): first, the cutoff month used to define the
child’s birth cohort differs across states. Second, we observe children and their families at
different points during the year as the survey is undertaken year-round (though 90% of the
interviews are between January and August).34 Our second robustness check therefore
34As the school year lasts around eleven months, two children born on the same date may differ in age
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includes controls for 3-month age windows (60-62 months, 63-65 months etc.) as well
as interview month fixed effects. Accounting for detailed age and survey month yields
estimates (shown in the second row of Table 2.9) very similar to the baseline.
An alternative approach to control for age effects is to use a narrow sample of children
born around the cutoff date for school entry. In the third row, we re-estimate equation
(2.2) but restrict the sample to children born up to 4 months before or after the cutoff
month. The coefficients are again very similar to the baseline results suggesting that age
differences cannot account for our results.
Shocks or differences other than age occurring around the reform date might affect the
interpretation of our estimates. One such change is the expansion of daycare slots for
children under the age of three as discussed in Section 2.2.1. If treatment states expand
their daycare slots for young children around the same time as they introduce free daycare
and to a larger extent than control states, our estimation strategy would identify the
combined effect of the increase in slots supplied and lower daycare prices. To check
whether changes on the supply side have an effect on our estimates, we re-estimate the
baseline in equation (2.2) controlling for the supply of daycare slots per 100 children at
the district level. The results reported in the fourth row of Table 2.9 (and in Table 2.12)
show that our estimates remain unchanged. Therefore, the increase in daycare attendance
and decline in home care with no effects on female labor supply are indeed behavioral
responses to the price decline and not a reaction to the availability of daycare. The only
exception is that the increase in informal childcare is somewhat larger conditional on the
supply of slots. Here, the baseline coefficient on informal care is likely a lower bound of
the true effect.
A fourth concern is that we do not account for the cumulative nature of the policy in
the treatment states. A child born in 2013 in Hamburg, for instance, has been eligible for
free daycare since age 2. Hence, that 2-year-old may attend daycare free of charge for
up to four years in Hamburg, while a child belonging to the same cohort in Bremen has
no access to free daycare and would have access to just one free daycare year in Bavaria.
The treatment variable then varies from zero years for children in non-adopting states
up to four years in the states with the most comprehensive free daycare policy after the
phase-in (see Table 2.1). We then use the cumulative number of years eligible for a free
daycare slot as an alternative treatment variable in equation (2.2).35 The fifth row in
Table 2.9 (and Table 2.12) shows similar effects for informal care; now, we also find a
by up to 11 months depending on the date of the interview. The raw data suggest that treated
households are interviewed somewhat later. A regression of the interview month on our baseline
specification (child, parent and household demographics, state, birth cohort and broad age group
fixed effects) yields no statistically significant relationship between treatment and interview month.
35Using the cumulative number of years of eligibility to free daycare as treatment variable thus accounts
for the intertemporal decision-making of households.
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statistically significant increase for daycare and a decrease in home care. Hence, offering
multiple years of free daycare increases the impact of a free daycare policy on eligible
families.
We further check whether there are any anticipation effects: families with children under
the age of 5 might send their child to daycare earlier if that child becomes eligible for a
free daycare slot in the last daycare year. To test for anticipation, we drop children in
the last daycare year and all families in the states adopting reforms for younger children.
Our results in the fifth row of Table 2.9 (and Table 2.12) suggest that parents indeed
send their child to daycare earlier when their child will be eligible for free daycare in the
future.
As the effects for younger children (below the age of 5) are identified from the three states
that adopted comprehensive reforms only, we also check whether the effects differ for these
treatment states. Such differences would cast doubt whether we can generalize the effects
for younger children identified from these three states to the whole of West Germany or
even other countries. The final row reports the effects in the comprehensive reform states:
the increase on informal care and female labor supply is very similar to the estimates in
the full sample (see Table 2.4 and 2.5). The coefficients on public daycare and exclusive
home care are slightly stronger than in the baseline reported in Table 2.4, but none of the
coefficients reaches statistical significance. It therefore seems plausible to assume that a
free daycare policy has similar effects in all states if they introduced a free daycare policy
for all preschool children.
2.6.2 Selective Migration of Eligible Families
Another concern with our estimation strategy might be that families with preschool chil-
dren selectively migrate into states that adopt a free daycare policy. There is some anec-
dotal evidence that local governments indeed aim to attract families with young children
by providing free daycare slots in addition to other benefits. If there is selective migration
into adopting states, our estimates on childcare arrangements, for instance, might not
reflect behavioral responses of eligible families, but rather a change in the mix of eligible
households residing in reform states.
To assess this concern, we collected migration statistics by detailed age groups from the
State Statistical Offices. We obtained comparable information for six of the nine reform
states.36 The net inflow of families with children under the age of 6 into adopting states
increases after the reform. Controlling for state and school year fixed effects as well
as local economic conditions, a free daycare slot in the last year attracts around 630
36Data are available for Bavaria, Berlin, Hamburg, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and
Schleswig-Holstein.
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additional families with preschool children. At the same time, however, migratory flows
of families with young children are extremely low (only about 4-5%) relative to total in-
and outflows across state borders over the 2000-2016 period. Furthermore, if we compare
the number of net inflows to the stock of families with preschool children in each state
using the 2011 Census, the total inflow of preschool children makes up only about 0.5-1%
of the population in that age range. As such, we think that the somewhat higher inflows
of preschool children following a free daycare reform does not pose a serious challenge to
the interpretation of our findings.
2.6.3 Alternative Estimates of Standard Errors
Our main analysis clusters standard errors at the state level as the reforms were introduced
by state governments, and all households with children in a certain age range were affected
by the same reform. As our clustering strategy might be sensitive to the type of clustering
as well as the small number of clusters (N=11), we report in Table 2.13 a range of
alternative strategies for obtaining standard errors. As in our main Tables 2.4 and 2.5,
we estimate variants of model in equation (2.2) where the dependent variables are again
childcare choices and maternal labor force participation. The first specification (in odd
columns) reports the average effect across all age groups, while the second specification
(in even columns) shows interaction effects with child age.
Following Abadie et al. (2017), we first present estimates without clustering. The rationale
is that fixed effects at the level of clustering (in our case, the state) will take care of
correlated errors as long as there is no heterogeneity in treatment effects. Alternatively,
we also explore the sensitivity of the estimated standard errors to clustering below the
state level. Here, we cluster at the state-year level, given that policies evolved over time as
well as across states. The second strategy includes separate state clusters for the pre- and
post-policy period to allow for breaks in the temporal dependence of the error terms over
time. For all three alternative estimators, the resulting standard errors are sometimes
larger and sometimes smaller than in the baseline. Most importantly, our conclusion that
a free daycare policy has increased informal childcare mostly for the youngest children
(raising daycare attendance, informal childcare and female labor force participation, while
reducing care at home) is supported by Table 2.13 irrespective of whether we do not cluster
at all or cluster below the state level.
The estimated standard errors with clustering might still be sensitive to the small number
of clusters, which is 11 in the case of clustering at the state level or 22 in the case of
state x pre-/post-reform period. To address this concern, we implement a wild bootstrap
procedure as proposed by Miller et al. (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015). This
procedure broadly generates confidence intervals and p values that support our main
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results: a free daycare policy raises the use of informal childcare and shifts childcare
arrangements for the youngest children and the labor supply of their mothers.37 Overall
then, our extensive set of robustness checks confirms that the conclusions presented in
Section 2.5 remain qualitatively valid.
2.7 Conclusion
We investigate how the introduction of free public day care affects child care attendance,
maternal labor supply and short-run child development. For estimation, we exploit quasi-
experimental variation in childcare prices induced by the adoption of free daycare polices
in nine out of eleven states in West Germany.
Our findings suggest that childcare attendance encourages earlier entry into public daycare
for the youngest children (aged between 2 and 3), mirrored by a decline in exclusive care
at home. Informal care also increases, suggesting that formal and informal daycare are
complements in the German context. Reflecting the increase in daycare attendance among
young children, mothers increase their labor supply, especially at the extensive margin.
Hence, for the youngest children, a free daycare policy can encourage behavioral changes
both among children and mothers. These behavioral changes have little effect on the
average child in terms of their short- and medium-run development: while there seems a
slight decline in daily skills, social skills actually improve.
For older children (aged between 3 and 6), we find little response in public daycare at-
tendance, which had been high even before the policies were adopted. Mothers of older
children aged between 4 and 6 mostly respond by increasing their labor supply at the in-
tensive margin: they are more likely to work full-time and work longer hours. Given that
the share working full-time and the average number of hours remain low in this group, a
policy of offering free daycare seems not enough to obtain more full-time participation in
the labor market among mothers in Germany – at least not in the short-run.
Finally, we also find sizable heterogeneity in the estimated effects: poorer and low-skilled
households respond much more to the free daycare policy than the average household.
Daycare attendance in this group increases much more than for the average child, which
substantially reduces the pre-reform enrollment gap of around 13 percentage points be-
tween poor and rich or between low-skilled and skilled parents by up to two-thirds. It
remains an open question, however, whether more targeted measures, which reduce the
37The wild bootstrap procedure uses binary weights for bootstrapping; we also implemented the Webb
(6 points) weights, which have performed better in Monte Carlo simulations when there are less than
10 clusters (Cameron and Miller 2015). The Wald test statistics generated by this wild bootstrap
procedure lead to conclusions that are very similar to those of the standard wild bootstrap procedure
reported in Table 2.13.
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fiscal burden of a universal policy of free daycare, could achieve a similar outcome at lower
cost.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 German Socio-Economic Panel (2000-2016)
The GSOEP provides comprehensive data on a representative sample of German house-
holds. We focus on households with young children and study the following variables:
Childcare variables: Our main dependent variables are the type of educational institu-
tion (school, kindergarten or other daycare facility) each child until the age of 6 currently
attends if at all. Based on this information, we code whether a child attends a public
childcare facility or not. We denote all childcare facilities that are publicly subsidized as
public daycare; publicly subsidized childcare may be provided by the local community,
churches, companies or other non-profit organizations. If the child attends an educational
institution, the parents are asked whether the child attends only in the morning, only in
the afternoon or the whole day. The survey also inquires about regular childcare provided
by persons outside the household. These external providers could be relatives not living
in the household, neighbors, friends or a paid child minder We define an indicator variable
equal to one if any type of informal childcare is used. The variable is coded as zero if no
informal childcare is used. In some specifications, we also distinguish whether the care
is provided informally by a relative, friend or neighbor or whether it is purchased on the
informal market from a child minder or nanny. Information about these informal sources
of childcare is available for all years except 2003. Finally, we define the variable exclusive
care at home as equal to one if no public or informal childcare outside the household is
reported. Hence, home care does not necessarily imply that all childcare is provided by
the parents, because it includes childcare by people living in the same household (like
grandparents, au pairs or older siblings, for example). The variable is equal to zero if the
child attends public childcare or is cared for by other people outside the household.
Maternal labor supply: We code labor force participation equal to one if the individual
works full- or part-time, is marginally employed (“geringfügig beschäftigt”), is currently
in school or vocational training. A mother is working full-time if she works 30 or more
hours per week; working hours refer to the number of hours per week in the work contract.
Child outcomes: Data on child outcomes for 2-3 year-old children are taken from a
supplementary questionnaire answered by mothers with children born in 2002 or later.
The data are available annually since 2005. We use the questions on social, language and
motor skills and skills for daily life to assess the short-run effects of the new policy on
outcomes for eligible children. The skills elicited come from a version of the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scale which has been adapted to the time constraints of a general
household survey. Social skills cover the following tasks: whether the child calls familiar
people by name; whether the child plays games with other children; whether the child
participates in role playing games; whether the child shows liking for certain playmates;
whether the child calls his/her own feelings by name. For motor skills, the survey asks
to assess whether the child walks down the stairs forwards; whether the child uses door
handle to open doors; whether the child climbs jungle gyms and other high playground
equipment; whether the child uses scissors to cut paper and whether the child draws
recognizable figures. For language skills, the following items are assessed: whether the
child understands brief instructions; whether the child forms sentences with at least two
words; whether the child speaks in full sentences of at least four words; whether the child
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listens attentively to a story for at least 5 minutes; and whether the child can relate
simple messages. Finally, the set of skills in daily activities comprises: whether the child
eats with spoon without making a mess; whether the child blows his/her nose without
assistance; whether the child uses the toilet “to do number two”; whether the child can
put on pants and underpants correctly; and whether the child brushes teeth without
assistance. For each question, the mother assesses the ability of her child on a 3-point
scale: 1=yes, 2=to some extent and 3=no. From the individual items, we construct a
score for the four categories by summing over the answers to each item coding as 0 if the
child cannot perform the skill, as 1 if the child partially and as 2 if the child fully performs
the skill. Each score ranges from a minimum of 0 to 10. We also calculate a total score
as the unweighted sum over the four categories; the total score then ranges from 0 to 40.
We then normalize the score to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one in our
sample of 2-3 year-old children in West Germany from 2005-2016. A higher score means
that the child is better able to perform a specific (set of) task(s).
To analyze the short-run effects on eligible children in older age groups we make use of
a shorter version of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire for 5-6 year-old children
which has been available since 2008. The questionnaire asks: “Compared to other children
of the same age how would you assess your own child?”. Then, a list of 17 skills is presented.
On a scale from 1 to 7 parents can choose whether their child is rather talkative or still,
rather untidy or neat, good-natured or irritable, not interested or hungry for knowledge,
has good confidence or is insecure, is withdrawn or outgoing, focused or dis-tractable,
defiant or obedient, understands quickly or needs more time and is anxious or not. We
construct a total score from these items by first recoding the answers using the original
Goodman scale (does not apply, applies somewhat, applies fully) (Goodman 1997). We
then calculate the unweighted sum over all items and several subcategories. Finally, we
standardize the score to mean zero and a standard deviation of one in our sample of 5-6
year-old children in West Germany for 2008-2016. A higher score reflects more behavioral
problems.
Control variables: As additional control variables, we use household characteristics like
household size, the number of children and whether there is an infant under the age of
one in the household. As a measure of household income, we use monthly disposable
household income measured in euros (deflated to 2010 prices). The specific question asks
about the total sum of all income sources of the household adjusted for taxes and other
contributions (“verfügbares Haushaltseinkommen”). A household is considered poor if
the household income (adjusted for size using OECD equivalence scales) is below 60% of
the median household income, the official definition of poverty in Germany.
To control for characteristics of the parent (or caretaker), we also code the age, education,
marital status and whether one parent holds a citizenship outside the European Union.
For marital status, we distinguish three categories: single (never married), married or
in a long-term partnership and divorced or widowed. Educational attainment is defined
as the highest educational level achieved. We define a person as low-skilled if she has
no vocational training and no high-school degree (“Abitur”). A person is defined as
medium-skilled if the highest educational degree is vocational training or a high-school
degree. Finally, the person is high-skilled if she has a tertiary degree from a university or
technical college. Further, the observation is coded as foreign if the parent does not have
German citizenship.
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To merge the parental information to the child record, we define the relevant caretaker
of the child in the household. The survey contains an identifier for the mother of each
child; if the identifier and hence mother is missing, we select the father of the child; if
both parents are absent in the household, we choose a female adult (presumably a relative
or close friend). In our sample, in more than 99% of all cases the responsible parent is
the mother or another female adult living in the household. Our main results consider
females as primary caretakers.
Aggregate economic controls: To control for state-specific labor market shocks, we include
the state unemployment rate defined as percentage of registered unemployed people to
the total number of employed persons. To control for the broader economic situation in
each state, we also include GDP per capita. Both variables are available from the Federal
Statistical Office.
2.A.2 Are Parental Assessments of Child Outcomes Reliable?
Parental assessments, often the only source of information on skills of very young children,
may suffer from systematic biases. Caregivers may be positively or negatively biased in
their perception, may give socially desired answers, or may report some behavior only
because they are asked in the survey (e.g. Schwarz 1999). Yet, external validation studies
of parent-reported data indicate that they are informative about the skills they are in-
tended to measure. There is also little evidence that any bias in parent-based reports is
correlated with the socio-economic characteristics of parents (De Los Reyes and Kazdin
2005; Treutler and Epkins 2003). Furthermore, a recent validation of the VABS used
in the SOEP showed that maternal assessments are highly correlated with scores on an
examiner-administered test of infant development (Sandner and Jungmann 2016).
Maternal assessments of their child may also be affected by the time a mother spends
with the child. Mothers might become less critical, for instance, as they care for their
child at home and observe the child’s eating habits or language use throughout the day.
In that case, a change in maternal assessments might be the result of changes in childcare
arrangements induced by the free childcare policy - and not the result of an actual change
in the child’s skill. In the absence of formal tests from developmental psychologists, we
cannot address this concern directly. Yet, we can provide some indirect evidence that mere
changes in perception are unlikely to drive our results. If maternal assessments mostly
reflect the time spent with the child, they should not differ for children who attend formal
or informal care (holding hours of care outside the home constant). Figure 2.3 shows
regressions where the dependent variable is the total VABS score (in columns (1)-(3))
and the total SDQ score (in columns (4)-(6)). Key independent variables are the types of
childcare used in addition to a number of socio-demographic characteristics. The results
for children aged between 2 and 3 show that mothers assess their children more favorably
if they attend public daycare instead of informal care (column (1)). The same pattern
holds even if a child spends more time in formal than in informal care (column (2)).
Finally, column (3) includes separate indicators for informal and formal care where the
reference category is exclusive care at home. If there was a positive correlation between
maternal assessments and care at home, we should see negative coefficients. Yet, we find
the opposite pattern with maternal assessment being especially favorable if a child visits
formal daycare.
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The patterns are similar, but statistically weaker for children aged between 5 and 6 (shown
in columns (4)-(6)). Recall that a higher SDQ score indicates more behavioral problems.
Formal childcare is negatively correlated with behavioral problems (see columns (4) and
(5)). The final column shows only a weak correlation between informal or professional
care (relative to home care) and behavioral problems. One explanation for this weaker
correlation is that only about 3% of the 5-6 year-old children in our sample are cared for
exclusively at home, which leaves little variation in the data. Overall, the evidence in
Table 2.11 indicates that maternal assessments do reflect more than biased perceptions
of the mother.
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2.A.3 Additional Tables
Table 2.10: Summary Statistics
Pre-Policy Period Post-Policy Period
(2000-2006) (2007-2016)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Childcare Attendance 0.714 0.452 0.820 0.385
Full-time Attendance 0.207 0.405 0.269 0.444
Informal Childcare 0.402 0.490 0.315 0.465
Exclusive Care at Home 0.158 0.365 0.121 0.326
Maternal Employment 0.460 0.498 0.528 0.499
Full-time Work 0.177 0.382 0.183 0.386
Contractual Working Hours 20.39 10.42 21.63 10.28
Child is a Girl 0.493 0.500 0.484 0.500
Age of Child 4.38 1.24 4.26 1.29
Household Size 4.10 1.11 4.34 1.26
Number of Children 2.10 0.901 2.37 1.13
Infants under Age 1 in Household 0.025 0.157 0.056 0.231
Age of Mother 34.13 5.18 35.15 5.76
Mother Low-Skilled 0.193 0.395 0.203 0.402
Mother Medium-skilled 0.646 0.478 0.535 0.499
Mother High-skilled 0.144 0.351 0.228 0.419
Single Mother 0.068 0.252 0.110 0.313
Mother Married 0.882 0.323 0.842 0.365
Mother Divorced/Widowed 0.050 0.217 0.048 0.213
Foreign Mother 0.168 0.374 0.198 0.398
Unemployment Rate (%) 8.31 2.36 6.35 2.22
GDP per capita (Euros) 28754.7 4248.3 36207.0 5388.5
Observations 7,920 22,471
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of our sample of preschool children (2-6 year-
olds) and their parents in West Germany over the period from 2000 to 2016. The first
two columns report summary statistics for the pre-policy period and the last two columns
for the 2007-2016 period. Childcare arrangements are binary indicators equal to one if the
family uses a certain childcare arrangement and zero otherwise. Low-skilled parents are
those without a high school or vocational degree; medium-skilled parents have a high school
or vocational degree and high-skilled parents a tertiary degree from university or technical
college.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (2000-2016).
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Table 2.11: Are Maternal Assessments of Child Behavior Reliable?
Cognitive and Noncognitive Skills Behavioral Problems
(Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale) (Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Professional Childcare 0.073*** -0.101*
(relative to Informal Care) [0.019] [0.055]
Mainly Professional Care 0.082*** -0.110*
(more than Informal Care) [0.016] [0.056]
Informal Childcare 0.012 0.007
[0.022] [0.050]
Professional Childcare 0.102*** 0.015
[0.022] [0.040]
Child is a Girl 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.188*** -0.290*** -0.296*** -0.293***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033]
Mother’s Age -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
Mother Medium-skilled 0.066** 0.068** 0.071** -0.224*** -0.229*** -0.241***
[0.026] [0.027] [0.023] [0.060] [0.066] [0.072]
Mother High-skilled 0.106** 0.101** 0.110** -0.436*** -0.447*** -0.426***
[0.038] [0.041] [0.038] [0.085] [0.092] [0.089]
Mother in School 0.077 0.074 0.056 -0.459*** -0.463*** -0.421**
[0.047] [0.047] [0.044] [0.117] [0.121] [0.153]
Mother Married 0.086*** 0.080** 0.081*** -0.032 -0.014 -0.067
[0.026] [0.027] [0.022] [0.059] [0.064] [0.058]
Mother Separate/Widowed 0.026 0.018 0.008 0.119 0.136 0.074
[0.051] [0.051] [0.053] [0.114] [0.117] [0.123]
Mother Foreign-born -0.071** -0.071** -0.066*** 0.100 0.103 0.077
[0.023] [0.024] [0.013] [0.076] [0.078] [0.080]
Household Size -0.030 -0.031 -0.036 0.072 0.076 0.054
[0.029] [0.031] [0.027] [0.062] [0.061] [0.059]
Number of Children in HH 0.052 0.054 0.059* -0.143* -0.152* -0.132*
[0.034] [0.035] [0.029] [0.072] [0.070] [0.069]
Newborn Child in Household 0.014 0.016 -0.014 -0.028 -0.022 0.014
[0.030] [0.033] [0.029] [0.070] [0.073] [0.108]
Notes: The sample in columns (1)-(3) are 2-3 year-old children whose mothers answered the supplementary questionnaire
between 2005 and 2016 (N=5,488); the sample in columns (4)-(6) are 5-6 year-old children whose mothers answered
the supplementary questionnaire between 2008 and 2016 (N=2,339). In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is a
standardized score on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale. See notes for table 6 for a more detailed description of
the dependent variable and controls included. In columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the standardized score of the
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ). The main independent vatriables are: in columns (1) and (4), an indicator
variable equal to one if a child attends public daycare and zero if the child attends informal care; in columns (2) and (5), an
indicator variable equal to one if the child spends more hours in public daycare and zero if it spends more time in informal
care. In columns (3) and (6), the indicator variable for informal care is equal to one if the child attends informal care and
zero if the child is cared for at home or in public daycare (and likewise for the indicator for professional childcare). The
control variables are the same as in Table 2.6. All standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and
*** p<0.01.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (2005-2016) for columns (1)-(3); Socio-Economic Panel (2008-2016) for columns (4)-(6).
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2.A.4 Additional Figures
Figure 2.2: Provision of Public Daycare Slots
Figure 2.3: Evolution of Proxy for Childcare Quality
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CHAPTER3
Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill
Development
joint work with Christina Gathmann and Christina Vonnahme
3.1 Introduction
Access to citizenship is the most fundamental integration policy a host country can offer
its immigrant population. Naturalization has obvious benefits in terms of political rights
and participation; but are there also benefits beyond the political realm? Some think that
the importance of citizenship for economic or social integration has declined as other rights
like permanent residency, for instance, have expanded over time.1 Others, in contrast,
argue that citizenship acts as an important catalyst for economic, social and even cultural
integration.
Proponents of the view that citizenship matters for educational and labor market per-
formance rely on three arguments: first, it improves the returns to labor market skills.
Citizenship is not only a prerequisite for certain public sector jobs and some well-paid
professions; it also removes any restrictions on career mobility that immigrants frequently
face enabling them to work in any job, at any time and place.2 In addition, employers
might be more willing to invest in training an employee whose naturalization signals a
long-term commitment to remain in the country (Lalonde and Topel 1997). To the extent
that further career options and training offer better pay or working conditions than jobs
available to the unnaturalized immigrant, citizenship improves the returns to labor market
1Shachar et al. (2017) provide a recent overview of the debate from the perspective of multiple disciplines.
2In some countries like Germany these restrictions apply to a much wider range of occupations: prior
to 2012, non-EU citizens had only restricted access to regulated professions like lawyers, notaries,
pharmacists or physicians. Also, non-EU citizens could not easily change their occupation prior to
2005 or move to a different EU member state without citizenship.
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skills. Second, the offer to naturalize signals to immigrants that they fully belong to the
host society, which might reduce return intentions and encourage further investments to
succeed in the host country (Dustmann 2008). Finally, citizenship might also change the
attitude of natives and immigrants alike reducing potential biases or overt discrimination,
for instance (Felfe et al. 2018).3
Identifying how citizenship affects immigrant choices and immigrants’ integration has
enormous policy relevance. Migrant populations have grown rapidly in recent years, espe-
cially families with young children. Results from the Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA) indicate that between 2003 and 2015 alone, the share of students with
direct migration experience or a parent who had migrated across international borders
grew by six percentage points. By 2015, almost one in four 15-year-old students in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were either foreign-
born or had at least one foreign-born parent (OECD 2018b). Moreover, several countries
have debated, announced or implemented reforms of their citizenship policy recently. The
U.S. government has been debating restricting access to birthright citizenship for children
of undocumented or illegal parents. In Europe, the U.K. has announced to tighten the
language and knowledge tests necessary for naturalization. Germany, in contrast, has
substantially liberalized its citizenship policy in recent decades.
Despite enormous policy relevance, there is little empirical evidence on the effects of access
to citizenship. Identification is hampered by sizable empirical challenges. Countries with
liberal citizenship policies, like citizenship by birthplace or short residency requirements
for naturalization, typically differ along many other dimensions from countries with more
restrictive access to citizenship. These cross-country differences are likely to influence
immigrant selection, the environment immigrants find themselves in and hence, the choices
families make after arrival. Access to citizenship sometimes varies within a given country:
children with one native and one foreign-born parent obtain citizenship automatically,
for instance. Yet, the selection into intermarriage and family circumstances are likely to
differ for immigrant families with two foreign-born parents or with one foreign-born and
one native parent. Therefore, using these within-country or cross-country differences is
unlikely to identify causal effects of citizenship.
In this paper, we estimate the causal effects of citizenship and explore their heterogeneity
for the skill development of children and young adults along both observable and unob-
servable characteristics. We focus in our analysis on young immigrants as immigrant-
native gaps in language, math and science tests are sizable and persistent as has been
demonstrated e.g. for 15-year-olds (Dustmann and Glitz 2011; OECD 2018b). Similarly,
3Note that this might reduce but not overcome discrimination as discrimination could be based on
appearance or foreign sounding names as well.
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the ethnic gap in achievement test scores and other skills increases substantially during
childhood (Fryer Jr. and Levitt 2004; Heckman et al. 2006; Cunha and Heckman 2007).
Given the strong link between student competencies and outcomes later in life, these gaps
are likely to have long-term effects on the occupational careers and labor market success
of children from immigrant families, reducing upward mobility and cementing unequal
opportunities (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Yet, immigrant-achievement gaps vary a lot
across countries and are typically lower for traditional immigration countries like Canada
or Australia than countries with restrictive citizenship policies like Germany or Sweden
(Entorf and Minoiu 2005; Sweetman and van Ours 2015). This comparison suggests not
only that citizenship policy could be important but also that effects are likely to be het-
erogeneous depending on the source country and socio-economic background of immigrant
children.
Our setting provides a unique opportunity to identify citizenship effects and explore their
heterogeneity across immigrant children. Over the recent decade, Germany has experi-
enced a rapid increase of inflow of immigrants, increasingly families with children. While
23% of the overall population have a migration background, i.e. they or at least one
parent was not born with German citizenship, more than one out of three children un-
der the age of six now fall into this category (OECD 2018a). Traditionally, citizenship
was tied to German descent. As such, naturalizations were rare and up to the discre-
tion of the authorities. Two national reforms in 1991 and 2000 completely overhauled
Germany’s citizenship law. The 1991 reform introduced explicit criteria for how first-
generation immigrants could naturalize. Immigrants who have reached the age of sixteen
can naturalize if they have lived legally in Germany for at least eight years. Adults had to
wait between eight and fifteen years but could include their dependent children in the ap-
plication for citizenship. The second reform in 2000 introduced birthright citizenship for
second-generation immigrants into German law. Children born in Germany after January
1, 2000 whose foreign-born parents had lived in the country legally for at least eight years
are eligible for a German passport. A transitional rule allowed parents with at least eight
years of residency to apply in 2000 to naturalize their child born in Germany between
1990 and 1999.
The 1991 and 2000 reforms together define four roads of eligibility to citizenship for chil-
dren of immigrants: birthright citizenship, the transitional rule for immigrant children
born in Germany, individual eligibility (at age 16) and eligibility through parents. All
four categories of eligibility depend only on socio-economic characteristics like year of
birth and year of arrival. They are, however, independent of any individual motivation
and aspiration that are likely to affect both the decision to naturalize and possibly edu-
cational outcomes. As such, we use the four access options to citizenship as instruments
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for the actual decision to naturalize and trace out its consequences for children’s skill
development.
To analyze who benefits from host country citizenship, we use the marginal treatment
effect (MTE) framework introduced by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and generalized
by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007b), which relates the heterogeneity in the
treatment effect to observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the naturalization deci-
sion. Previous studies on the determinants of naturalization decisions suggest that first-
generation immigrant adults are typically positively selected with respect to formal educa-
tion (Chiswick and Miller 2008; Gathmann and Keller 2018). If returns are heterogeneous,
the marginal immigrant who gets naturalized under a more liberal citizenship policy might
have zero or even negative returns.
Indeed, we find substantial heterogeneity in the returns to citizenship along both observ-
able and unobservable characteristics. Immigrant children born in Germany and girls in
particular benefit substantially from German citizenship in terms of language skills as
measured by standardized test scores but also their school grade in German. At the same
time, German-born children of immigrants are more likely to naturalize pointing to a
positive selection on gains. Immigrant girls in turn, are just slightly more likely to obtain
citizenship than immigrant boys. The positive selection in gains is reflected in unobserved
heterogeneity as well: returns to citizenship with respect to language skills are declining
with increasing resistance to treatment. Hence, children whose unobserved characteristics
make them most likely to naturalize benefit the most, while children whose unobservable
characteristics make them least likely to pick up German citizenship have zero returns to
host country citizenship. We further show that improvements in language skills also help
immigrant children to improve their school performance: children are much less likely to
repeat a grade in school, for instance.
We then ask how potential reforms to citizenship policies would affect the skill devel-
opment of (first- or second-generation) immigrant children. Given that we have limited
common support for the propensity score in the MTE framework, we calculate marginal
policy-relevant treatment effects, which analyze how the expansion or restriction of the
take-up of citizenship would affect the skill development of immigrant children. Given the
high take-up rates for immigrant children (around 80%) and the positive selection in gains,
it comes at no surprise that expanding take-up even further yields few additional gains
in language skills. Quite the contrary: returns to host country citizenship would actually
be more pronounced if we restricted take-up to children with unobservable characteris-
tics that make them most prone to naturalize (“low resistance" children). A possibly
more attractive policy alternative to limiting access to citizenship is to expand access
to birthright citizenship. At present, second-generation immigrant children only obtain
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citizenship if one of their parents has lived in Germany for at least eight years or they
become eligible when they turn sixteen. Traditional immigrant countries like Canada or
the United States grant birthright citizenship to all children born in the country. Granting
citizenship to all immigrant children born in Germany would carry substantial benefits in
terms of language skills. The reason for these returns is that immigrant children born in
Germany benefit the most from obtaining host country citizenship.
Our analysis makes several important contributions to the literature. Existing studies
on the consequences of citizenship have estimated at most intention-to-treat effects of
birthright citizenship on early childcare attendance, school entry and school track (Felfe
et al. 2019). The study based on administrative data from a single German state finds very
large effects, which closes most of the immigrant-native gap. Our analysis estimates causal
effects (LATEs) of citizenship on skill development throughout primary and secondary
school. Even more importantly, we explore for the first time the heterogeneity of returns
to citizenship across observable and unobservable characteristics by estimating Marginal
Treatment Effects. Furthermore, our data cover all states in Germany and allows to
control for detailed parental characteristics like years since migration, which is typically
not available in administrative datasets.
A second line of research analyzes how birthright citizenship has affected parental inte-
gration efforts (Avitabile et al. 2013), fertility behavior (Avitabile et al. 2014) and return
migration (Sajons 2016) showing that parents increase their efforts to use the local lan-
guage and reduce the total number of children in favor of more investments in the ‘quality’
of children. Another line of research investigates the consequences of access to citizenship
on the labor market performance and marriage behavior of adult immigrants using panel
data approaches (e.g. Bratsberg et al. 2002; Steinhardt 2012) or intention-to-treat effects
(Gathmann and Keller 2018; Gathmann et al. 2019). Unlike all previous evidence, we
focus on how access to citizenship through parents, individual eligibility or birthplace
affects children’s skill development, which is a crucial prerequisite for later success in the
labor market. In addition, we are able to identify causal effects and explore for the first
time their distribution along observable and unobservable dimensions.
Our study also contributes to the growing literature that estimates marginal treatment
effects. So far, most studies focus on monetary returns to a college education (see e.g.
Carneiro et al. 2011; Kaufmann 2014; Nybom 2017; Kamhöfer et al. 2018), to secondary
education: (e.g. Carneiro et al. 2017: in Indonesia) or to early childcare education (Cor-
nelissen et al. 2018; Felfe and Lalive 2018; Kline and Walters 2016).
This chapter proceeds as follows. We next discuss the background on the citizenship
reforms, which introduced multiple paths of eligibility for citizenship. Section 3 then in-
troduces the data sources and the policy variation in our data. Section 4 sets out the
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econometric framework to estimate marginal treatment effects and discusses the estima-
tion strategy. In Section 5, we present our main results on selection into citizenship and
the returns to citizenship on skill development. Section 6 investigates how alternative
citizenship policies might affect skill development by estimating marginal policy-relevant
treatment effects. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Background on Germany’s Citizenship Reforms
For a long time, German citizenship was closely tied to ancestry. As such, there were few
possibilities to naturalize unless one could demonstrate German descent. This traditional
notion of citizenship was overhauled with the two citizenship reforms in 1991 and 2000.4
The Alien Act (Ausländergesetz (AuslG)), which came into effect on January 1, 1991,
defined for the first time explicit criteria how first-generation immigrants could naturalize
in Germany. Most importantly, immigrants had to satisfy certain residency requirements,
which were age-dependent: immigrants who came to Germany under the age of 8 or were
born in Germany, could naturalize when they turned 16. An immigrant who arrived in
Germany between the ages of 8 and 14 could naturalize after 8 years in Germany, while
individuals arriving after age 14 required 15 years of legal residency.5
Applicants had to fulfill several additional criteria: first, they had to renounce their
previous citizenship upon naturalization as the new law did not allow dual citizenship.
Citizens of the European Union were exempt from this rule and could keep their original
citizenship.6 Second, the applicant must not be convicted of a severe criminal offense.7
Furthermore, immigrants who arrived in Germany at age 15 or older had to demonstrate
economic self-sufficiency, i.e. they should be able to support themselves and their de-
pendents without welfare benefits or unemployment assistance. Younger immigrants who
arrived in Germany before the age of 15 had to have completed a minimum of six years
4The citizenship reforms were brought on the agenda by the fall of the Iron Curtain and demographic
changes on the one hand and political and court decisions on the other hand. Gathmann and Keller
(2018) discuss the adoption process of the 1991 reform and Worbs (2014) provides an in-depth dis-
cussion of the 2000 reform.
5See AuslG (Alien Act). If the applicant stayed abroad for no more than 6 months, the period of absence
still counted toward the residency requirement. Longer stays abroad (between 6 months and 1 year)
may still count for the residency requirement if they are shown to be temporary.
6Children of bi-national marriages, for example, did not have to give up their dual citizenship until
they turned 18. Exceptions were also granted if the country of origin prohibits the renunciation
of citizenship or delayed it for reasons outside the power of the applicant, if the applicant was an
acknowledged refugee or if the renunciation imposed special hardships on older applicants.
7Applicants with minor convictions, such as a suspended prison sentence up to 6 months (which would
be abated at the end of the probation period), a fine not exceeding 180 days of income (calculated
according to the net personal income of the individual), or corrective methods imposed by juvenile
courts were still eligible. Convictions exceeding these limits were considered on a case-by-case basis
by the authorities.
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of schooling in Germany, of which at least four years had to be general education. It is
important to stress that both requirements are less restrictive than those for obtaining a
permanent work or residence permit. Finally, an applicant needed to declare her loyalty
to the democratic principles of the German constitution. Foreign-born parents who ful-
filled these requirements could include their dependent children (under the age of 18) in
their citizenship application even if the child or spouse did not yet fulfill the individual
residency requirement.
The Citizenship Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG)), which came into effect on Jan-
uary 1, 2000, introduced for the first time birthright citizenship into German law. Children
born in Germany in 2000 or later obtain German citizenship automatically if at least one
foreign-born parent has lived in Germany legally for 8 years (and had a permanent resi-
dency permit, available after five years of legal residence, for at least three years).8 The
law also stipulated a transitional rule for children born between 1990 and 1999: immigrant
parents who had lived in Germany for at least eight years could apply for citizenship for
their child. This option expired on December 31, 2000, however.
Furthermore, the 2000 reform reduced the residency requirements for immigrants arriv-
ing at the age of 15 or older to 8 years. Since 2000, most immigrants face residency
requirements of eight years; only immigrants arriving under the age of eight have to wait
until they turn 16 to become eligible. The other requirements of the 1991 reform stayed
the same: applicants could not have a criminal record, had to demonstrate economic
self-sufficiency and their loyalty to democratic principles. In addition, the new law also
required applicants to demonstrate adequate German language skills prior to naturaliza-
tion. As before, the law of 2000 did not recognize dual citizenship in general though
exemptions became more common in practice.9
Together the reforms of 1991 and 2000 define four roads to obtaining citizenship for im-
migrant children: citizenship by birth, eligibility through the transitional rule, individual
eligibility and eligibility through parents. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the different
access options and the associated requirements on residency, age and birthplace. For those
with foreign citizenship, the 1991 reform defined two ways to naturalize: the child had to
be at least 16 years old and lived in Germany legally for at least eight years (individual
eligibility). Alternatively, a child under the age of 18 could obtain German citizenship if
8Eligibility is checked when parents register their newborn children, which is legally required in Germany.
In most cases, the children also keep the citizenship of their parents’ country of origin. Until 2014,
children have to decide at age 21, which citizenship to keep (‘option model’). Since December of 2014,
children who have grown up in Germany for at least 8 years and have finished at least 6 years of
formal education can keep both passports.
9It became easier for older applicants and refugees to keep their previous citizenship. Applicants could
also keep their nationality if it was legally impossible to renounce it or if it imposed a special hardship
like excessive costs or serious economic disadvantages (e.g. problems with inheritances or owning
property in their country of origin).
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Figure 3.1: Eligibility Rules for Citizenship
one foreign-born parent became eligible and included the child in the citizenship applica-
tion (eligibility through parent). The 2000 reform further added two more options open
to immigrant children born in Germany: for children born in 2000 or later whose foreign-
born parents satisfy the residency requirement of 8 years (citizenship by birth) and for
children born between 1990 and 1999 if their parents satisfied the residency requirement
of 8 years and filed a citizenship application for their child in 2000 (transitional rule).
Figure 3.2 shows the share of naturalizations granted in each category between 2000 and
2017. Across all age groups, the most important category is individual eligibility, which
makes up for around 60% of all naturalizations over this period. Birthright citizenship
has also played an important role accounting for around 20% of all naturalizations. The
transitional rule, in contrast, played only a transitory role indeed: while 10% of all nat-
uralizations in 2000 and 2001 occurred under the transitional rule, the fraction became
negligible thereafter. Naturalization as part of a family application makes up less than
10% of naturalizations across all age groups. We next discuss the data we use to analyze
the consequences of the two citizenship reforms on children’s skill development.
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Figure 3.2: Naturalizations by Type of Eligibility
Notes: The figure shows the percentages of naturalizations by birth under the transitional rule,
individual eligibility, or as a family member of an eligible adult. Data prior to 2000 are not available as
they did not distinguish between different legal forms of naturalizations.
Sources: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2008; 2019) and Federal Statistical Office (2018)
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3.3 Data Sources
3.3.1 National Educational Panel Study
Our main data source is the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS, Blossfeld et al.
2011). The panel collects detailed information on children’s education and skill develop-
ment. The survey first samples schools and then randomly selects specific classes in the
target grade. All students in the selected classes are asked to participate and then followed
over time even if they repeat or skip a grade.10 To select children under six who have not
yet entered school, NEPS first samples primary schools and then surveys children in the
day care centers that typically send children to the selected primary school. Our study
covers the period from 2010 to 2017.
A unique feature of the data for our purpose is that the NEPS study administers standard-
ized competence tests to all children. Such detailed standardized test results are rarely
available in Germany and certainly not for large samples of school-aged children.11 For
our main analysis, we will focus on the evolution of language skills in German. Fluency
in the host country language is crucial to learn many other subjects in school. In addi-
tion, tests of language skills are available for all children in several grades thus providing
large enough samples for our analysis. Below, we will also investigate other outcomes like
math, science or ICT skills as well as measures of school performance like grade retention
or grades in German and math.
Similar to the PISA test program, the test for reading comprehension measures the ability
to handle different types of texts encountered in daily life (like advertisements, literary or
instructional texts).12 The vocabulary test is based on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test and hence, similar to those in other large-scale panel studies (e.g. the British Cohort
Study or the European Child Care and Education Study). Each test contains between
21 to 89 items and takes around 30 minutes to complete. For school children, the test
is completed in the class room. Pre-school children or first-graders are tested one-to-one
with an interviewer and age-adjusted items. We use the number of correct answers in
each test as our baseline measure. To make effects comparable across subject and age
groups, we rescale the scores to values between 0 and 100 and then standardize them to
have mean zero and a standard deviation of one in our sample.
10The survey does not follow all students who leave the school, however. It is unclear a-priori whether
these students are positively or negatively selected. We return to the question of selective attrition
from the sample in more detail below.
11Prior studies on Germany have analyzed data on school readiness, which is assessed by a pediatrician
when the child is five years old prior to school entry (Cornelissen et al. 2018; Felfe and Lalive 2018;
Felfe et al. 2019).
12See the data appendix for a detailed discussion of all tests and measures of school performance analyzed.
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A second unique feature of the NEPS data is that information on parents’ education,
working career and migration history is available. The survey interviews not only the
child, but also the main caretaker, in 80% of the cases the mother, and collects information
about the partner or spouse living in the household.13 We restrict the sample to children
where the main caretaker is foreign-born. The children might be born abroad or in
Germany, i.e. are first- or second-generation immigrants. We keep children whose parents
have naturalized at some point but exclude children with a native parent.
We focus our analysis on three cohorts spanning the period from kindergarten until the
end of compulsory schooling. The first cohort, which we call the child cohort, is born in
2005 and 2006 and hence, on average eight years of age during our sample period. They
are still in kindergarten in the first wave and go through primary school over our sample
period. Most of this cohort is eligible for birthright citizenship, but could be eligible
through their parents as well. The second or teen cohort, mostly born in 1999 and 2000,
is on average 13 years of age during our sample period. The teens attend grade 5 in 2010,
just after the school track has been chosen at the end of primary school (after grade 4)
in most federal states. This cohort might be eligible through all four channels though
the majority will not yet be individually eligible (as they are still under the age of 16).
Finally, the third or adolescent cohort is on average 17 years of age and attend grade 9
at the beginning of our sample period, which marks the end of compulsory schooling in
Germany. As these children are mostly born between 1995 and 1996, they are not eligible
for birthright citizenship. Yet, they could be eligible under the transitional rule, through
individual or parental eligibility.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of our sample of first-generation and second generation
of immigrants in the NEPS. Around 85% of children in our sample were born in Germany.
Those immigrant children who were born abroad came to Germany at the age of five on
average.
3.3.2 Eligibility and Take-Up of Citizenship
To study the effect of citizenship on children’s skill development and school performance,
we will instrument actual German citizenship with the four access options to citizenship
discussed in Section 3.2. In particular, we define separate binary indicators equal to one if
a child with at least one foreign-born parent is eligible by birthright, under the transitional
rule, or when they themselves or their parents are eligible for citizenship. The indicators
are equal to zero if the child is not eligible under the specified access option. Eligibility
13While information on the main caretaker is available for most of the sample with less than 10% missing,
the information on the second parent or partner is missing for 30% of our sample. We return to this
issue in the robustness section below.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for the Sample of Immigrant Children
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Child Treatment:
German Citizenship 0.81 0.39 0 1
Child Eligibility
Birthright 0.40 0.49 0 1
Transitional Rule 0.34 0.48 0 1
Individual Eligibility 0.44 0.50 0 1
Parental Eligibility 0.96 0.19 0 1
Child Outcomes:
Math -0.16 0.96 -2.45 2.36
Vocabulary -0.55 1.09 -4.69 2.62
Reading Comprehension -0.11 0.97 -3.09 2.73
Science 0.12 0.97 -2 2.46
Computer -0.08 0.99 -3 2.89
Grade in German 2.74 0.87 1 6
Grade in Math 2.80 1.05 1 6
Ever Repeatd a Grade 0.17 0.38 0 1
Academic Track Recommendation 0.44 0.50 0 1
Academic Track 0.42 0.49 0 1
Child Characteristics:
Girl 0.50 0.50 0 1
Age 13.6 4.22 4.25 26
Birth Cohort 2000 4.70 1990 2008
Foreign-born 0.14 0.35 0 1
Age at Immigration if Foreign-born 4.9 3.61 0 16
Parental Characteristics:
German Citizenship 0.59 0.49 0 1
Age 41.44 6.14 15 77
Years since Immigration 23.42 10.05 0 58
Birth Cohort 1971 6.71 1936 1996
Immigration Year 1990 10.13 1957 2012
Education: Low 0.33 0.47 0 1
Education: Medium 0.57 0.49 0 1
Education: High 0.10 0.30 0 1
Observations 23,868
Notes: The sample is restricted to first- and second-generation immigrant children with at least one foreign-born parent. The
eligibility variables are binary indicators equal to one if the child is eligible under one of the access options specified (see
Institutional Background section in the main text). Parental education is coded as follows: low (no high school or vocational
degree), medium (high school or vocational degree) and high (university or college degree).
Source: National Educational Panel Study, Starting Cohorts 2-4, 2010-2017
116
3.3 Data Sources
for any of the four access options depends on observable characteristics. Eligibility for
birthright citizenship and the transitional rule depend on the child’s country of birth (in
Germany or abroad) and birth cohort as well as parental years since migration. Individual
eligibility is defined based on the child’s birth cohort and years since migration (or parental
years since migration if the child is born in Germany). Finally, eligibility through the
parents depends on parental years since migration and the child’s birth cohort (as only
children under age 18 can be included in the citizenship application).
Eligibility for citizenship will not be perfectly correlated with observed citizenship for at
least two reasons: additional eligibility criteria and take-up.14 All access options to citi-
zenship depend on residency requirements of the parents or child. While fulfilling the res-
idency requirement is an important eligibility criteria, it is not the only one. As discussed
in Section 3.2, the absence of a severe criminal background or economic self-sufficiency,
among others, are additional conditions to be fulfilled. Hence, some immigrants might
satisfy the residency requirement but fail because of one of the other criteria. Even if they
fulfill all eligibility criteria, immigrants might decide not to apply for German citizenship
because of unobserved costs that exceed the benefits of obtaining host country citizenship.
One potential source of such costs is that immigrants feel strongly attached to the source
country, which might increase the perceived costs of naturalizing, especially if one needs
to renounce the citizenship of the source country (Monscheuer 2019). Other factors might
be social aspirations or motivations to apply for citizenship. All of these factors will be
filtered out with our instrumental variables strategy.
Appendix Table 3.8 shows the share of immigrant children in our sample who are eligible
under one of the four access options and their take-up of citizenship.15 Among immigrant
children born in Germany, the highest take-up rate (93%) occurs for those 47% in our
sample who are eligible under birthright citizenship. Almost all (99%) children born in
Germany to foreign-born parents have been eligible through their parents. 85% of those
have naturalized. Foreign-born children in turn are most likely to be eligible through
their parents (79%) but their take-up rates are with 64% much lower than for immigrant
children born in Germany. Note that these take-up rates are substantially higher than for
first-generation immigrants with more than ten years of residency in Germany, of which
around 35-40% naturalized (OECD 2011).
14In addition, there can also be measurement error in the survey data. If it is classical measurement
error, our estimates will be biased toward zero making it more difficult to detect causal effects of
citizenship on skill development.
15Note that a child eligible for citizenship might not have naturalized under that specific category as
some children are eligible through multiple channels. Take-up rates are similar if we restrict children
to be eligible under one access option only (see notes to Table 3.8 for the actual take-up rates).
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3.4 Econometric Framework
To analyze how host country citizenship affects educational outcomes and to explore the
heterogeneity in treatment effects along observable and unobservable gains, we use the
marginal treatment effects (MTE) framework developed by Björklund and Moffitt (1987),
Heckman (1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2007b).
3.4.1 Setup
Let Y0i be a potential outcome like test scores for child i in the non-treated and Y1i the
potential outcome for child i in the treated state. We model potential outcomes as linear
in parameters:
Yji = Xiβj + Uji j = 0, 1 (3.1)
where E[Uj|X = x] = 0, which is satisfied if we interpret equation (3.1) as a linear
projection of Yj onto X. The X denote child and parental characteristics that might
influence educational outcomes even independently of citizenship.
The selection into treatment, i.e. whether a child has host country citizenship, is denoted
by Ni. We follow the literature in modeling the treatment decision as a latent index
model:
N∗i = Ziβd − Vi with Ni = 1 if N∗i ≥= 0 and Ni = 0 otherwise (3.2)
where Z includes the same variables X as the outcome equation and in addition the
instruments Z˜, which are excluded from the outcome equation. In our case, the excluded
instruments Z˜ are binary indicators equal to one if a child is eligible for citizenship under
a certain access option (birthright, transitional rule, individual or parental eligibility)
and zero otherwise. The unobserved component of the selection equation Vi represents
individual characteristics not observed by the econometrician that make a child less likely
to obtain host country citizenship.
Without loss of generality, we can transform the selection equation (3.2), Ziγn − Vi ≥ 0,
into Ziγn ≥ Vi and Φ(Ziγn) ≥ Φ(Vi) where Φ denotes the cdf of V (in our case, a
standard normal). The term Φ(Ziγn) ≡ P (Z) is the propensity score, while the second
term Φ(Vi) ≡ UN denotes a random variable distributed in the unit interval. Hence, a
person naturalizes when the propensity score, which is in part determined by the available
options to obtain citizenship, exceeds UN , which represents the unobserved resistance to
treatment. In what follows, we will think of UN as the unobserved (monetary or psychic)
costs of obtaining host country citizenship.
The gain from treatment for child i based on the potential outcomes in equation (3.1) is
given as:
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Yi1 − Yi0 = Xi(β1 − β0) + (Ui1 − Ui0). The first term represents how gains vary with
observable characteristics like gender, for example, in the treatment state, while the second
term represents the unobserved gains from citizenship. Individuals might select into
citizenship based on both observable and unobservable gains. As a result, the unobserved
gains from citizenship (U1i−U0i) may be correlated with the unobserved costs of obtaining
citizenship (UN).
The marginal treatment effect (MTE) is then defined as:
MTE(X = x, UN = uN) = E[Y1 − Y0|X = x, UN = uN ] (3.3)
The MTE represents the gain from treatment for an individual with observed character-
istics X = x and unobservable characteristics UN = uN . Hence, the MTE identifies the
return to citizenship for an individual with P (Z) = uN who is just indifferent between
naturalizing (N = 1) and not naturalizing (N = 0). Tracing the MTE at different UN val-
ues reveals how the return to citizenship varies across different quantiles of the unobserved
costs to obtain host country citizenship.
We make the following assumptions: (U1, U0, UN) is independent of (Z|X). In our con-
text, this assumption implies that eligibility through one of the four access options Z˜ is
as good as randomly assigned and hence, independent of the unobserved gains and the
unobserved resistance to treatment conditional on the control variables X. We provide
some evidence for this assumption in Section 3.4.3 below. Under the conditional inde-
pendence assumption, we can trace the propensity score P (Z) over the unit interval for a
given X. In practice, however, we rarely have the data and variation in the instruments
available, especially with a large set of control variables X (Carneiro et al. 2011) and bi-
nary instruments as in our case (Brinch et al. 2017). We therefore impose in addition the
assumption that X and (U1, U0) are additively separable conditional on UN (Brinch et al.
2017). 16 We can then trace the MTE over the unconditional support of the propensity
score P (Z), as opposed to the support of P (Z) conditional on X = x. A consequence of
this assumption is that the shape of the marginal treatment effect does not depend on X
except for its intercept. Under additive separability, we can rewrite the MTE as
MTE(X = x, UN = uN) = E[Y1 − Y0|X = x, UN = uN ] = x(β1 − β0) +K(p) (3.4)
where K(p) = E[U1−U0|UN = uN ]. The first term represents the heterogeneous effect of
treatment with respect to observable characteristics, while the second term characterizes
the heterogeneity in unobserved gains to citizenship.
16These two assumptions are slightly weaker than the full independence assumption, i.e. (U1, U0, UN )
is jointly independent of (Z˜,X) that is typically imposed in empirical work (Carneiro and Lee 2009;
Carneiro et al. 2011; French and Song 2014; Maestas et al. 2013).
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3.4.2 Empirical Specification and Estimation
The estimation proceeds in two steps. In the first stage, we estimate the selection equation,
i.e. the empirical counterpart of equation (3.2). The dependent variable in the first stage
is an indicator equal to one if a child has German citizenship and zero otherwise. The
instruments Z˜ are the four eligibility indicators discussed in Section 3.3.2. Each indicator
is equal to one if a child is eligible under the specific access option and zero otherwise.
As control variables X we include child and family characteristics that influence take-
up and educational outcomes. As child characteristics we include gender, a linear and
squared term in age (measured in years with monthly precision), an indicator whether
the child was born abroad or in Germany and the child’s age of arrival.17 We also control
for a full set of birth cohort fixed effects as the child’s year of birth is an important
determinant of eligibility. We further include parental age as this might affect both the
financial resources available in the family as well as parenting styles like the time spent
with the child.18 A full set of parental years since migration fixed effects is included to
absorb additional differences between immigrant parents that might affect the take-up or
educational outcomes of the child.
In addition, we control for state fixed effects to adjust for state-level differences in educa-
tional policy as well as cohort- and wave-specific fixed effects. The latter ensure that we
only compare outcomes between children belonging to the same cohort and wave. To ad-
just for differential propensities of take-up and school performance across source countries,
we define ten regions of origin: the traditional EU-15 member states (e.g. Italy), immi-
grants from countries that recently joined the European Union (the EU-12, e.g. Poland),
immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and the Former Soviet Union (except the Baltic
states). We lump together other immigrants into broad regions of origin (Asia, Africa,
the Middle East and North and South America).
We estimate the first stage as a probit model thus assuming that the cdf of V , Φ, is a
standard normal. From the estimates of the citizenship decision, we predict the propensity
scores for treated and non-treated individuals. Recall that our second-stage estimation of
the MTE is identified non-parametrically only over the support of P (Z). Therefore, we
impose common support of P (Z) for treated and non-treated individuals. In addition,
we also trim 1% of the observations with the thinnest common support in the data. We
show in Section 3.5.4 below that our results are robust to alternative trimming margins.
17Note that the child’s age of arrival is equal to zero if the child was born in Germany. Age of arrival
effects are therefore identified from children born abroad only.
18We do not include parental education, employment or number of siblings. While these are potentially
important determinants of family resources and time spent with the child (Doepke et al. 2019), they
are themselves influenced by citizenship eligibility of the parent (Gathmann and Keller 2018) or child
(Avitabile et al. 2013, 2014).
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In the second step, we estimate the outcome equation which is given by:
E[Yi|X = x, UN = uN ] = Xiβ0 +Xi(β1 − β0)p+K(p). (3.5)
The MTE for individual i is then calculated as the derivative of equation (3.5) with respect
to p.
We allow the observable gains to citizenship (the second term in equation (3.5)) to vary
with child gender, whether the child is born abroad and parental age.19 We also need to
specify the functional form for K(p), the unobserved gains to treatment (the third term
in equation (3.5)). Our main results use a third-order polynomial in the propensity score,
which restricts the MTE to be quadratic. In the robustness section, we demonstrate that
more flexible, higher-order polynomials or semi-parametric methods to approximate K(p)
yield results that are similar to the baseline.
To estimate the second stage, we use local instrumental variables (Local Instrumental
Variable (LIV)), which estimates equation (3.5) and then calculates its derivative with
respect to p. Recently, Brinch et al. (2017) have propagated the separate estimation
approach, which estimates the outcome equations in the treated and non-treated state
separately and then calculates the MTE. This estimation approach can be particularly
useful in the case of discrete instruments with limited variation. In our case, the four
instruments of eligibility can take on twelve distinct combinations. Therefore, even using
the LIV approach to estimate the MTE allows us to identify a flexible, high-order poly-
nomial of the unobservable gains to treatment K(P (Z)).20 We bootstrap all standard
errors to account for the estimation error in the first stage.21
3.4.3 Exogeneity of Citizenship Eligibility
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, the identification of the MTE requires that the instruments
Z˜ are jointly independent of unobservable gains in the outcome equation (U1i, U0i) and
19We include all other control variables as in the first stage but restrict its coefficients to be the same in
the treated and untreated state.
20Note that the number is lower than 24 = 16 because eligibility under birthright citizenship and the
transitional rule are mutually exclusive. Suppose that the conditional expectations of the unobserv-
ables U1 and U0 are specified as parametric functions linear in L parameters. Even without any
control variables the LIV approach can identify a MTE with L ≤ (M − 1) = 11 parameters, while the
separate estimation approach can identify L ≤M = 12 parameters (see Proposition 1 in Brinch et al.
2017). Hence, LIV can still identify K(P (Z)) as a polynomial of order eleven in our case.
21While the instruments vary at a more aggregated level than the individual child, each instrument varies
at a different level (e.g. individual eligibility depends on birth cohort and years since migration, while
birthright eligibility depends on parental years since migration and whether the child is born in
Germany). As a consequence, it is not obvious at which level to cluster or whether to cluster at
all given that we include fixed effects for parental years since migration and the child’s birth cohort
(Abadie et al. 2017).
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resistance to treatment in the selection equation (UN) conditional on our control variables
X. The four eligibility indicators, which serve as instrumental variables, only depend on
observable, demographic characteristics like parental years since migration, the child’s
country of birth or birth cohort (see the discussion in Section 3.3.2). As such, the instru-
ments are independent of any individual motivations and aspirations to succeed in the
host country or attachment to the source country, which are likely determinants of the
resistance to treatment (UN).
The identifying assumption could still be violated if certain groups of eligible children
benefit more from citizenship or have better preconditions to succeed. Immigrants from
outside the EU who naturalize obtain easier access to certain jobs and professions, which
has positive effects on earnings and educational investments (for a more detailed discus-
sion see Gathmann and Keller 2018). For EU citizens, there are no restrictions as the
single market guarantees the same access to jobs and professions as natives. If the compo-
sition of EU and non-EU immigrants coming to Germany changes over time (and hence,
the composition of immigrants becoming eligible for citizenship), this could generate a
spurious correlation between eligibility and educational outcomes. To rule this out, our
baseline specification controls for the geographical composition of immigrants by includ-
ing ten regions of origin fixed effects (including two categories for long-term and recent
EU member states), as described in Section 3.4.2.
Furthermore, the returns to host country citizenship might also be higher or lower for
foreign-born children than for children born and brought up in Germany. Similarly, the
returns to citizenship might decline when parents have lived in the country for a long
time and are well integrated in the host country. Both variables (being foreign-born
and parental years since migration) also determine eligibility for at least one of the four
access options, which might generate a spurious correlation between the instruments and
unobservable gains to treatment. Finally, both age of arrival of first-generation immigrants
and the child’s birth cohort are correlated with eligibility: children arriving at a younger
age have to wait longer for individual eligibility; the birth cohort in turn determines
whether a child born in Germany is eligible for birthright citizenship, for instance. At
the same time, it is well known that language acquisition is more difficult after a certain
age, which would result in lower scores on tests measuring the skill in the host country
language. And there might be cohort effects in skill development if schools or teachers
improve over time or are better able to teach classes from diverse backgrounds. To control
for these potential confounding influences, we include a full set of birth cohort and parental
years since migration fixed effects as well as the child’s age of arrival and whether the
child is foreign-born as controls in our baseline specification.
Table 3.2 provides more direct evidence supporting the identifying assumption. Using
122
3.4 Econometric Framework
our instruments as dependent variables, we check whether observable characteristics are
correlated with the instrument conditional on our set of control variables. As potential
confounders we use parental employment and education, living arrangement and child
gender. All of these are likely determinants of the returns to citizenship and resistance
to treatment. The results in Table 3.2 show that out of the 24 coefficients, only two are
statistically significant at the 5% level and a third one at the 10% level. The F-statistic
reported at the bottom of the table shows that we can reject the joint significance of the
regressors for all four instruments.
Another concern could be that selective return migration could bias our estimates. Specif-
ically, if immigrants are less likely to return to their home country if they become eligible
faster or have access to birthright citizenship for their children, for instance, our sample
of eligible children differs from the sample of not (or not yet) eligible children. Depending
on the type of return migration, this could bias our estimates upward or downward. We
would obtain an upward bias, for instance, if non-eligible children with the worst educa-
tional performance are more likely to leave the host country. We return to this issue in
the robustness section.
Table 3.2: Balancing Tests
Eligibility Transitional Individual Eligibility
by Birth Rule Eligibility through Parent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child is a Girl 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.000
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.000]
Partner living in Household -0.001 0.010 -0.002 -0.001**
[0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.001]
Parental Employment 0.002 -0.010 0.005 0.000
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001]
Mother Working Full-Time 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.000
[0.004] [0.007] [0.005] [0.001]
Parental Education: medium -0.007 0.015** -0.007* -0.001
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001]
Parental Education: high -0.009 0.003 -0.005 0.000
[0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.001]
F-Test Joint Significance of Covariates 1.04 1.91 0.70 0.83
(p-value) 0.40 0.10 0.65 0.55
Notes: The table reports regression estimates where each column comes from a separate regression. The dependent variables shown in the top
row are binary indicators equal to one if a child is eligible for citizenship by birth (column (1)), eligible under the transitional rule (column
(2)), individually eligible (column (3)) or eligible through parents (column (4)) and zero otherwise. A parent is medium-skilled if she has a
high school or vocational degree and she is high-skilled if she holds a college or university degree. The omitted category is low-skilled, i.e.
without a high school or vocational degree. The p-value shown is for the F-test of joint significance of the covariates shown in the table. All
specifications also include whether a child is born abroad, child age and age squared as well as its age of arrival (which is coded as zero if
the child is born in Germany), birth cohort fixed effects, age of the parent and fixed effects for the number of years the parent has lived in
Germany. Robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01.
Source: National Educational Panel Study, Starting Cohorts 2-4, 2010-2017
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3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Selection into Citizenship
We start out with the estimates of the selection equation (3.2). Table 3.3 shows marginal
effects from a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if the child
holds German citizenship and zero otherwise. The first column shows the results for the
whole sample, while columns (2) to (4) report estimates for the subsamples in which the
language tests were conducted. The estimates show that the four access options have a
strong effect on the likelihood of citizenship. Birthright citizenship, which is available for
children born in Germany only, raises the probability of having a German passport by
14.6 percentage points in the full sample. Individual eligibility, which is available when
immigrant children turn sixteen is also an important channel to obtain citizenship, in
particular for children born abroad. Compared to children born in Germany, foreign-
born children are about 10 percentage points more likely to naturalize under individual
eligibility.22
Recall that children eligible under the transitional rule are, by definition, eligible through
their parents as well. Hence, the negative coefficient on the transitional rule thus implies
that children are less likely to naturalize under the transitional rule than children only
eligible through their parents. This effect is in line with aggregate statistics that show a
very low take-up under the transitional rule, most likely because many immigrant parents
did not know about this transitional policy. Eligibility through parents plays a minor
role for citizenship in our context as almost all children (96%) in our samples are eligible
through their parents. The F-statistic at the bottom of Table 3.3 confirms that the four
access options have a strong effect on selecting into treatment (citizenship) across all sam-
ples. Foreign-born children are overall less likely to obtain citizenship unless they become
individually eligible. We also find strong negative effects of age and age at immigration
on take-up. In contrast, there are no gender differences in the likelihood of citizenship
acquisition.
As we can identify returns to citizenship at quantiles of UN within the support of the
distribution of P (Z) only, Figure 3.3 plots the distribution of estimated propensity scores
for treated and untreated children. The common support generated by both instruments
and observable characteristics covers the range between 0.47 and 0.97.23 Hence, we cannot
22While the overall pattern is similar across samples, the coefficients are typically larger in magnitude
in the three subsamples. The main reason is that eligibility options differ across birth cohorts and
grades.
23Figure 3.3 shows common support for the whole sample. In Figure 3.6, we also show the propensity
scores for treated and untreated children in the subsamples with valid test scores for reading and
vocabulary (in Panel A and B) or information on German grades (in Panel C). The common support
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say much for immigrants who are most likely to take up citizenship unless we are willing
to extrapolate based on functional form assumptions like normality, for instance. Given
aggregate take-up rates of between 40-80% among all immigrants (OECD 2011), the
common support generated by our instruments covers an important, (policy-)relevant
range of take-up rates.24
Table 3.3: Selection Equation
Sample (Full) Sample (Reading) Sample (Vocabulary)
Sample
(German Grade)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birthright Citizenship 0.146*** 0.459** 0.793*** 0.455***
[0.017] [0.185] [0.211] [0.169]
Transitional Rule -0.104*** -0.654*** -0.856*** -0.533***
[0.012] [0.108] [0.152] [0.104]
Individual Eligibility -0.006 -0.339* -0.825** 0.208
[0.014] [0.176] [0.382] [0.143]
Individual Eligibility*Foreign-born 0.100*** 0.533*** 0.936*** 0.548***
[0.010] [0.172] [0.213] [0.147]
Eligibility through Parents -0.051** -0.168 4.622 -0.042
[0.026] [0.682] [105.789] [0.544]
Foreign-born -0.171*** -0.597*** -0.653*** -0.612***
[0.025] [0.178] [0.189] [0.152]
Child is a Girl 0.003 0.018 0.097* 0.071
[0.005] [0.052] [0.059] [0.047]
Age -0.065*** -0.534* 0.159 -1.282***
[0.020] [0.275] [0.363] [0.312]
Age Squared 0.001 0.002 -0.012 0.038***
[0.001] [0.011] [0.021] [0.012]
Age at Immigration -0.009*** -0.113*** -0.103*** -0.114***
[0.002] [0.028] [0.035] [0.025]
Parental Age -0.001 -0.006 -0.011** 0.003
[0.000] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004]
Partial R2 Instruments 0.019 0.017 0.031 0.013
F-Test Joint Significance of Instruments 64.0 11.5 275.4 10.00
(p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 23,065 3,920 3,465 4,609
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects of a probit selection model where the dependent variable indicates whether
the child has German citizenship or not. Column (1) uses the full sample across all survey cohorts and waves, while columns
(2)-(4) use the sample with valid tests in reading comprehension (column (2)), vocabulary (column (3)) and German grade
(column (4)). The instruments are four indicators equal to one if a child is eligible for citizenship under the respective access
option and zero otherwise. These are birthright citizenship (child born in Germany after December 31, 1999 with at least one
foreign-born parent who satisfies eight years of legal residency at birth); the transitional rule (child born in Germany between
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 with at least one foreign-born parent who satisfies eight years of legal residency
and applies for the child in 2000); individual eligibility (child is at least 16 and has lived legally in the country for at least
eight years); and eligibility through parents (child is under 18 and has one foreign-born parent who satisfies the residency
requirement (eight years for immigrants arriving in 1992 or later, eight years for teen immigrants arriving under the age of
15 before 1992; or up to fifteen years for adults arriving at the age of 15 or older prior to 1992)). We also interact individual
eligibility with an indicator whether the child is born abroad to allow for differential take-up rates. Age at immigration of the
child is equal to zero for children born in Germany. In addition to the variables shown, all specifications further include birth
cohort fixed effects, parental years since migration fixed effects and survey cohort interacted with wave-specific fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: National Educational Panel Study, Starting Cohorts 2-4, 2010-2017
3.5.2 Language Skills
We now turn to the question whether and how citizenship affects language skills as mea-
sured by standardized test scores in vocabulary and reading and school grades in German.
for reading comprehension (in Panel A) and German grade (in Panel C) is [0.47; 0.97], for vocabulary
(in Panel B) the common support covers the slightly broader range [0.42; 0.98].
24We are not the only study estimating heterogeneous treatment effects with limited common support
in the propensity score: Maestas et al. (2013) obtain coverage between 0.57 and 0.85 and French and
Song (2014) cover the range between 0.45 and 0.85 for disability receipt, while Felfe and Lalive (2018)
have coverage between 0 and 0.5 of the propensity to attend early childhood education.
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Figure 3.3: Common Support for Treated and Untreated Individuals
The results, based on estimating equation (3.5), in Table 3.4 show that citizenship allows
some immigrant children to improve their skills relative to their peers. Girls who do not
obtain German citizenship have a vocabulary that is 0.61 of a standard deviation below
their male peers. Obtaining citizenship allows girls to close the gap in language skills
compared to immigrant boys. They also improve their German language grade by 0.3
grades.
Foreign-born children, in turn, have better language skills in the untreated citizenship than
children born in Germany. Obtaining citizenship allows immigrant children who are born
in Germany to catch up with foreign-born children. Similarly, immigrant children with
older parents have a better vocabulary in German than children with younger parents,
possibly because parents spend more time to improve their child’s command of the German
language. Obtaining citizenship neutralizes the advantage of parental age and allows
children with younger parents to catch up to their peers.
Overall, the evidence from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggests that foreign-born children and
children with older parents are less likely to obtain citizenship and also have lower returns
to citizenship in terms of language skills. Immigrant girls who have higher gains in
terms of language skills are somewhat more likely to select into treatment than boys.
These results suggest a pattern of positive selection into citizenship in terms of observed
characteristics. This finding is in line with estimates for adult immigrants where more
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educated immigrants are more likely to naturalize (see e.g. Chiswick and Miller 2008;
Gathmann and Keller 2018).
Figure 3.4 plots the MTE curve for reading comprehension (Panel A), vocabulary (Panel B)
and German grade (Panel C) at the mean values of observable characteristics (X) in the
sample. The figures relate the gains from treatment (U1 − U0) on the y-axis to the un-
observed costs of citizenship (UN) on the x-axis. For language skills, the MTE curve is
downward sloping: individuals who face higher costs (or higher resistance) to citizenship
have lower gains than individuals with a low unobservable resistance. Individuals with
low resistance to citizenship have positive gains, while individuals with high resistance
have zero returns to citizenship.
The pattern for reading comprehension and vocabulary points to positive selection into
citizenship in terms of unobservables. Panels A and B in Figure 3.4 suggest that chil-
dren with an unobserved resistance smaller than UN < 0.8 and UN < 0.75, respectively
have statistically significant positive returns to citizenship, while children above these
resistances have zero returns. The slope of the MTE curve and hence, heterogeneity in
returns in terms of unobservables is statistically significant at the 2% level for reading
comprehension and at the 1% level for vocabulary (see the p-value of the test for essential
heterogeneity reported in column (1) and (2) of Table 3.4). The estimates for school
grades in German are also consistent with positive selection. Recall that school grades
vary from one to six with one being the best and six the poorest grade. Panel C of Figure
3.4 shows that immigrant children with the lowest resistance to treatment have positive
treatment effects, i.e. experience an improvement in grades. Unobservable gains are zero
for children with UN ≥ 0.6. This threshold when unobservable gains are zero is lower for
German grades than for standardized test scores.
Overall then, the positive selection into citizenship with respect to language skills implies
that those with the highest returns are most likely to take-up citizenship. Returns are
lower and approach zero for immigrant children at the margin of take-up, i.e. with
unobservable characteristics that make them more hesitant to take up citizenship. We
will return to the question whether a further liberalization of citizenship law generates
additional benefits in the next section below.
3.5.3 Other Estimates and Outcomes
So far, we have shown that immigrant children with the highest propensity to become
German citizens have the highest returns in terms of improved German language skills.
Understanding the language of instruction and knowing how to express oneself in class is
important to follow and understand other subjects taught. We next investigate whether
citizenship has positive effects on the performance in other subjects and school more
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Figure 3.4: Marginal Treatment Effects for Language Skills
Panel A
Panel B
Panel C
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Table 3.4: MTE Estimates for Test Scores
Reading Vocabulary German Grade
(1) (2) (3)
Child is a Girl -0.218 -0.617 -0.018
[0.16] [0.21]*** [0.15]
Child Foreign-born 0.627 1.378 -0.724
[0.36]* [0.47]*** [0.42]*
Parental Age 0.011 0.053 -0.003
[0.01] [0.01]*** [0.01]
Propensity Score 11.930 -14.517 5.809
[6.04]** [10.69] [6.20]
Propensity Score Squared -11.248 5.706 -2.003
[4.56]** [8.16] [5.10]
Propensity Score x Girl 0.366 0.527 -0.305
[0.19]* [0.25]** [0.18]*
Propensity Score x Foreignborn -0.792 -1.373 0.968
[0.53] [0.59]** [0.54]*
Propensity Score x Parental Age 0.004 -0.048 -0.010
[0.02] [0.02]*** [0.02]
Test Observable Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.017 0.001 0.048
Test for Essential Heterogeneity (p-value) 0.019 0.004 0.060
Observations 3,920 3,465 4,609
Notes: The table reports estimates from the outcome equation where the dependent variables are standardized test scores in
reading comprehension (column (1)), vocabulary in German (column (2)) and German grade (column (3)). Coefficients not
interacted with the propensity score measure the effect in the untreated state, while coefficients interacted with the propensity
score represent the difference in effect between treatment (host country citizenship) and no treatment. In addition to the variables
shown, all specifications also include child age and age squared, the child’s age at immigration, birth cohort fixed effects and
parental years since migration fixed effects (all not interacted with the propensity score). Bootstrapped standard errors are
reported in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: National Educational Panel Study, Starting Cohorts 2-4, 2010-2017
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broadly. Our data provide us with standardized test scores for math, natural sciences and
computer skills. In addition, we know the grade in math, whether a child ever repeated
a grade in school, whether the child attends the academic high school track and whether
the primary school teacher recommended the child for the academic track or not.25
Table 3.5 shows the results of estimating our baseline model in equations (3.2) and (3.5)
where the dependent variables are cognitive tests and other measures of school perfor-
mance. Given that we only have limited support, we do not report global treatment
parameters (like ATE or Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)) as these would
depend on strong functional form assumptions like joint normality.26 Instead we report
the LATE as well as marginal policy-relevant treatment effects (Marginal Policy Rele-
vant Treatment Effects (MPRTE)). The latter are obtained by perturbing the propensity
score by a factor α and assessing its effect on the returns to citizenship for the marginal
child between treatment and no treatment (for details see Carneiro et al. 2011). The
basic assumption is that a marginal change to the propensity score (with α approaching
zero) only shifts P (Z), the propensity to obtain citizenship, but does not affect potential
outcomes or the unobservables determining selection (U1, U0 and UN). Hence, knowing
how the distribution of the propensity score Pα changes is sufficient to calculate a policy-
relevant treatment effect. As we cannot identify the full support of the propensity score,
we estimate MPRTEs, which identify how the returns to citizenship for immigrant chil-
dren change at the margin of take-up. Our first perturbation adds a fixed amount α to
each child’s propensity score (hence Pα = P + α). The resulting MPRTE1 is then the
MTE aggregated over individuals (with observables X and unobservables UN) who would
switch into treatment in response to the perturbation. The second perturbation is to
multiply each child’s propensity score with (1 +α), so Pα = P (1 +α) and calculating the
MPRTE2. In practice, the two methods yield very similar results.
As a baseline for comparison, columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.5 show the estimates for our
main measures of language skills. The LATE, which is a weighted average of the MTE over
the relevant distribution of X and UN is positive but does not reach statistical significance
at conventional levels. The MPRTE are positive for test scores and statistically significant
25In most states, parents decide on the school track for their child, which may or may not coincide with
the recommendation of the primary school teacher. In some states (Baden-Württemberg until 2012,
Bavaria, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia), the recommendation by the primary
school teacher prescribed the track choice. In all six states, parents can circumvent (or overrule) the
prescribed track choice by requesting a slot or trial period in the academic track.
26Alternatively, we could estimate average treatment or average treatment on the treated effects by
rescaling the weights to sum to one over the common support (see Carneiro et al. 2011). For reading
comprehension, the ATE, ATT and Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated (ATUT) (with boot-
strapped standard errors in brackets) are 0.682 [0.26]***, 0.946 [0.27]*** and -0.018 [0.42] respectively.
For vocabulary, we get as ATE 1.22 [0.36]***, as ATT 1.571 [0.41]*** and as ATUT 0.004 [0.46]. These
effects might differ, however, from the effect of an individual outside the common support.
130
3.5 Empirical Results
in three out of four cases suggesting that expanding take-up of citizenship would improve
the language skills of the marginal child.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 3.5 show estimates for test scores in math, sciences and ICT
skills. For all three outcome variables, the LATE estimates are positive, but only reach
statistical significance for math skills at the 10% level. The MPRTE are also positive for
math skills indicating that expanding take-up would improve math skills of the child at
the margin. Interestingly, the test of essential heterogeneity at the bottom of Table 3.5
shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no unobservable gains of citizenship for
math and science skills. The test statistic for ICT skills indicates in turn that there is some
heterogeneity but reaches statistical significance only at the 15% level. The corresponding
MTE curves in Panels A (math), B (sciences) and C (ICT skills) of Figure 3.7 illustrate
that pattern. For math skills, Panel A suggests that the effects of citizenship are positive
and sizable across the distribution of unobservable resistance to treatment. As the MTE
curve is basically flat, there is no sizable heterogeneity in unobservable gains that varies
with UN . For sciences skills, the MTE graph shows some curvature but the variation is
not enough to reject the null of no essential heterogeneity.
These findings indicate that either there is no heterogeneity in unobservables for math and
science skills or agents (i.e. parents and children) are not aware of it and hence, do not
act on these gains when deciding whether to apply for citizenship. Econometrically, the
absence of essential heterogeneity implies that, under additive separability, equation (3.4)
becomes E(Y1−Y0|X = x, UN = uN) = E(Y1−Y0|X = x), so Y1−Y0 is mean independent
of UN given X = x. In that case, all the treatment parameters are the same, so MTE =
LATE.27
Finally, we turn to the question whether immigrant children with host country citizenship
perform better in school. Columns (7) to (10) of Table 3.5 show modest LATE effects
for grades in math, whether a child attends the academic track and whether the primary
school teacher recommended the academic track or not. Similarly, the MPRTE are close
to zero and never statistically significant. The p-value at the bottom further indicates that
there is no heterogeneity in returns to citizenship with respect to resistance to treatment.
The only exception is grade retention (shown in column (8) of Table 3.5): immigrant
children with German citizenship are much less likely to repeat a grade in school. The
p-value at the bottom also suggests that the null hypothesis of no essential heterogeneity
can be rejected at the 5% level.
27In principle, we would have MTE = ATE = ATT = LATE. Yet, given our limited common support,
we cannot rule out the possibility that there is essential heterogeneity outside the common support
for those most or least likely to take-up citizenship.
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3.5.4 Robustness
The pattern of positive selection in language skill gains is robust to a number of alternative
specifications. Our baseline estimation uses a second-order polynomial to approximate
K(P (Z)), which implies a linear MTE function. Hence, unobserved gains can either
monotonically increase or decrease over the quantiles of UN but not both. To allow for
more flexible MTE curves over the distribution of UN , we estimate models with a third-
or fourth-order polynomial where the dependent variables are standardized test scores
in reading comprehension. The results are shown in Panel A of Figure 3.5. Allowing
the MTE curve to be quadratic (using a third-order polynomial) is very similar to the
baseline: both linear and quadratic MTE curves are downward sloping in line with positive
selection on unobserved gains. Allowing for an even more flexible fourth-order polynomial
still yields a downward sloping MTE curve, which becomes upward sloping for those least
likely to take-up citizenship (UN > 0.9). Using a semiparametric approach, we again
find a very similar downward sloping shape of the MTE curve. Overall then, the positive
selection in unobservable gains is robust to alternative functional form assumptions.
In our baseline, we also trim 1% observations with the thinnest common support. In
Panel B of Figure 3.5, we report estimates using alternative trimming margins of 2%,
4% and 5%. Additional trimming mostly cuts observations at low levels of resistance
(with UN < 0.6). The resulting downward sloping MTE curves, however, are very similar
across alternative trimming margins. That suggests that our results are not driven by
observations with little common support.
Table 3.6 reports a number of additional robustness checks for our main outcomes reading
comprehension in Panel A and vocabulary in Panel B. The first column shows the baseline
estimates for comparison. We again report LATE and MPRTE effects. The MPRTE are
calculated based on the same two perturbations of the propensity score we discussed in
the last section. We first check the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications
of the outcome equations. In column (2), we implement an alternative semi-parametric
estimator based on a double residual regression approach (Robinson 1988).28 Column (3)
uses the separate approach, which estimates the outcome equation in the treated and
untreated state separately, rather than local instrumental variables (LIV). In both cases,
we get even stronger positive effects on language skills in the baseline.
The next set of robustness checks uses alternative specifications of the selection equation.
In column (4), we specify the treatment equation as a logit rather than a probit. In
column (5), we only use our four discrete instruments of eligibility without interacting
28In the first step, we obtain residuals from regressions of Y , X and Xp on polynomial in p. In the
second step, we estimate β0 and β1 − β0 by regressing the residualized outcome on the residualized
regressors. We then use a local polynomial regression of the residualized outcomes on p to obtain an
estimate of K(p). MTE is then calculated by taking the derivative of K(p).
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Figure 3.5: Specification Checks
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individual eligibility with an indicator for being foreign-born. Including an interaction
effect seems a natural specification as foreign-born children do not have access to birthright
citizenship. We would therefore expect that foreign-born children are more likely to take
advantage of individual or parental eligibility. We drop the interaction effect in column (5)
to rule out that the naturalization effect in the first stage is primarily identified through
the interaction effects rather than the instruments themselves. The results show that
functional form and interaction between instruments and controls have little effect on our
estimates, which are very similar to the baseline in column (1).
As children’s cognitive skills typically improve with age, one might worry that our linear
and squared term are not enough to pick up age-related differences in language capacities.
In column (6) we, therefore, add a full set of birth month dummies to our baseline. The
LATE effects for reading comprehension are somewhat stronger although the effects on the
marginal child are very similar to in the baseline. For vocabulary we find typically even
stronger positive effects for the set of compliers as well as the marginal child. One might
also worry that the observable or unobservable characteristics of subsequent immigrant
cohorts change over time and are correlated with both treatment and potential outcomes.
In addition to our years since migration fixed effects, we therefore include in column (7)
cohort of arrival fixed effects in 5-year bands (to avoid multicollinearity between years
since migration, year of arrival and survey year). The estimates indicate again strongly
positive returns to citizenship for the set of compliers as well as the marginal child.29
Finally, one might worry that parents adjust their fertility behavior in response to the
citizenship reform. In particular, parents may have delayed conception or birth to ensure
that their child is eligible for birthright citizenship. If parents delay conception, we should
see a spike in birth in January of 2000 and a (corresponding) decline of births in December
of 1999. Vital statistics, however, exhibit no discontinuity in the number of immigrant
children born in the time period before or after January 1, 2000 (see Appendix Figure A1
in Felfe et al. (2019)). Parents scheduled to deliver around the cutoff date could have
tried to delay the birth of their child until January 1, 2000. To rule this out, we drop
from our sample children born in December of 1999 and January of 2000 in column (8) of
Table 3.6. This additional restriction reduces the sample by only 50 children. The results
are again somewhat stronger for reading comprehension and very similar for vocabulary
compared in the baseline in column (1).30
29To check whether outliers in terms of parental age, year of arrival or child age have any impact on our
results, we also drop parents born before 1970 (N=1,514), parents arriving in Germany prior to 1975
(N=453) or children older than 19 (N=11) in additional checks. In all cases the results obtained are
similar to the baseline.
30Parents might also adjust their long-run fertility by reducing the number of children (see Avitabile
et al. 2014: for evidence on birthright citizenship), having children at a later age (see Gathmann
et al. 2019: for evidence on parental eligibility) and investing more in each child in line with the
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Across the many different specifications in Table 3.6, the p-values reported below the
estimates in each panel indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no essential
heterogeneity in only three out of the sixteen specifications at the 15% level.
quantity-quality tradeoff (Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). Such an adjustment in
parental behavior in response to the opportunities of host country citizenship are fully in line with
the mechanisms discussed in the introduction.
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3.6 Policy Simulations
The higher returns for children with the lowest resistance to treatment raises the ques-
tion whether a reform of immigration policy would carry any additional net benefits.
To explore this possibility, we calculate policy-relevant treatment effects (PRTE), which
characterize the effect of a change from the existing policy to an alternative policy regime
(Heckman and Vytlacil 2001, 2005; Carneiro et al. 2011).
The basic idea is to consider alternative policies that shift P (Z), the propensity to ob-
tain citizenship, but do not affect potential test scores or the unobservables determining
selection (U1, U0 and UN). Hence, knowing how the policy changes the distribution of
the propensity score Pα is sufficient to calculate the policy-relevant treatment effect of
the reform considered. As we cannot identify the full support of the propensity score,
we cannot estimate policy-relevant treatment effects that allow for arbitrary variation in
the take-up of citizenship. Instead, we estimate marginal versions of the PRTE, which
identify how small changes in take-up or eligibility might affect the returns to citizenship
for immigrant children.
For each alternative policy, we generate a counterfactual distribution of propensity scores.
Using the estimated coefficients from the second stage, we aggregate the MTE over those
individuals who switch treatment states in the alternative policy regime.31 We explore
the consequences of three alternative policy regimes. Our first counterfactual experiment
is to increase the likelihood of take-up. We perform the policy simulation in two ways:
the first counterfactual exercise adds 10 percentage points to the propensity score of each
child up to a maximum of one (hence, we set Pα = P + α where α = 0.1). The second
counterfactual raises the propensity score of each child by 10% (by setting Pα = P (1 +α)
where again α = 0.1). The results are contained in row (1) of Table 3.7. Encouraging
take-up among immigrant children has few additional gains in terms of language skills
irrespective of how we perturb the propensity score.32 With positive selection in gains and
high take-up (83% in our case), those induced to obtain citizenship in the counterfactual
scenario, have low or no returns to citizenship in this scenario.
Our second counterfactual scenario is a more restrictive citizenship policy that reduces
take-up. One way to achieve this to raise the actual or implicit costs of obtaining citi-
zenship (increase in application fees or waiting time) or by tightening eligibility criteria
(e.g. by requiring more than six years of basic education, for instance). Similar to the
first scenario, we implement this in two ways: by subtracting 10 or 20 percentage points
31See Table 1 in Carneiro et al. (2011) for the corresponding weights to calculate PRTE from MTE for
alternative policy changes.
32Note that the propensity score does not increase by 0.1 to 0.93 in the first counterfactual because we
set the maximum to one.
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from the propensity score or multiplying the propensity score by 0.9 and 0.8 respectively.
The results show that restricting take-up has positive effects in terms of language skills.
A small reduction in take-up does not reach statistical significance (see row (2a) in Table
3.7). In contrast, a stricter access to citizenship for immigrant children, which would
reduce take-up by up to 20 percentage points, has positive gains. Hence, inducing some
children not to obtain host country citizenship, would actually be beneficial in terms of
their language skills.
Our third counterfactual scenario is one where we implement a policy that grants birthright
citizenship to all second-generation immigrants irrespective of their parents’ years of res-
idency in Germany. This counterfactual scenario is thus close to the one followed in
traditional immigration countries like the United States or Canada, for instance. To
implement this counterfactual exercise, we set the eligibility indicator for birthright cit-
izenship to one for all immigrant children born in Germany. We then recalculate the
distribution of the propensity score and the policy-relecant treatment effect. Row (3) in
Table 3.7 shows that such a policy reform would imply a modest increase in take-up from
82% to 87% but imply sizable gains in terms of improved language skills.
Table 3.7: Simulations of Alternative Citizenship Policies
Propensity Score Policy-Relevant Treatment Effects
Sample Counterfactual 1 Counterfactual 2 Pa = P + a Pa = (1+a)*P Z[k]a = Z[k] +a
(A) Increase Citizenship Take-up 0.820 0.899 0.883 0.178 0.157
(by 10pp or 10%) [0.392] [0.368]
(B1) Restrict Access to Citizenship 0.820 0.720 0.737 0.415 0.337
(by 10pp or 10%) [0.319] [0.279]
(B2) Restrict Access to Citizenship 0.820 0.621 0.656 0.631 0.572
(by 20pp or 20%) [0.300]** [0.268]**
(C) Give Birthright Citizenship to
all Second-Generation Immigrants 0.820 0.866 0.528
[0.236]**
Notes: The table presents estimates of policy-relevant treatment effects on reading comprehension (measured by standardized test scores) from
three different policy experiments (described in the first column). The first policy experiment raises take-up of citizenship (row (A)); the second
experiment restricts take-up (row (B1) and (B2)). The third experiment grants automatic citizenship by birth to all immigrants born in Germany
(row (C)). To implement the first and second policy experiment, we calculate the PRTE for two alternative perturbations of the propensity
score: in the first case, we add X percentage points to each propensity score (MPRTE1). The second perturbation raises the propensity score
of each individual by X% (MPRTE2). For (A1). Column (1) shows the take-up rate in the sample, while columns (2) and (3) report the
counterfactual take-up rates in the alternative policy regime. Columns (4) and (5) then report the policy-relevant treatment effect (PRTE) of
the alternative policy, which is calculated by aggregating the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) for individuals induced to switch treatment in
the alternative policy regime. Column (6) shows the PRTE when we set eligibility for birthright citizenship, one of our instruments, to one for
all second-generation immigrants (MPRTE3). Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: National Educational Panel Study, Starting Cohorts 2-4, 2010-2017
3.7 Conclusion
Granting access to citizenship is one of the most fundamental integration policies a host
country can offer. In this paper, we estimate marginal returns (MTE’s) to citizenship for
children of immigrants. We study two important policy reforms in Germany, a country
that has substantially liberalized its citizenship policy in recent decades.
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The four different access options to citizenship introduced by the policy reforms in 1991
and 2000, birthright citizenship, an associated transitional rule, eligibility through parents
and individual eligibility, enable us to explore naturalization decisions in much detail. We
find offering birthright citizenship to be the most important access channel, while there
are also interesting effects of individual eligibility. Here, children react differently by place
of birth. Becoming eligible for naturalization in their own right encourages foreign-born
children much more successfully to naturalize than German-born children.
The offer to naturalize signals to immigrants that they fully belong to the host country
society, therefore, granting citizenship should encourage further investments in important
host country specific skills, such as local language. Exploring the effect of citizenship on
German language abilities in more detail, we indeed uncover promising effects. Granting
citizenship enables three important groups to overcome their weaker performances in lan-
guage tests or grades − immigrant girls, German-born children and children of younger
parents. Immigrant girls catch up to immigrant boys, who otherwise display more elabo-
rate vocabulary skills than girls. Also, German-born children are able to close the gap to
foreign-born kids in terms of reading abilities, vocabulary test results and German grades.
Usually, immigrant children with older parents display better German vocabulary than
children with younger parents, possibly because parents spent more time to improve their
child’s command of the German language. Obtaining citizenship, too, allows children
of younger parents to catch up and close the gap to children of older parents in terms
of vocabulary. Interestingly, we find evidence for positive selection into citizenship for
children of immigrants. This is in contrast to previous studies analyzing the effects of
the same German reforms for grown-up immigrants. Gathmann and Keller (2018), for
instance, find intermediate selection into citizenship for men and even negative selection
for women.
Understanding the language of instruction and knowing how to express oneself in class
is important to follow and understand all school subjects. Therefore, one might expect
improving language skills would lead to improvements in other skills or school subjects as
well. Interestingly, we only observe an improvement of math skills and a decrease in the
probability of grade retention, whereas most other skills like natural science or computer
abilities as well as further measures of school performance seem to be unaffected.
The fact that we observe positive selection into treatment, i.e. higher returns for children
with lowest resistance to treatment, raises the question whether a reform of immigration
policy would carry any additional net benefits. We explore this in three ways. Firstly,
we conduct a policy simulation that encourages citizenship take-up and find that this has
few additional gains. Due to the positive selection in gains and high-take up, those in-
duced to obtain citizenship have low or no returns to citizenship. Secondly, we simulate a
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policy that reduces take-up. The results show that restricting take-up has positive effects
in terms of language skills. In our third counterfactual scenario we implement a policy
that grants birthright citizenship to all second-generation immigrants irrespective of their
parent’s year of residency in Germany. This counterfactual scenario is thus close to the
one followed in traditional immigration countries. We find that such a policy reform in
Germany would imply a modest increase in take-up but imply sizeable gains in terms of
improved language skills.
Overall, this paper provides encouraging evidence on returns to citizenship for children,
yet, results on objective tests, grades and policy simulations point out that attention to
detail is key when deciding on the specific policy design.
141
3 Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill Development
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 The National Educational Panel Study
The National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) provides a comprehensive set of stan-
dardized competence tests (for a comprehensive overview see Weinert et al. 2011). We
focus on general competences such as reading, vocabulary, math, natural sciences and
ICT literacy, which are administered to all students. We have up to three measurements
of the language and math skills and up to two measurements for the evolution of a child’s
science and ICT skills. The tests are mostly pen-and-paper, cover age-adjusted topics
and levels of difficulties, and take about 30 minutes to complete. Tests contain between
21 to 89 items and each item is given the same weight. To make the tests comparable
across age groups, we standardize test scores to values between 0 and 100 in each starting
cohort and consider test outcomes in terms of standard deviations. Usually, two to three
of these competence tests are conducted in each wave. Assessments are conducted on two
consecutive days for younger children to reduce test fatigue.
Language skills: NEPS tests German language skills along several dimensions. We focus
in our analysis on tests for reading comprehension and vocabulary as these are available
for all cohorts in multiple waves (for a more detailed discussion see Berendes et al. 2013).
Reading comprehension tests consist of handling different text formats and comprehension.
The first part of the NEPS reading competence tests participant’s ability to understand
and interpret texts encountered in everyday situations: texts providing information or
instructions, discursive or literary texts, or advertisements. The test approach is very
similar to other large-scale education tests like PISA.33 In addition, NEPS tests the
cognitive requirements to handle texts like finding information in the text or drawing text-
related conclusions and assessments. Test items are either provided as multiple choice,
true-false answers or by matching the appropriate item like a headline to a text passage.
Tests take approximately 30 minutes and are conducted in a pen and paper-based in-
classroom situation for most age groups. Very young children undergo an adapted testing
procedure. They are tested in a one-to-one situation with an adult interviewer and tests
are situation oriented. More details on test content and test development for reading
comprehension can be found in Weinert et al. (2011) and Gehrer et al. (2013). Vocabulary
tests are based on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT, Dunn and Dunn (1981))
and similar to those in other large-scale panel studies (e.g. British Cohort Study or the
European Child Care and Education Study). More detailed information on tests for
receptive vocabulary, i.e. listening comprehension at the word level, can be found in
Hecker et al. (2015) and Berendes et al. (2013).
Math skills: The math tests are closely related to OECD’s Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) and Germany’s Mathematics Education Standards (GMES).
The goal of the latter is to harmonize educational standards across the sixteen federal
states, which have been developed by the National Council of Teachers of Mathemat-
ics (Weinert et al. 2011). NEPS tests both the mathematical knowledge and skills to
meet real-life challenges (as covered by the international PISA test) and the age-specific
33Yet, in contrast to the PISA test, NEPS does not include discontinuous text formats containing dia-
grams, graphs or tables because these require additional skills not closely related to reading compre-
hension.
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skills that students should master in a certain grade (according to the school curriculum).
Test items cover areas like quantity, change and relationships, space and shape, data and
chance, but also logical communication, argumentation and modeling using representa-
tional forms, mathematical problem solving, technical abilities and skills. Generally, the
math tests take 30 minutes and are conducted in a pen and paper-based multiple-choice
format in a class-room situation. Children in pre-K (kindergarten or first grade) undergo
an adapted testing procedure. They are tested in a one-to-one situation with an adult
interviewer and tests are situation oriented. A typical task in a kindergarten math test
would be as follows: the child is asked for the number of stones an interviewer has placed
in a bowl. The interviewer then adds a certain number of stones (always less than 10) and
asks the child again for the correct number of stones. More detailed information including
examples of test items can be found in Neumann et al. (2013), Weinert et al. (2011), and
Ehmke et al. (2009).
Science skills: The NEPS scientific literacy test uses concepts from the PISA test program,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the German educational
standards. The test covers knowledge of science (like knowledge of basic scientific concepts
and facts) and knowledge about science (like the understanding of scientific processes).
For each cohort, the final test takes 30 minutes and consists of 23 to 26 items. For younger
age groups (in kindergarten and first grade) tests are picture based and conducted in a
one-to-one testing situation with an adult interviewer. The interviewer leads the children
through a story (e.g. a kindergarten party where the child is asked to help solving scientific
problems) and asks them to choose the correct answer from a picture. Tests are pen-and-
paper multiple-choice tests and are conducted in a class-room situation. In rare cases,
computer- or web-based tests are conducted instead (Fuß et al. 2016). Details on test
procedures and test development can be found in Weinert et al. (2011) and Hahn et al.
(2013).
ICT literacy: The Test of Technological and Information Literacy (TILT) tests knowl-
edge and skills needed for a problem-oriented use of modern ICT. The underlying test
concepts comes from the PISA test framework and the International ICT Literacy Panel
(Digital Transformation: A Framework for ICT Literacy, International ICT Literacy Panel
(2002)). The test contains items on technological literacy (define, access, manage, create),
communication literacy (integrate, evaluate, communicate) and five different software ap-
plications (word processing, spreadsheets, presentation software, e-mail, search engines).
Tests are given as either pen-and-paper or computer- and web-based. A typical test item,
for instance, consists of a spreadsheet table with daily ticket sales. Participants are then
provided with a multiple choice answer for the formula to calculate weekly ticket sales
(for further details see Senkbeil et al. 2013; Weinert et al. 2011).
3.A.2 School Performance
We also use information on grades, track choice and grade retention to asses children’s
progress in school. These measures are interesting because they are informative about
how teachers and educational staff assess immigrant children with or without host country
citizenship. Yet, these dimensions are also more likely to vary across schools and across
states.
School Grades: Each year, students are asked about the mark in their last school report.
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Grades range from 1 (very good) to 6 (insufficient) where a grade of 4 or better is required
to pass the subject.
Grade Retention: Grade retention is quite common in Germany affecting about one in six
students over their school career. We use an indicator variable whether a student has ever
repeated a grade or not. As this information is not collected annually, we use the most
recent wave available for each student up to grade 5 for the child cohort (which we first
observe at age 4 in pre-K) and up to grade 10 for the teen and adolescent cohort (which we
observe since grade 5 and 9 respectively). We generally exclude all observations beyond
grade 10 because only students in the academic track to obtain a high school degree (A-
levels) remain in schools of general education, whereas the rest enters vocational training.
Track Recommendation and Choice: We code a variable equal to one if a student attends
the academic track, which leads up to a high school degree (A-levels). Based on teacher
recommendations, parents decide whether, after finishing primary school, their child goes
to Hauptschule (finishing after grade 9), Realschule (finishing after grade 10) or High
School (finishing with a high school degree after grade 12/13). In most states, parents
can go divert from the recommendation of teachers (except in six states where teacher
recommendations are binding). We also code a binary indicator whether the teacher
recommended academic track (leading up to a high school degree) or not. Both variables
on track choice are available in grade 5 for the child and teen cohorts and in grade 9 for
the adolescent cohort as we only observe them from grade 9 onward.
3.A.3 Additional Tables
Table 3.8: Citizenship Eligibility and Take-Up in NEPS Sample
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3.A.4 Additional Figures
Figure 3.6: Common Support for Subsamples with Test Scores
Panel A
Panel B
Panel C
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Figure 3.7: Marginal Treatment Effects for Math and Science Skills
Panel A
Panel B
Panel C
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